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What Did the Framers Know, and
When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington
Thomas Y. Davies †
I.

INTRODUCTION

Originalism is not without appeal in the abstract: why
not interpret constitutional provisions according to the original
meaning they carried when the text was framed? After all,
that is what the Framers agreed to. However, originalism as
practiced is another matter.
Original meaning – the public meaning that a
constitutional provision carried at the time the provision was
framed – is a historical phenomenon. As such, it can be
established only by valid historical evidence. 1 However, the

†
Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor and National Alumni Association
Distinguished Service Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. The author
thanks Professor Clifford S. Fishman, Professor Otis H. Stephens Jr., and Professor
George C. Thomas III for helpful comments on a draft of this article. Of course, the
author is solely responsible for any errors and for the views expressed. The quotations
of historical sources in this article are presented with the spelling, capitalization, and
punctuation of the originals, but use modern typefaces.
1
Supreme Court justices generally seem to accept this definition of “original
meaning,” although they often use the term to refer to what a provision meant at the
time of ratification, which is not necessarily the same thing. See infra notes 166-75
and accompanying text. I do not think it is worthwhile to distinguish between the
public meaning and the meaning the Framers “intended”; rather, because the criminal
procedure provisions drew upon settled understandings of legal rights, I believe those
two concepts are equivalent.
However, recovering the original meaning of a constitutional provision is
distinct from two other enterprises with which it is sometimes confused. First, original
meaning is distinct from a variety of textualism in which modern readers, using
framing-era dictionaries, attempt to parse the specific wording of the text for a precise
or “plain” meaning. Because the criminal procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights
employed phrases that were understood to invoke settled legal understandings of
rights, “reading” the constitutional text word-by-word today will not produce the
historical original meaning; rather, as a historical phenomenon – how the text was
actually understood – original meaning can be recovered only by reconstructing the
larger doctrinal and institutional context which the language of the text was meant to
invoke. See, e.g., infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
“witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause).
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history that one finds in Supreme Court criminal procedure
opinions tends to drastically understate the degree to which
doctrine and institutions have changed since the framing of the
Bill of Rights. 2 Indeed, much of what the justices have
announced as original meaning is merely historical fiction. 3
The historical claims regarding the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause in the 2004 decision Crawford v.

In addition, it is important to distinguish the recovery of the original
meaning from the study of the “origins” of the rights set out in the Bill of Rights. The
original meaning is the meaning that would have been attached to the text during the
framing-era itself. What actually came before is not directly relevant to the original
meaning, although the understanding that framing-era Americans had of history is
relevant (even if it was inaccurate) insofar as it informed the public understanding of
the texts. Unfortunately, far more historical research has been done on the “origins” of
constitutional rights than on the actual content of those rights in framing-era law. See,
e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1999) (discussing the
historical origins of several of the rights in the Bill of Rights but saying relatively little
about the legal content of those rights at the time of the framing itself).
I address only the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause
itself in this article. However, I should note that Professor Jason Mazzone posed an
interesting question at the Brooklyn symposium: given that the Sixth Amendment was
not originally intended to apply to state proceedings, but became applied only through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, should the relevant “original
meaning” be that of the original Sixth Amendment itself, or of the understanding of the
Sixth Amendment’s protections when the Fourteenth Amendment was framed after the
Civil War? The latter might seem more appropriate – if one assumes that the “due
process of law” clause of the Fourteenth was actually intended to incorporate the rights
protected in the federal Bill. I do not attempt to deal with these questions in this
article; however, they reflect how much criminal procedure protections have changed
over time.
2
One reason that erroneous claims regarding historical criminal procedure
are commonplace in judicial opinions is that there has been far more discontinuity in
that area than is generally recognized. The criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of
Rights were framed to preserve the accusatory procedure that had come to full
development during the eighteenth century. However, during the nineteenth century
American courts abandoned accusatory procedure and replaced it with investigatory
procedure that allowed more aggressive attempts to suppress crime, especially the
development of modern policing. Then, during the early twentieth century, the federal
Supreme Court reformulated constitutional criminal procedure doctrines to
accommodate new criminal investigative institutions, especially modern policing. The
result is that modern doctrine, and the historical claims in modern criminal procedure
opinions, often bear little resemblance to framing-era procedure. For an overview of
the transformation from accusatory to investigatory criminal procedure, see Thomas Y.
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 418-35 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Atwater]; see also
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
724-34 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth] (describing the discontinuity of
search and seizure law). See also infra notes 328-43 and accompanying text.
3
For some examples of erroneous originalist claims in criminal procedure
opinions, see infra notes 34, 319, 326, 343; see also Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at
262-66.
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Washington 4 provide the latest installment of fictional
originalism.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
purported to find that the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause limited the scope of the confrontation
right to “testimonial” statements comparable to framing-era
depositions of witnesses to crimes. Additionally, Justice Scalia
asserted that framing-era doctrine subjected the admission of
an out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness in a
criminal trial to a strict cross-examination rule: the statement
was admissible if, but only if, the defendant had had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness. I argue
in this article that neither of those claims was validly derived
from history.
The former claim limiting the scope of the right to
testimonial statements amounts to a political choice posing as
a historical mandate. The more accurate historical statement
is that the Framers did not address whether the Confrontation
Clause should apply to nontestimonial hearsay evidence
because they never anticipated that informal hearsay
statements could come to be viewed as valid evidence in
criminal trials – as they have.
The latter claim regarding a rigid cross-examination
rule is simply erroneous history. Framing-era authorities did
not articulate a general rule regarding the admissibility of
depositions of unavailable witnesses. Rather, those authorities
differentiated between misdemeanor and felony prosecutions.
The authorities did not indicate that there was any legal
authority for taking witness depositions at all in misdemeanor
cases; hence, it is doubtful that depositions would have been
admissible in misdemeanor trials even in the unlikely event
that there had been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
The situation was quite different in felony cases, in
which more importance was accorded to obtaining a conviction.
Two statutes enacted during the reign of Mary Tudor, the socalled Marian statutes, required that justices of the peace make
written records of the sworn depositions of witnesses of a felony
at the time an arrest was made and send those depositions on

4
541 U.S. 36 (2004). For another commentary critical of the history in
Crawford, see 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6371.2, at 29-30 (Supp. 2005).
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to the felony trial court. 5 Moreover, these sworn Marian
depositions, which were a standard aspect of felony
prosecutions, were understood to be admissible in felony trials,
without regard to whether there had been an opportunity for
cross-examination, if a witness became unavailable prior to
trial. Indeed, depositions were inadmissible in felony cases
only in the odd instance when they were improperly taken
outside of the statutory procedure. Thus, because Marian
procedure was standard for felony prosecutions in framing-era
America as well as in England, the use of Marian witness
depositions as evidence in framing-era felony trials disproves
Scalia’s claim that the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause included a rigid cross-examination rule. In contrast to
Justice Scalia’s claim, it does not appear that a prior
opportunity for cross-examination had any effect on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of the deposition of an
unavailable witness in a framing-era criminal trial.
By way of background, let me briefly review the
confrontation issue in Crawford, and describe the originalist
claims Justice Scalia made in his opinion for the Court. Then I
will sketch out my criticisms of Justice Scalia’s historical
claims in more detail before moving on to the historical
evidence.
A.

The Confrontation Issue in Crawford

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . . .” 6 The specific issue in Crawford was whether the
admission in a murder trial of a tape recording of a statement
the defendant’s wife had made during a police interrogation
had violated the defendant’s right under that Clause. The
wife’s hearsay statement tended to undercut the defendant’s
claim of self-defense, and the defendant was convicted of
murder. 7 However, the wife could not be called as a witness or
cross-examined during the trial because of the Washington

5

See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing and citing these

6

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.

statutes).
7
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state marital privilege. 8 Hence, the defendant asserted that
admission of his wife’s hearsay statement had violated his
constitutional right to confront an adverse witness. 9
When the defendant’s appeal was heard in the
Washington Supreme Court, the controlling authority
regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause to
hearsay statements was the United States Supreme Court’s
1980 decision Ohio v. Roberts. 10 Under the flexible approach
set out in Roberts, all hearsay statements were subject to
confrontation analysis, but a hearsay statement was
nevertheless admissible if the statement bore “‘adequate
indicia of reliability’” either by falling within a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception or because of other “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.” 11 Applying that standard, the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that admission of the
wife’s hearsay statement to police did not contravene the
Confrontation Clause. 12
The United States Supreme Court reversed. All of the
justices agreed that the wife’s statement should have been
inadmissible even under Roberts, 13 but they split as to validity
of the Roberts standard itself. In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were of the view that
the Roberts standard was sufficient. However, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, condemned Roberts as a “fundamental
failure” as a constitutional standard. 14
8
See id. at 40 (noting that the Washington state marital privilege “bars a
spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent,” but “does not extend to a
spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception”).
The
Washington formulation of the privilege contrasts with the broader formulation of the
privilege in framing-era law which appears to have barred any use of a spouse’s
statement. Thus, it does not appear that the specific confrontation issue that arose in
Crawford could have arisen during the framing era. See infra note 18.
9
The Washington Supreme Court accepted the defendant’s claim that the
admission of his wife’s statement conflicted with his right to confrontation, and
reasoned that “forcing the defendant to choose between the marital privilege and
confronting his spouse presents an untenable Hobson’s choice.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at
42 n.2 (quoting State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002)). Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court “express[ed] no opinion on these matters.” Id.
10
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
11
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
12
Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42.
13
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (“We readily concede that we could resolve this
case by simply reweighing the ‘reliability factors’ under Roberts and finding that Sylvia
Crawford’s statement falls short.”).
14
Id. at 67 (“[W]e view this as one of those rare cases in which the result
below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion
[regarding the application of the confrontation right].”).
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To replace Roberts, Justice Scalia announced “the crossexamination rule”: 15 a hearsay statement that is testimonial in
nature may not be admitted in a criminal trial unless the
person who made the statement is actually unavailable to
testify and the defendant had had at least a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the unavailable witness regarding the
statement. 16 Moreover, Scalia described the cross-examination
rule announced in Crawford as though it were derived from the
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. 17
B.

Justice Scalia’s Originalist Claims

Although Justice Scalia apparently did not specifically
inquire whether the Framers could have anticipated that a
statement by a wife could ever be admitted against her
husband, 18 he did assert a more general claim that two aspects
15

Id. at 46.
Id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”).
17
See, e.g., id. at 59 (referring to the “Framers’ understanding: Testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine”); id. at 68 (comparing cross-examination rule to the “Framers’ design”).
Although six other justices joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court, I
think it is nevertheless appropriate to treat the originalist analysis as Scalia’s own
work. It seems unlikely that other justices played a significant role in formulating the
historical claims. For example, it seems unlikely that the historical aspects were
discussed in any detail at the justices’ conference. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 289-91 (1987) (suggesting that
conference discussions tend to be brief). Moreover, available information suggests that
justices who are not authoring an opinion make relatively few suggestions about the
drafts of opinions that are circulated among the justices. (Some years ago, I examined
the files of a number of salient criminal procedure Supreme Court cases when Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s papers were first made public at the Library of Congress.
Although the practice in the Court is for justices to circulate suggested changes in
opinions by a letter which goes to all of the justices, and such letters were included in
Marshall’s papers, I was struck by how few changes were actually suggested, even in
cases that were widely regarded as being quite significant.) Hence, although it is not
impossible that one or more other justices had significant input, I think it is
appropriate to view the claims about original meaning in Crawford as Justice Scalia’s
own work.
18
It seems doubtful that the Framers could have anticipated the specific
issue that arose in Crawford because framing-era evidence doctrine seems to have
strictly prohibited any use of a statement made by one spouse as evidence against the
other. For example, a leading eighteenth-century treatise on criminal procedure stated
the following:
Sect. 16. As to the first of these particulars, viz. Whether a husband or Wife
may be witnesses for or against one another: It seems agreed, That the
Husband and Wife being as one and same Person in Affection and Interest,
can no more give Evidence for one another, in any Case whatsoever than for
themselves; and that regularly the one shall not be admitted to give Evidence
16
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of the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause
mandated the cross-examination rule. 19 First, Scalia asserted
that Roberts had deviated from the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause insofar as it applied confrontation
analysis to all hearsay evidence. According to Scalia, the
Framers were concerned with more formal types of
“testimonial” hearsay, such as depositions, 20 but not with
informal or spontaneous hearsay statements. 21 Although he
left a precise definition of “testimonial hearsay” for another
day, 22 his opinion conveyed a strong impression that the
Confrontation Clause should regulate only the admissibility of
those more formal out-of-court statements that amount to
“testimonial” hearsay. 23 Nevertheless, Scalia also asserted that
contemporary police interrogation bears “a striking
resemblance” to the taking of a witness’s deposition by a
framing-era justice of the peace, 24 and therefore concluded that
the wife’s hearsay statement in Crawford was sufficiently
“testimonial” to be subject to confrontation analysis. 25
against the other, nor the Examination of the one be made Use of against the
other, by Reason of the implacable Dissension which might be caused by it,
and the great Danger of Perjury from taking the Oaths of Persons under so
great a Bias, and the extreme Hardship of the Case. . . .
2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 431, 432 (1771) [hereinafter HAWKINS,
PLEAS (1771)] (emphasis added, citations omitted); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 607-08 (Thomas Leach ed. 1787) [hereinafter HAWKINS, PLEAS (1787)]
(emphasis added, notes omitted). The only exceptions Hawkins noted were situations
in which a crime or threat was committed by one spouse against the other. Id. Several
of the justice of the peace manuals used in colonial and framing-era America reprinted
this statement. See, e.g., RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE
OF THE PEACE 145 (entry for “Husband & Wife”) (Williamsburg, 1774); JAMES PARKER,
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 171 (entry for “Evidence”) (New York City, 1788).
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (“[H]istory supports two inferences about the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment”).
20
See, e.g., id. at 50 (asserting that “the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused”).
21
Id. at 51 (asserting that “not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s
core concerns”).
22
Id. at 68.
23
See the statements quoted infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text. But
see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (noting that the Court’s decision in Crawford “casts doubt”
on the Court’s previous refusal to limit the Confrontation Clause to “testimonial”
hearsay, although noting that Crawford did not directly raise or “definitively resolve”
the issue).
24
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. I argue below that this comparison is flawed.
See infra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
25
Id. at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”). Justice Scalia’s
opinion did not differentiate between custodial and noncustodial interrogations. See id.
at 53 n.4 (“We use the term “interrogation” in its colloquial, rather than any technical
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Second, Justice Scalia asserted that Roberts was
inconsistent with the original meaning insofar as it assessed
the admissibility of testimonial hearsay according to a
relativistic standard. According to Scalia, both historical
English cases and post-framing American state-court cases
revealed a rigid framing-era cross-examination rule under
which “the Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had
Thus,
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 26
because the defendant in Crawford had not had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the adverse
statement, Scalia concluded that the admission of the
unavailable witness’s statement in the defendant’s trial had
violated the defendant’s confrontation right. 27
Notably, the two sets of historical claims that Justice
Scalia made in Crawford carry opposing implications. The
rigidity of the cross-examination rule adopted in Crawford
appears to imbue the confrontation right with considerably
more protection for criminal defendants than had been the case
under the relativistic formulation of the confrontation right in
Roberts (although Crawford did not define precisely what
would constitute a prior opportunity for cross-examination or
indicate whether assistance of counsel would be a necessary
aspect of such an opportunity).
However, the explicit
limitation of the confrontation right to “testimonial hearsay,”
coupled with the incomplete definition of that concept in
Crawford, may leave room for a future Court to define
“testimonial hearsay” fairly narrowly and thereby limit the
significance of the confrontation right.
I leave it to others to prognosticate as to which aspect of
Crawford will ultimately turn out to be the more important.
Likewise, although I am inclined to think that Crawford may
legal, sense.”). However, the opinion also did not define “police interrogation” except to
include a “cf.” citation to a case discussing the nature of “custodial interrogation” for
purposes of applying Miranda warnings. See id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300-01 (1980)). That citation is notable insofar as Innis held that the police
conduct in that case did not amount to “interrogation” even though the defendant
responded to the police conduct by making an incriminating statement.
Lower courts have adopted a wide variety of broader or narrower
definitions of “police interrogation” for purposes of applying Crawford. See, e.g., JONES
ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 28:20b (Clifford S. Fishman ed., 7th ed. 2003 &
Supp. forthcoming Nov. 2005).
26
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
27
Id. at 68-69.
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well be an improvement over the extreme flexibility of Roberts
– at least insofar as it imposes a cross-examination opportunity
standard – I leave it to others to explore the policy
ramifications of the majority’s choice. My concern in this
article is with Justice Scalia’s history. 28
I argue that the historical claims that Justice Scalia
made in Crawford were invalid, and that Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion gave a more accurate picture of
the actual history (although Rehnquist’s analysis also reflected
serious historical errors). History does not mandate the rigid
cross-examination rule that Scalia articulated in Crawford.
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that an opportunity for crossexamination affected the admissibility of depositions in
criminal trials under framing-era law. Rather, the historical
errors and distortions in Scalia’s originalist rationale simply

28

Although there does not appear to have been any consideration of the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause in the Washington state court
proceedings in Crawford, several of the briefs filed in the Supreme Court did make
historical arguments. Petitioner Crawford’s brief made historical claims to the effect
that framing-era law made an opportunity for cross-examination a categorical
requirement for the admission of an out-of-court statement. See Brief of Petitioner at
12-20, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) [hereinafter
Petitioner’s Brief]. For a discussion of several of the more significant historical errors
in petitioner’s brief, see infra notes 84, 121, 298. Similar historical claims were also
made in an amicus brief filed by nine law professors. See Motion for Leave to File and
Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark, James J. Duane, Richard D.
Friedman, Norman Garland, Gary M. Maveal, Bridget McCormack, David A Moran,
Christopher B. Mueller, and Roger C. Park in Support of Petitioner, at 8-11, Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) [hereinafter Professors’ Brief]. For a
discussion of several of the more significant errors in the historical claims that the
professors’ brief made regarding the supposed cross-examination rule, see infra notes
84, 88, 103, 298. Although Justice Scalia’s assertions overlapped with the claims made
in those briefs to some degree, his opinion introduced several crucial but erroneous
claims that did not appear in any brief. See infra notes 121, 153.
In addition, both the professors’ brief and the brief filed by the Solicitor
General made historical arguments to the effect that the original scope of the
Confrontation Clause was limited to only “testimonial” statements. See Professors’
Brief, supra, at 11; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-13, Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the United
States]. Those claims were roughly comparable to those made by Scalia on the same
topic. See infra note 322.
Respondent State of Washington’s brief did not make any historical
arguments. See generally Brief of Respondent, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) (No. 02-9410). That was also the case with Brief of Amici Curiae The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The American Civil Liberties Union and The
ACLU of Washington in Support of Petitioner. See generally Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, and the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of
Washington in Support of Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No.
02-9410).
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underscore the inappropriateness of originalism as a mode of
justifying constitutional criminal procedure rulings.
C.

The Organization of This Article

In part II, which comprises most of this article, I
address the specific historical claim that Justice Scalia made in
Crawford – that a rigid cross-examination rule was part of the
American understanding of the “common-law” confrontation
right at the time the federal Bill of Rights was adopted. With
regard to the historical English evidence, Scalia asserted that
the Court of King’s Bench created a broad cross-examination
rule in the 1696 ruling King v. Paine, 29 in which the judges
ruled that a deposition of a deceased witness could not be
introduced as evidence in a misdemeanor case. He also
asserted that any doubts regarding the broad crossexamination rule created in Paine were removed by a set of
three later English cases decided in 1787, 1789, and 1791. 30
Thus, he asserted that a rigid cross-examination was part of
the understanding of the confrontation right when the
Confrontation Clause was ratified in 1791. I argue that Scalia
misinterpreted Paine and that the later 1787, 1789, and 1791
cases were actually irrelevant to the original understanding of
the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia’s interpretation of Paine was flawed
because he failed to give adequate consideration to important
differences between misdemeanor procedure, which was at
issue in Paine, and felony procedure, which was not. Framingera law assigned substantially different standards and
procedures to felony and misdemeanor prosecutions.
In
particular, the so-called Marian statutes that applied to
felonies required that a justice of the peace take and record the
sworn information of witnesses of a felony at the time an arrest
was made. The written record of a witness’s statement during
Marian procedure was commonly referred to as a “deposition”
or, sometimes, as an “examination.” The Marian statutes also
29
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45 (citing 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696)).
However, the evidentiary ruling in that case was actually also reported in four other
case reports. See infra note 104. The dates given in the various reports of Paine vary
from 1695 to 1697; however, I have opted to follow Crawford and use 1696. See id.
30
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47 (citing King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 45961, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (Old Bailey 1787); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 50204, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (Old Bailey 1789); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168
Eng. Rep. 383, 383-84 (Old Bailey 1791)).
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required that the justice of the peace send the written record of
a witness deposition to the felony trial court. Because a
Marian deposition was viewed as a judicial record of sworn
testimony, a Marian deposition could be admitted into evidence
in a felony trial if the witness had become unavailable. In
contrast, there was no similar statutory authority for taking or
recording pretrial statements of witnesses in misdemeanor
cases. 31
In Crawford, Justice Scalia glossed over the important
differences between felony and misdemeanor procedure and
misinterpreted Paine in two significant respects. First, Scalia
misstated the implication that Paine carried for misdemeanor
prosecutions. Paine ruled that the deposition of a deceased
witness could not be admitted in a misdemeanor trial. Scalia
focused narrowly on one statement in one of the five reports of
the deposition issue in that case in which the judges of the
Court of King’s Bench were reported to have noted that the
deposition could not be admitted because the defendant had not
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the deceased witness.
On that basis, Scalia interpreted Paine to mean that the
deposition would have been admissible if there had been a prior
opportunity
for
cross-examination.
However,
that
interpretation ignored other reports of the case in which the
judges concluded that there was no legal authority for anyone
to even take a deposition in a misdemeanor case. Hence, it
seems likely that Paine was actually understood to mean that
depositions could not be taken or admitted in misdemeanor
cases at all, and there does not seem to be any indication that
depositions were taken or offered as evidence in misdemeanor
cases after the Paine decision. Thus, Scalia erred when he
interpreted Paine as though it meant that a prior opportunity
for cross-examination would make a deposition admissible in a
misdemeanor case. It appears more likely that Paine actually
ended the taking of depositions in misdemeanor cases
altogether. 32
Second, Justice Scalia misinterpreted Paine insofar as
he treated it as a decision that restricted the admissibility of a
Marian deposition of an unavailable witness in a felony case.
The judges in Paine explicitly recognized that the misdemeanor
31

For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
32
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
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case before them did not implicate the rule that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses were admissible in felony
cases, and they explicitly reaffirmed the admissibility of
Marian depositions in felony cases. That same understanding
of Paine is also evident in important historical sources that
Scalia downplayed or omitted: the leading eighteenth-century
treatises on criminal procedure and evidence explicitly
affirmed the rule that a Marian deposition of an unavailable
witness was admissible in a felony trial and also explicitly
noted that Paine did not alter that rule. Moreover, although
the treatises did state certain conditions for admitting a
Marian deposition (for example, that the justice or his clerk
had to swear to its authenticity), none suggested that the
admissibility of a Marian deposition depended upon an
opportunity for cross-examination. Thus, Paine did not create
any cross-examination rule applicable to felony trials, either. 33
The bottom line is that Paine did not create any crossexamination rule at all. There simply was no valid historical
basis for Justice Scalia’s claim that Paine made an opportunity
for cross-examination a general condition for admitting a
deposition of an unavailable witness in a criminal trial.
Justice Scalia’s reliance on the 1787, 1789, and 1791
English cases was also misplaced. For one thing, he made a
prochronistic error 34 when he treated the English cases decided
33

For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
34
A “prochronism” is the form of anachronism that occurs when more recent
concepts or events are erroneously projected backward into an earlier period. Because
interest in constitutional history often seems to be prompted by a desire to see what
implications the historical meaning of a text might have for modern issues, there is
often a temptation to impose modern concepts on the Framers’ understandings, and to
cite sources that the Framers did not have access to at the time of the framing as
evidence of the Framers’ understanding.
Prochronistic errors arising from a failure to apprise when a statement
actually became accessible are scattered throughout the U.S. Reports. For example,
Justice Bradley put the interpretation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments off to
a false start in Boyd v. United States when he assumed that the American Framers had
been familiar with a passage attributed to Lord Camden in a 1765 English case. 116
U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886). The Framers probably were aware of the case; however, the
statement that Bradley quoted had not appeared in the report of the case that had
been published in 1770, when the controversy over general warrants was still hot. See
Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 726-27. Instead, that passage was added to a
later report of the case that was not published until more than a decade later, by which
time the controversy over the legality of general warrants had been settled, and state
declarations of rights had already prohibited use of general warrants. Id. Hence, it
seems quite doubtful that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have been
familiar with the passage upon which Bradley based Boyd, and the idea involved – that
a search of papers amounts to a compelled confession – did not appear in other sources.
Id.
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in 1787, 1789, and 1791, as though they constituted evidence of
the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause. That
claim involved two errors. First, the relevant outside date for
assessing original meaning is the date when the text was
framed by the First Congress, not the date of ratification. The
state legislatures had authority to decide whether to accept or
reject the Bill of Rights proposed by the First Congress, not to
Second,
alter the meaning of the proposed provisions. 35
Americans had no access to the content of an English decision
until a published report of the decision became available in
America, but none of the reports of the three cases Scalia cited
were published in London early enough for them to have come
to the attention of the American Framers prior to the framing
of the Confrontation Clause in 1789. Indeed, the 1791 case was
not published until 1792, which was even after the ratification.
It is a virtual certainty that the Framers were unaware of any
of those cases when the Confrontation Clause was framed. 36
In addition, contrary to the impression created in
Justice Scalia’s opinion, none of the three cases rejected the
admissibility of a Marian deposition of an unavailable witness.
The 1787 case admitted a deposition. The 1789 and 1791 cases
merely ruled that a deposition that had not been taken at the
time of arrest in accordance with Marian procedure was
Failure to attend to appropriate editions of treatises can also lead to
prochronistic errors. For example, the Supreme Court misinterpreted the original
understanding of the “breach of the peace” arrest standard in the Speech and Debate
Clause of Article I in Williamson v. United States, as a result of mistakenly treating a
statement from Blackstone on the subject as though it were what Blackstone had
written in the first edition of his Commentaries. 207 U.S. 425, 435-46 (1908). Actually,
Blackstone had originally taken the opposite view, but flip-flopped on the issue in later
editions to accommodate a statute passed by the English Tory Parliament. See Davies,
Atwater, supra note 2, at 292-300. A more recent example of this sort of prochronistic
error occurred in Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court in Atwater v. Lago Vista. 532
U.S. 318 (2001). Souter treated statements regarding a pre-framing authority that
appeared in nineteenth-century editions of treatises as though they showed that the
same statement had appeared in the earlier editions of the treatises. Id. at 330-32.
However, that was not the case; the significant statements had actually only been
added to the nineteenth-century editions. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2 at 310-14.
A “parachronism” is the opposite form of anachronism, and occurs when
concepts or events from an earlier period are projected forward into a more recent
period. Parachronistic errors seem to pose less of a threat to constitutional history, but
they sometimes do appear in Supreme Court opinions. For example, Justice Souter
also relied on early colonial statutes that likely had become obsolete by the eighteenth
century in describing framing-era arrest standards in Atwater. See id. at 341-44.
35
I also argue that English cases and doctrines first published after 1775
generally cannot constitute valid evidence of original meaning. See infra notes 155-59
and accompanying text.
36
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 160-82 and accompanying text.
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extrajudicial and thus could not constitute valid, sworn
evidence. The most that can be said of these cases is that the
1789 and 1791 cases hinted at the possibility that crossexamination might be allowed during a Marian deposition
itself. However, I can find no similar suggestion that crossexamination was part of Marian procedure in any published
source that Americans could have had access to prior to the
framing of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, regardless of how
one interprets those cases, they cannot constitute valid
evidence of the original understanding of the Confrontation
Clause. 37
Turning to the historical American evidence, Justice
Scalia also asserted that “numerous early state decisions”
showed that the Framers had rejected the admissibility of
Marian depositions unless there had been an opportunity for
cross-examination. 38 However, the evidence for that claim
collapses on inspection. Although one post-framing 1794 North
Carolina case does lend support to Scalia’s cross-examination
rule, that is the only case among those cited by Scalia that was
both germane and “early” in any meaningful sense. In
addition, the significance of that lone post-framing case is more
than offset by highly relevant pre-framing evidence that Scalia
overlooked: justice of the peace manuals that were printed and
used in framing-era America usually included quotations from
the English treatises that endorsed the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses in felony trials – without
mentioning cross-examination. Thus, the available evidence
indicates that the admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses was still accepted as settled law when
the Confrontation Clause was framed. 39
Justice Scalia’s history was correct insofar as he noted
that English commentators did advocate a cross-examination
rule for Marian depositions shortly after the framing of the
American Bill of Rights, that the English Parliament did enact
a cross-examination standard for the admission of depositions
in 1848, and that some American state courts imported that
rule.
However, those post-framing developments hardly
constitute valid evidence of the original meaning of the
37
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 183-216 and accompanying text.
38
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 54 n.5 (2004).
39
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 231-69.

2005]

FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM IN CRAWFORD

119

Confrontation Clause. Rather, the historical record indicates
that Scalia prochronistically imposed a post-framing
development on the original understanding of the
Confrontation Clause.
Hence, the cross-examination rule
announced in Crawford was only fictional originalism. 40
In part III, I turn to Justice Scalia’s broader claim
regarding the scope of the original Confrontation Clause. As
noted above, Justice Scalia asserted that the confrontation
right should apply only to “testimonial” hearsay because the
Framers were concerned only with formal types of hearsay
such as depositions. However, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
correctly noted in his concurring opinion, framing-era sources
did not distinguish between “testimonial” and “nontestimonial”
hearsay. Indeed, during the framing era it was still blackletter law that hearsay was “no evidence.” The modern
conception of hearsay and the variety of exceptions under
which hearsay is now often admitted as evidence in criminal
trials were at most only embryonic at the time of the framing. 41
The more accurate historical statement is that the Framers
never had occasion to contemplate whether or how the
confrontation right should apply to what today might be viewed
as informal or nontestimonial hearsay because they never
imagined that informal hearsay could become admissible
evidence. Thus, Scalia’s assertion that the Confrontation
Clause was not intended to address informal hearsay expressed
a political choice, not a mandate from history. 42
I conclude in part IV by arguing that the historical
errors and distortions in Crawford provide significant
additional evidence that originalism is a defective and
undisciplined mode of justification for criminal procedure
decisions. I argue that there is now so much distance between
modern doctrine and the framing-era law that shaped the
authentic original meaning of the criminal procedure
provisions of the Bill of Rights that the authentic history rarely
connects in any meaningful way with modern criminal
procedure issues. I also argue that claims regarding original
meaning in Supreme Court opinions tend to mask the genuine
differences between historical and contemporary doctrine,
40
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 217-230.
41
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
42
For a discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra
notes 273-322.
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rather than illuminate the authentic history. Hence, the whole
originalist project of justifying modern constitutional criminal
procedure rulings by invoking historical doctrine results in
distorted history and false justifications for criminal procedure
decisions. 43
II.

THE FICTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE “CROSSEXAMINATION RULE”

As noted above, Justice Scalia condemned the Roberts
approach to the confrontation right as being too relativistic. He
based that condemnation partly on a general assertion that
constitutional rights should take the form of rules, 44 and partly
on a historical claim that the framing-era confrontation right
preserved in the Confrontation Clause included an absolute
cross-examination rule that admitted no exceptions.
In
contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the confrontation
right was not inflexible, but rather was always subject to
exceptions. 45 I think Rehnquist’s view was closer to the
authentic history on this point – although the evidence he
presented was also underdeveloped and flawed in a variety of
ways. 46

43
I discuss original meaning as a mode of justifying decisions rather than
deciding cases because there are reasons to doubt whether the rationales presented in
Supreme Court opinions are accurate indicators of the reasons why the justices voted
as they did; rather, the rationales stated in opinions serve as a sort of test of whether
the decision can be justified. Indeed, if one considers the actual decision-making
process in the Court, it seems unlikely that an originalist justification that appears in
an opinion would have been formulated in any detail until after the case had been
decided in conference, and the opinion had been assigned to an individual justice. See
supra note 17.
Constitutional law is not about the motivations justices have for voting as
they do. Rather, constitutional law consists of the justifications they offer for having
done so. One may hope that the need to provide a justification introduces some degree
of discipline. However, that hope is defeated if the justices simply invent fictional
history and blame the decision on the Framers.
44
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68 (“By replacing categorical constitutional
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague
standards are manipulable . . . .”).
45
See, e.g., id. at 73 (“Between 1700 and 1800 the rules regarding the
admissibility of out-of-court statements were still being developed. There were always
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion, and it is not clear to me that the Framers
categorically wanted to eliminate further ones.” (citation omitted)).
46
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s response was underdeveloped insofar as he
overlooked important evidence and was also defective insofar as he was as prone to
using prochronistic sources that were not actually available to the Framers as Scalia.
See infra notes 162, 163, 181, 272.
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Justice Scalia’s Claims Regarding English Authorities

Justice Scalia initially set the stage for asserting a rigid
understanding of the confrontation right by discussing “the
historical background of the Clause.” 47 In particular, he
recounted that the common-law confrontation right had
emerged in the wake of several prominent historical treason
trials in which that right had been denied, and specifically
invoked the famous trials of Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton, John Lilburn, and Sir John Fenwick in
seventeenth-century England. 48 He also invoked the 1768-69
civil-law smuggling prosecution of John Hancock in the Boston
vice-admiralty court. 49
Justice Scalia’s rendition of this general history was
flawed in several ways, 50 and he oversimplified history insofar
47

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
Id. at 43 (citing Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16, 24
(1603) [hereinafter Raleigh’s Case]; The Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 How. St.
Tr. 869, 875-76 (1554); The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr.
1315, 1318-22, 1329 (Star Chamber 1637)). See also id. at 45 (citing Proceedings
Against John Fenwick, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-92 (Attainder in House of Commons
1696) [hereinafter Fenwick’s Case]).
49
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48 (citing Sewall v. Hancock (Oct. 1768-Mar. 1769),
in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 194, 207 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zoebel eds.
1965) (reprinting Adams’s notes on the prosecution of Hancock; there is no formal case
report)). See also infra note 52.
50
Although Justice Scalia purported to describe the Framers’ understanding
of confrontation, he erroneously based his description upon a number of sources that
the Framers plainly had no access to. For example, Scalia based some of his assertions
about Raleigh’s trial on a nineteenth-century English work. See, e.g., Crawford, 541
U.S. at 44 (citing 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435 (London 1832) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1832)] (reprinted Philadelphia 1835 [hereinafter CRIMINAL TRIALS
(1835)]) (quoting a statement by Raleigh)); id. (citing CRIMINAL TRIALS (1832), supra, at
520 (quoting a statement by one of Raleigh’s judges)); id. at 52 (citing CRIMINAL TRIALS
(1832), supra, at 430) (stating that Cobham’s statement in Raleigh’s trial was
unsworn). However, Jardine indicated both in the preface to his book and in an
introductory note to the section on Raleigh’s trial itself that he had used materials not
previously published as well as prior published reports. See CRIMINAL TRIALS (1835),
supra, at 38-39, 400 n.*. Thus, in citing points from Jardine’s account, Scalia employed
a work that was unknown to the Framers as evidence of the Framers’ understanding.
See also other instances in which Scalia erroneously relied upon sources unavailable to
the Framers set out infra notes 162-64, 176-77 and accompanying text.
Scalia also repeated some claims about the impact of these cases that are
likely exaggerated. For example, he cited Dean John Henry Wigmore’s claim that the
1696 attainder proceeding in the House of Commons against Sir John Fenwick “must
have burned into the general consciousness the vital importance of the rule securing
the right of cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing “3 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1364 at 22-23 n.54” (1923) [hereinafter 3 WIGMORE] (discussing Fenwick’s
Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537 (Attainder in the House of Commons 1696))). However, “the
general consciousness” is not a substitute, in claims about original meaning, for
evidence that the Framers were actually knowledgeable about a case. One can safely
assume that the Framers were familiar with the fact that the right of confrontation
48
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as he conveyed the impression that the right to confrontation in
the famous cases was understood solely or primarily in terms of
cross-examination. 51 Likewise, he oversimplified when he
described American opposition to civil-law inquisitorial
procedure as though it had been narrowly focused on the use of
depositions as evidence. 52 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that
had been abused in seventeenth century political trials in England, but I know of no
evidence they were conversant with Fenwick’s trial itself, and I doubt Wigmore knew of
any, either.
51
We may now think of confrontation primarily in terms of crossexamination, but commentators have questioned whether that is historically accurate.
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause:
A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 572-77 (1992)
(discussing the procedural functions of the right to confront adverse witnesses).
Cross-examination was not necessarily the issue in some of the famous
cases. Justice Scalia asserted that “the problem” in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh was
that “the judges refused to allow Raleigh to confront Cobham [who had given a
damning out-of-court statement against Raleigh] in court, where he could crossexamine him and try to expose his accusation as a lie.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
However, the report of the case does not show that Raleigh sought to cross-examine
Cobham. Rather, Raleigh said that if Cobham would accuse him to his face, he would
accept that as proof of his guilt. At one point he said “let Cobham be sent for; let him
be charged upon his soul, upon his allegiance to the King, and if he will then maintain
his accusation to my face, I will confess myself guilty.” Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1,
420 (1603). Likewise, he said “[Cobham] is in the house hard by and may soon be
brought hither; let him be produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this
Confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof.” Id. at 427. In fact,
he responded to a question as to how he would respond if Cobham was produced and
persisted in his accusation by saying, “[m]y Lord, I put myself upon it.” Id. at 436.
Thus, Raleigh apparently hoped either that his protests would raise a doubt as to
whether the alleged statement by Cobham had been manufactured by prosecutors, that
Cobham’s physical appearance would reveal he had been tortured, or that Cobham
would be too embarrassed or too guilt-stricken to repeat the statement to Raleigh’s
face. However, Raleigh did not indicate that he sought to cross-examine Cobham in the
usual sense of that term.
52
Americans also objected to other features of civil-law inquisitorial
procedure. For example, the absence of a threshold requirement of an accusation of
crime in fact allowed the government to use a civil prosecution to “fish” for evidence
upon which a charge could be based. Likewise, civil-law inquisitorial procedure was
associated with drawn-out trials and repetitious considerations of evidence. These
abuses and others figured prominently in American complaints about the civil-law
smuggling prosecution of John Hancock in the Boston vice-admiralty court from
October 1768 to March 1769.
Although Justice Scalia mentioned this trial, he cited only John Adams’s
(Hancock’s counsel) complaint about the use of “Examinations of witness upon
Interrogatories” during that prosecution. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48 (citing Draft of
Argument in Sewall v. Hancock, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 194, 207 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds. 1965)). However, that is too narrow a view of the
vices of that prosecution.
The best evidence we have of how Americans perceived Hancock’s
prosecution is found in contemporary newspaper accounts of the trial that were
smuggled out of the city and reprinted in other colonial papers. See BOSTON UNDER
MILITARY RULE (Oliver M. Dickerson ed. 1936) (reprinting the contemporary accounts).
What one finds there are repeated complaints that the prosecution, which was initiated
by the filing of libel, was not based on an accusation of actual crime, but only on a
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the Framers did attach great importance to the confrontation
right and did intend for the Confrontation Clause to at least
prevent the sorts of extreme denials of confrontation evident in
the famous cases by requiring, as a general principle, that
evidence in criminal trials be presented in face-to-face oral
testimony rather than through depositions or affidavits. 53
However, the general history of the confrontation right
simply does not reach the specific issue of the admissibility of a
suspicion of smuggling. For example, one of the earliest entries notes that “none of the
interrogatories on behalf of the informers have been as yet lodged in the registersoffice” (that is, the supposed evidence was not being made public), and that Bostonians
“heartily wish that the Co[mmissioners of the customs, the prosecutors] may still toil in
their infamous fishery, without catching any evidence that may operate to [Hancock’s]
prejudice.” Id. at 28 (entry for Nov. 28, 1768).
A later entry notes that “a number of witnesses were examined by the
court, in a most extraordinary and curious manner; Mr. Hancock’s nearest relations,
and even his tradesmen were summoned as evidences; but nothing turning up, that
could support the [prosecution], the court was again adjourned . . . .” Id. at 43 (entry
for January 2, 1769). A later entry complained that the prosecution was “re-examining
witnesses” by a method “so extraordinary” that the proceedings were “more alarming
than any that had appeared to the world, since the abolition of the Court of Star
Chamber” and that “[a]lmost every person already, who has the least connection with
the parties accused, or who can be supposed to have the knowledge of the secrets of
their business, has been pressed in the service, but to no purpose hitherto.” Id. at 46
(entry for January 7, 1769).
Still another entry complained that the commissioners had required
Hancock to post bail “without their having any proof of the matter of charge in their
hands, but that the [prosecution was initiated], with design further to harass and
distress [Hancock], and in hopes that some evidences would be fished up in the course
of a lengthy trial, which might support [the prosecution].” Id. at 57 (entry for January
30, 1769). Likewise, a later entry states that the Commissioners had sought a further
adjournment “for them and their emissaries to hunt up other evidence. – When this
trial will end, we cannot say . . . .” Id. at 67 (entry for February 21, 1769).
It was at this late point in the proceedings that Adams apparently objected
to the use of interrogatories as evidence (the argument that Scalia cited); but in the
newspaper account the interrogatories are only one of several complaints Adams made.
For example, the newspaper account complained that the judge was being arbitrary as
to “which rules of the civil law shall, and which shall not be adopted by the court”; and
that the prosecutors were being permitted to use methods that the defense was not
permitted. Id. at 72 (entry for March 2, 1769).
Viewed in its entirety, the prosecution of John Hancock exhibited a litany
of abuses that extended far beyond the use of interrogatories (prosecution without
accusation of crime in fact, lack of speedy trial, excessive bail, civil-law modes of
evidence such as interrogatories, no jury, a judge who served at the pleasure of the
king and was paid from the fines he collected, etc.). See generally id.
53
The requirement that confrontation be physically face-to-face is clearly
stated in historical sources. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1st ed. 1768) [hereinafter 3 BLACKSTONE]. Although
citations to the later editions of this work with “star” pagination are commonplace in
judicial opinions and legal commentaries, inattention to the changes that Blackstone
made in various editions can lead to serious errors. See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra
note 2, at 292-300 (explaining the role of a miscitation of a passage Blackstone had
altered in a later edition in the Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of the original
understanding of the arrest provision of the Speech and Debate Clause in Williamson
v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 439 (1908)).
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statement of a genuinely unavailable witness. The famous
abuses involved the use of a deposition where testimony of a
live witness could have been offered; however, use of a
deposition of a genuinely unavailable witness presented a
different situation (as Raleigh noted during his own trial 54).
Indeed, it seems likely that the problem of unavailable
witnesses may have been especially acute during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when there were no
police agencies to protect witnesses from threats from
defendants. Hence, Scalia necessarily sought other English
authority that specifically addressed the admissibility of a
deposition of an unavailable witness in a criminal trial.
As a general matter, Justice Scalia was correct to turn
to English legal materials. Although it is possible that some
differences had developed between framing-era American
understandings of criminal procedure rights and those set out
in English sources (as well as among the American colonies and
states), framing-era Americans still looked primarily to English
materials for the content of legal rights. 55 Thus, although
considerable caution must be exercised with regard to any
doctrine first announced in an English publication after 1775,
statements appearing in English materials published prior to

54
See Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. at 19 (quoting Raleigh as saying,
“Indeed, where the Accuser is not to be had conveniently, I agree with you [that
reading an examination would suffice as evidence]; but here my Accuser may [testify in
person]; he is alive, and in the house”). The post-framing account by Jardine, which
Scalia cited for several points, has Raleigh say: “If my accuser were dead or abroad, it
were something; but he liveth, and is in this very house.” CRIMINAL TRIALS (1835),
supra note 50, at 418-19.
55
Some commentators have suggested that the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment should be sought in American sources rather than English sources. See,
e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on
Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 619-21 (1991) (pointing to some differences between
American and English trial rights; for example, that some American colonies allowed
defense counsel in nontreason felony trials when counsel was not permitted in
England).
However, the notion of a distinct American legal culture should not be
overstated. The published legal materials that were available in framing-era America
were almost entirely English. As of 1789, there still were virtually no published
reports of American court decisions. For all practical purposes, American state case
reports began with Kirby’s Connecticut Reports, which were first published in 1789.
Likewise no American legal treatises on evidence or criminal procedure had been
published by 1789. See ELDON REVARE JAMES, A LIST OF LEGAL TREATISES PRINTED IN
THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE AMERICAN STATES BEFORE 1801 (1934). Justice of the
peace manuals had been published in the American colonies and states and they do
provide important evidence of the American understanding of legal rights (see infra
notes 241-68 and accompanying text), but those manuals were derived quite directly
from English treatises and manuals.
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1775 do constitute relevant sources for probing the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 56
In Crawford, Justice Scalia based his claim regarding
an absolute cross-examination rule primarily on two specific
historical claims about English cases. First, he asserted that
the 1696 decision by the Court of King’s Bench in the
misdemeanor libel case King v. Paine 57 announced an acrossthe-board cross-examination rule. 58 Although he suggested
that “some doubts remained” after Paine as to whether the
“common-law” cross-examination rule applied even to the
admissibility of a deposition of an unavailable witness of a
felony taken under the authority of the Marian statutes, 59 he
dismissed Marian procedure as a mere statutory “derogation”
of common law. 60
Second, Justice Scalia also asserted that any lingering
“doubts” as to whether the Marian depositions were subject to
his cross-examination rule were removed, in any event, by
three subsequent English cases decided in 1787, 1789, and
1791 that “rejected” the “statutory derogation view.” 61 He
identified these three cases as being pertinent to the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause because they constituted
English common law “by 1791,” the year the Bill of Rights was
ratified. 62
However, neither Paine nor the later three cases
actually stood for the propositions that Scalia implied they did,
56
As I explain below, it is unlikely that statements or doctrines first
appearing in English publications after 1775 informed the Framers’ understanding of
legal rights. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
57
5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696). There are also several other,
different reports of the case. See infra note 104.
58
In Scalia’s description of Paine, “[t]he court ruled that, even though a
witness was dead, his examination was not admissible where ‘the defendant not being
present when [it was] taken before the mayor . . . had lost the benefit of a crossexamination.’” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45 (2004) (quoting King v. Paine,
5 Mod. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585 (K.B. 1696)). A mayor possessed the judicial
authority of a justice of the peace as well as that of an executive. See Davies, Atwater,
supra note 2, at 340-41 n.317, 361 n.411.
59
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46.
60
Id. (“the [Marian] statutes were in derogation of the common law”); id. at
54 n.5 (“to the extent Marian examinations were admissible, it was only because the
statutes derogated from common law.”).
61
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5 (citing King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 56263, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-84 (Old Bailey 1791); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 50204, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (Old Bailey 1789). Cf. King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 45961, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (Old Bailey 1787)). See also id. at 46-47 (citing same).
62
Id. at 46 (“by 1791 (the year the Sixth Amendment was ratified)”); id. at 54
(“the common law in 1791”); id. at 54 n.5 (“by 1791”).
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and the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases also were all published in
London too late to have come to the attention of the American
Framers prior to the framing of the Confrontation Clause.
Instead, the framing-era authorities show that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses were routinely admissible
in felony trials. Moreover, Marian depositions were not a
minor procedural departure from “common law.” Rather, they
were a standard feature of felony prosecutions in both framingera England and framing-era America. Thus, the framing-era
confrontation right was not as rigid as Justice Scalia claimed.
B.

Marian Procedure in Felony Prosecutions

Justice Scalia actually said little about Marian
In particular, he omitted the
procedure in Crawford. 63
important fact that the Marian statutes were generally
understood to be part of the law of the American colonies and
early states as well as of England. 64 Hence, some additional
background is required to appreciate how significant Marian
procedure actually was in framing-era law.
1. Felony Procedure Under the Marian Statutes
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s account, “common-law”
criminal procedure during the framing-era did not necessarily
take the form of across-the-board rules. Rather, because
English law assigned more importance to convicting and
punishing traitors and felons than misdemeanants, distinct
procedures and standards often applied separately to treason,
felony, or misdemeanor prosecutions, and even to subsets of
63
Justices and commentators who assume an originalist posture often
advance isolated claims about specific historical doctrines or events without providing
the reader with much information about the larger doctrinal and institutional context.
See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 317-26 (noting that Justice Souter made a
variety of isolated erroneous assertions about historical arrest doctrine but never
described the larger structure of common-law procedure and thus evaded the reasons
why warrantless arrest authority had been limited to felonies and breaches of the
peace). This expert posturing leaves the reader little choice but to accept the historical
claim at face value. Indeed, this style of presentation exerts something of a bullying
effect – as if the writer had said to the reader “I have this arcane knowledge because
I’m an expert; unless you already know what I am talking about, you are unqualified to
question my assertions; so just take my word for it.” Justice Scalia adopted an expert
posture of this sort in Crawford when he tossed about references to Marian procedure
without actually describing that procedure in any comprehensible way and without
locating it in the larger context of framing-era procedure. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at
43-44, 46-47, 50, 52-55.
64
See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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misdemeanor prosecutions, such as those that did or did not
involve a breach of the peace. 65 The important point for present
purposes is that Marian procedure was a standard feature of
felony prosecutions. 66
During the eighteenth century, English criminal
procedure was still accusatory; that is, a criminal prosecution
was initiated when a private person (usually the victim, with
the obvious exception of homicides) made a sworn accusation
that a crime had been committed “in fact” (that is, that a felony
or misdemeanor had actually – not just probably – been
committed). 67 This requirement of an accusation of crime “in
fact” was one of the more fundamental differences between
common-law procedure and continental “inquisitorial”
procedure. 68 Likewise, the requirement of an accusation of
crime “in fact” is one of the most important differences between
framing-era procedure and modern investigatory procedure, in
which government officers can initiate arrests and prosecutions
on the basis of fairly minimal notions of “probable” crime. 69
The first step in a prosecution in accusatory procedure
usually was the complainant’s arrest of the accused person,
either with or without a warrant. 70 Once the complainant had

65

For example, there were different arrest standards depending on whether
the crime involved was a felony, or a breach of the peace, and warrantless arrest
authority did not extend to non-breach minor offenses. See generally Davies, Atwater,
supra note 2, at 321-26. There were also distinct trial standards. For example,
defendants were permitted to have counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions and in
treason prosecutions (by statute), but not in felony prosecutions. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 348-50 (1st ed. 1769)
[hereinafter 4 BLACKSTONE]. Similarly, the evidence of at least two witnesses was
required for treason prosecutions, but not for felony or misdemeanor prosecutions. See,
e.g., id. at 350-51.
66
It should be noted that felonies were a more narrowly defined class of
crimes during the framing-era criminal law than they are today; at that time, many
serious crimes were only misdemeanors. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 283.
67
An allegation that a crime had been committed “in fact” was required to
justify either an arrest warrant or a warrantless arrest. See, e.g., Davies, Original
Fourth, supra note 2, at 631-33, 651-52.
68
See supra note 52.
69
Contrary to claims in other Supreme Court opinions, “probable cause” was
not a recognized justification for a criminal arrest or search in framing-era law. See
Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 368-79; Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 62440, 640 n.252, 703-06. In addition, the concept of probable cause was drastically
relaxed in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 246 (1983) (defining “probable cause”
as a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of criminal activity). See Davies,
Atwater, supra note 2, at 379-82.
70
Unlike modern Sixth Amendment doctrine, framing-era law treated the
arrest as the beginning of the “prosecution.” See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and
Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The Recharacterization of the Right
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made the arrest, 71 he was required promptly to take the
arrestee to a justice of the peace so that the justice could either
release, bail, or commit the arrestee to jail to await trial. 72 The
complainant was also required to justify the arrest at that time
by also bringing any supporting witnesses he had to the justice
of the peace. The justice would then question the complainant
and witnesses under oath to determine whether there were
grounds for a prosecution.
In cases involving felonies, the Marian statutes – 1 & 2
Philip & Mary, chapter 13 (1554) and 2 & 3 Philip & Mary,
chapter 10 (1555) – were understood to require the justice of
the peace to make a written record of the unsworn statement
made by the arrestee and of the sworn statements made by the
complainant and his witnesses. 73 The 1554 Marian statute also
imposed similar requirements for the recording of information
given under oath in a coroner’s inquest into a homicide. 74
Specifically, the Marian statutes required a justice of the peace
to “examine” the unsworn arrestee when the arrestee was
brought before him and to make a written record of that
statement. 75 In addition, the statutes also required that the
justice make a written record of the “information,” given under
oath, by the complainant and any witnesses whom the
complainant had brought along to support his accusation, and
Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV.
987, 1013 n.126 (2003) [hereinafter Davies, Chavez].
71
A warrantless arrest was attributed to the complainant, although he
usually would procure the assistance of other persons, or a constable, as well. In a
warrant arrest, the accuser obtained the issuance of a warrant that was then executed
by a constable, who could command others to assist.
72
See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 293 (“When a delinquent is
arrested . . . he ought regularly to be carried before a justice of the peace.”).
73
British statutes are styled according to the year of the reign of the
monarch. The Marian statutes are called such because they were enacted during the
reign of Queen Mary Tudor, who was married to Philip of Spain. The names Philip and
Mary are usually abbreviated in citation of the statutes as “Phil. & Mar.,” “Phil. & M.,”
or “P. & M.”
By its terms, the 1554 Marian statute applied if an arrestee was to be
bailed to await trial for “Manslaughter or Felony.” See 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., c. 13, § IV.
The 1555 statute extended the same procedures to an arrestee who was to be
committed to “Ward” (i.e., jail) to await trial for “Manslaughter or Felony.” See 2 & 3
Phil. & Mar., c. 10, § II. However, Marian procedure generally did not apply to
accusations of treason, which were subject to other statutory provisions (see infra note
189), or to lesser offenses, which generally were not subject to specific statutory
procedures.
74
1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., 1554, c. 13, § V.
75
1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., 1554, c. 13; 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar., 1555, c. 10. See also
Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1002-06 (discussing the implications of the Marian
examination for the right against self-accusation).
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also required that the justice place the complainant and any
witnesses he produced at the time of the arrest under a
recognizance to compel them to appear and testify at trial. 76
In addition, the Marian statutes required the justice to
“certify” the written records of the arrestee’s “examination” and
of the complainant’s and witnesses’ information to the felony
trial court, 77 and it appears that these were made available to
the judges and prosecuting counsel – though perhaps not to the
defendant or his counsel – during the subsequent felony trial. 78
In eighteenth-century sources, the record of the statement
made by a complainant (who was sometimes called an
“informer” or “accuser”) or witness (who was sometimes called
an “evidence”) was sometimes called an “examination” but was
most commonly referred to as a “deposition,” even though the
statutes did not use either of those terms to describe the
statements of witnesses.
The purpose of the Marian provisions, evident in the
prologue of the statutes themselves, was to increase the
The
likelihood that felons could be convicted at trial. 79
expectation probably was that the record of the deposition
could be used by the felony trial court to detect whether a
witness had changed his story because of a bribe or threat.
However, by the seventeenth century Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses had also become admissible as evidence
in felony trials.
2. The Admissibility of Marian Depositions of
Unavailable Witnesses During the Seventeenth
Century
Sir Matthew Hale was a leading English judge of the
seventeenth century. He wrote two works on criminal law and
procedure prior to his death in 1675, but both were published
only posthumously. His shorter outline of criminal law and
76

1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., 1554, c. 13, § IV.; 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar., 1555, c. 10, § II.
1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., 1554, c. 13, § IV.; 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar., 1555, c. 10, § II.
78
See infra note 207.
79
See 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar., 1554, c. 13, § I (complaining that prior procedure
allowed justices of the peace to permit “the greatest and notablest Offenders” to escape
justice and go unpunished).
For an account of Marian procedure in seventeenth-century England, see
John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 313, 317-35 (1973). For an account of Marian procedure in eighteenth-century
England, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 40-47
(2003) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL].
77
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procedure, titled variously as a “Summary” or “Methodical
Summary” of the pleas of crown, was published in 1678, and
subsequent editions were published up to 1773. 80 In that work,
he noted that the Marian statutes empowered justices of the
peace to “Examine the Offender and Informer” and that
“[t]hese Examinations, if the party be dead or absent, may be
given in Evidence” in a felony trial. 81
Hale’s larger treatise, History of the Pleas of the Crown,
was first published in 1736, and subsequent editions were
published into the nineteenth century. 82 In that work, Hale
also stated in four passages that Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses were admissible in felony trials, and one
of those passages explicitly described such depositions as a
form of judicial record:
By the [Marian statutes, justices of the peace] ought to take the
examinations of felons (without oath,) and the informations of
accusers or witness (upon oath,) and return them to the justices of
gaol-delivery.
And these examinations may be read as evidence against the
prisoner, and so may the informations of witnesses taken upon oath,
if they are dead or not able to travel, for they are judges of record,
and the statute enables and requires them to take these
examinations; but then oath is to be made in court by the justice or

80

SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN OR A METHODICAL SUMMARY OF
PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT (commonly cited as “H.P.C.” in
eighteenth-century sources). This work was published under various titles in seven
editions from 1678 to 1773.
See 1 A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 362 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., 2d ed.
1955) [hereinafter MAXWELL] (entry 35, “Summary of the Pleas of the Crown”). Three
editions for 1707 [hereinafter HALE, SUMMARY (1707)], 1716 [hereinafter HALE,
SUMMARY (1716)], and 1773 [hereinafter HALE, SUMMARY (1773)] are available in The
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Thomson Gale, www.gale.com [hereinafter
Eighteenth Century Collections].
81
HALE, SUMMARY (1707), supra note 80, at 262-63 (discussing “Evidence to
the Petit Jury” in “Case of Felony”); HALE, SUMMARY (1716), supra note 80, at 262-63
(same); HALE, SUMMARY (1773), supra note 80, at 262-63 (same).
82
MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Sollom Emlyn ed.,
1736) (two volumes) (commonly cited as “H.H.P.C.” in eighteenth-century materials)
(reprinted in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80) [hereinafter HALE,
HISTORY (1736)]. According to the preface, the editor attempted to publish Hale’s
handwritten manuscript without changes. Subsequent editions were published in 1778
(in London [hereinafter HALE, HISTORY (London 1778)] and Dublin [hereinafter HALE,
HISTORY (Dublin 1778)]) and in 1800 [hereinafter HALE, HISTORY (1800)]. See
MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 362 (entry 36). Both of these later editions are available
in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80.
THE
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his clerk, that these examinations and informations were truly
taken. 83

83
2 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 52. This passage, which
appears in the chapter on the powers of a justice of the peace, was unchanged in later
editions. See 2 HALE, HISTORY (London 1778), supra note 82, at 52; 2 HALE, HISTORY
(Dublin 1778), supra note 82, at 52. The same passage also appears with minor
stylistic alterations in 2 HALE, HISTORY (1800), supra note 82, at 51.
Three other passages in this treatise endorse the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses. The first of two passages in the first volume
dealt with the admissibility of Marian depositions in treason trials as follows:
By the statute of 1 & 2 P. & M. cap. 14. justices of the peace ought to examine
the party and take informations touching offenses brought before them, and
certify them at the next gaol-delivery.

Tho justices of peace cannot hear and determine treason by virtue of the
commission of the peace, nor take an indictment of it, yet they may take
examinations and informations touching such offense of the party brought
before them, and certify them according to that statute; and those
informations taken upon oath, as they ought to be, and sworn to by the
justice or his clerk, that took them; to be truly taken, may be read in evidence
against the prisoner, if the informant be dead, or not able to travel, and
sworn so to be; yea by some opinion, if he were bound over and appear not,
they may be read, which seems to be questionable.
1 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 305. This passage appears unchanged in the
1778 and 1800 editions. See 1 HALE, HISTORY (London 1778), supra note 82, at 305; 1
HALE, HISTORY (Dublin 1778), supra note 82, at 305; 1 HALE, HISTORY (1800), supra
note 82, at 304-05.
The second, briefer passage in the first volume appears in a discussion
regarding the steps to be taken in connection with the execution of an arrest warrant.
Although it does not explicitly refer to the Marian statutes, this passage appears in a
chapter titled “Concerning felonies by the common law . . . and first touching arrests”:
2. [The justice of the peace] must take information of the prosecutor or
witnesses in writing upon oath, and return or certify them at the next
sessions or gaol-delivery, and these being upon the trial sworn to be truly
taken by the justice or his clerk, &c. may be given in evidence against the
prisoner, if the witnesses be dead or not able to travel.
1 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 586. This passage appears unchanged in the
1778 and 1800 editions. See 1 HALE, HISTORY (London 1778), supra note 82, at 586; 1
HALE, HISTORY (Dublin 1778), supra note 82, at 586; 1 HALE, HISTORY (1800), supra
note 82, at 585.
In addition to the passage quoted in the text, there is also a second passage
in the chapter on evidence in the second volume:
By the statute of 1 & 2 P. & M. cap. 13. and 2 & 3 P. & M. cap. 10. Justices of
peace and coroners have power to take examinations of the party accused,
and informations of the accusers and witnesses, (the examination to be
without oath, the informations to be upon oath,) and are to put the same in
writing, and are to certify the same to the next gaol-delivery.
These examinations and informations thus taken and returned may be read
in evidence against the prisoner, if the informer be dead, or so sick, that he is
not able to travel, and oath thereof made; otherwise not.
But then, 1. Oath must be made either by the justice or coroner, that took
them, or the clerk that wrote them, that they are the true substance of what
the informer gave in upon oath, and what the prisoner confessed upon his
examination . . . .
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These statements by Hale provide strong evidence that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses – witnesses who had died
or had become unable to travel – were understood to be
admissible in felony trials during the seventeenth century.
3. Justice Scalia’s Disparagement of Marian Procedure
Although Justice Scalia briefly acknowledged one of
Hale’s statements regarding the admissibility of Marian
depositions (though not the one treating such depositions as
judicial records), 84 he disparaged Marian procedure by
asserting that the Framers would have disdained Marian
depositions as an import from despised continental civil-law
“inquisitorial” procedure. 85 However, that treatment ignored
an important difference between Marian procedure and civil2 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 284. This passage appears unchanged in the
1778 edition. See 2 HALE, HISTORY (London 1778), supra note 82, at 284; 2 HALE,
HISTORY (Dublin 1778), supra note 82, at 284. The passage also appears with minor
stylistic alterations in 2 HALE, HISTORY (1800), supra note 82, at 284.
84
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing 2 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at
284). The passage that Justice Scalia cited is the final of the three passages quoted
supra note 83.
Although Scalia did not acknowledge Hale’s treatment of a Marian
deposition as a judicial record, his treatment of Hale was an improvement over the
claims made regarding Hale’s views in the briefs filed in Crawford. Petitioner’s brief
quoted a very general statement by Hale endorsing cross-examination as being
superior to ex parte examinations based on written interrogatories but never
mentioned Hale’s specific endorsements of the admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses in criminal trials. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 28, at 15 (citing
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 164 (Charles M.
Grey ed., 1713)). The passage from Hale that Petitioner quoted simply contrasted
common-law procedure for the trial of civil lawsuits to the civil-law procedure for trials
in the English ecclesiastical or equity courts. See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra
note 79, at 233-34 n.241.
The amicus brief of the law professors, apparently referring to the same
passage by Hale, simply noted that “Hale . . . praised the open and confrontational
style of the criminal trial” –without citing any particular work. This brief also did not
mention Hale’s specific statements regarding the admissibility of Marian depositions.
See Professors’ Brief, supra note 28, at 9, 11.
85
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (describing examinations of witnesses
conducted by justices of the peace as having been “adopted” from “civil-law practice”);
id. at 44 (describing examinations of witnesses conducted by justices of the peace as
“an adoption of continental procedure”); id. at 50 (describing Marian statutes as
inviting “the civil-law mode of criminal procedure”).
Justice Scalia has not always recognized American hostility to
“inquisitorial” procedure. Indeed, in a slightly different context he has claimed that
American pretrial criminal procedure has always been “inquisitorial.” See McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (“Our system of justice is, and has
always been, an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage (even the grand jury is an
inquisitorial body) . . .”). Although the framing-era grand jury is often described as
though it were inquisitorial, I think that is likely yet another modern myth. See
Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 427-28.
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law inquisitorial procedure: a Marian examination of the
arrestee and deposition of a witness was taken only after a
named and potentially accountable accuser had made an arrest
on the basis of a sworn accusation that a crime had been
committed “in fact”; in contrast, because inquisitorial
procedure did not require an accusation of crime in fact, it was
perceived to allow officials to use detentions and interrogations
abusively to “fish” for evidence that could be used to charge a
crime. 86
Hence, although it is fair to say that Marian procedure
was in tension with common-law rights that English courts
were developing during the late-seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries – both the rights against self-accusation 87 and of
confrontation – it is hardly the case that the American Framers
simply would have dismissed Marian depositions of witnesses
as part and parcel of civil-law inquisitorial procedure. Indeed,
although Scalia implied that the American Framers viewed
Marian depositions as an abuse, 88 he failed to actually cite any
historical complaint about Marian procedure itself. 89
Justice Scalia also disparaged the admissibility of
Marian depositions by writing as though that rule of
admissibility was merely a statutory “derogation” from
common-law procedure. 90 However, there is no basis for
86

See supra note 52.
See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1003.
88
For example, Justice Scalia wrote:
[t]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these practices that
the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s; that the Marian
statutes invited; that English law’s assertion of a right to confrontation was
meant to prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth
Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. The amicus brief filed by law professors in Crawford also
claimed that the admission of Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses “almost
certainly was one of the chief abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed” –
but provided no evidence for that claim. See infra note 103.
89
The earliest American complaint about admitting a Marian deposition of a
witness I have located dates to 1794. See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
90
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (asserting that “the [Marian] statutes
were in derogation of the common law”). Justice Scalia’s rhetorical strategy of treating
Marian depositions as an exception to a general common-law rule appears to parallel
Wigmore’s earlier treatment. Wigmore, writing about hearsay rather than the
Confrontation Clause as such, claimed that after Paine “the applicability of the hearsay
rule to sworn statements in general, as well as to unsworn statements, is not
questioned,” but conceded that sworn statements to justices of the peace or to coroners
“being already expressly authorized by statute, though not expressly made admissible,
might be thought to call for special exemption . . . .” 3 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 1364
(emphasis added); see supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text. This passage also
87
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assuming that the American Framers would have discounted
Marian procedure simply because it was based on statutory
authority. Although framing-era criminal procedure was still
predominantly a matter of common law, a number of older
English statutes had been absorbed into common-law
procedure. 91 Moreover, because statutes trumped common law
in the hierarchy of legal authority (as they still do), English
judges had no authority to formulate a “common-law” doctrine
that contravened a statute. Marian procedure could be altered
only by Parliament. For that reason, the Marian statutes were
grandfathered in when English courts refined the common-law
confrontation right as they reformed criminal procedure during
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Moreover, because the Marian statutes were enacted
during the mid-sixteenth century – earlier than the date of the
initial settlement of any of the American colonies – the Marian
statutes were generally understood to be part of the law of the
American colonies. 92 Several colonies or early states even
explicitly reenacted Marian procedure by local statute, 93 and
the framing-era American justice of the peace manuals
routinely included discussions of Marian felony procedure. 94
Hence, these historical sources refute Scalia’s suggestion that
understated the significance of the rule of admissibility as to Marian statutes insofar
as it failed to acknowledge that the “special exemption” created by the Marian statutes
included all felony prosecutions.
91
See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 327-33. Justice Scalia had
previously cited older English statutes – “the so-called night-walker statutes, and their
common-law antecedents” – as though they provided broad authority for investigative
detentions in framing-era criminal procedure. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, however, Scalia’s claim in Dickerson
overstated the implications of the historical statutes he cited, which stopped far short
of providing the broad authority for detaining suspicious persons that is allowed by
contemporary doctrine. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 263-64 n.65 and
accompanying text.
92
The general rule was that an English statute that had been enacted by
Parliament prior to the date of settlement of an American colony applied in the colony;
however, a statute enacted by Parliament after the date of settlement of a colony
applied in the colony only if the statute explicitly stated that it applied to the colony.
See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 331 n.280.
93
Some colonies or states reenacted English statutes to clarify local law. See,
e.g., “An Act to put in force in this Province the several Statutes of the Kingdom of
England or South-Britain, therein particularly mentioned,” Pub. L. No. 331, 1712 Pub.
L. S.C. 25 (1712), particularly subparts “An Act touching Bailment of Persons,” id. at
58, and “An Act to take Examination of Prisoners suspected of any Manslaughter or
Felony,” id. at 59-60 (South Carolina’s reenactment of both Marian statutes); infra note
239 (1715 North Carolina statute enacting examination procedure for felony
prosecutions); infra note 254 (1787 New York statute reenacting Marian procedure). I
have not attempted to make a thorough inventory of these statutes.
94
See infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
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framing-era Americans dismissed Marian deposition procedure
as merely a statutory aberration.
However, Justice Scalia did not merely disparage the
stature of the Marian statutes. He also wrote as though
English courts had actually rejected the rule of admissibility
regarding Marian depositions that Hale had set out in the late
seventeenth century. Specifically, he stated that a “recurring
question was whether the admissibility of an unavailable
witness’s pretrial examination depended on whether the
defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine him,” 95 and
he asserted that the admissibility of Marian depositions had
been brought under a general “common law” cross-examination
rule by the 1696 ruling in King v. Paine. 96 Additionally, he also
asserted that any lingering doubts that might have remained
on that point were removed by three much later cases decided
in 1787, 1789, and 1791. 97 However, these claims do not
withstand examination.
C.

The 1696 Ruling in Paine

Justice Scalia traced the “cross-examination rule” to the
1696 ruling in the misdemeanor seditious libel prosecution 98 in
Paine. 99 According to the Modern Reports version – the only
report of the case that Justice Scalia cited 100 – the judges of
King’s Bench and Common Pleas 101 were of the opinion that the
95

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 45-46 (citing and discussing King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep.
584 (K.B. 1696)).
97
Id. at 46-47 (citing King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep.
383, 383-84 (Old Bailey 1791); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-04, 168 Eng. Rep.
352, 353 (Old Bailey 1789); King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330,
331-32 (Old Bailey 1787)).
98
Id. at 45. Seditious libel was a misdemeanor in English law, not a felony.
See, e.g., Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696) (headnote in English Reports
states regarding a seditious libel prosecution that deposition cannot be read in a trial
for a “misdemeanor”); Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 359, 90 Eng. Rep. 527 (same case)
(basing the ruling regarding the nonadmissibility of a deposition in a libel prosecution
on “the difference between felony and misdemeanor”). Justice Scalia recognized that
Paine involved a “misdemeanor libel.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45.
99
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584).
100
Justice Scalia noted that Paine was “widely reported.” Id. at 45. However,
he did not cite any of the other reports.
101
The ruling in Paine was by the Court of King’s Bench at Westminster, the
most authoritative English court in matters of criminal procedure. See 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 65, at 262 (discussing the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench over criminal
cases). However, in Paine, the judges of King’s Bench conferred with the judges of
Common Pleas, who sat in another part of the same hall, before issuing their ruling.
See Paine, 5 Mod. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585.
96
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deposition of a deceased witness “was not admissible where ‘the
defendant not being present when [it was] taken before the
mayor . . . had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.’” 102
Scalia read that statement as expressing a rigid rule – his
“cross-examination rule” – that a deposition of an unavailable
witness could be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial if, but
only if, the defendant had had a prior opportunity to crossexamine that witness. 103
However, four other case reporters provided three
additional versions of the evidentiary issue in Paine (one of the
reports reprinted a previous version), 104 and they presented a
102
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45 (citing Paine, 5 Mod. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585).
A mayor possessed the judicial authority of a justice of the peace. See supra note 58.
103
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46. Two of the briefs filed in Crawford had also
addressed Paine. Petitioner Crawford’s brief described the ruling in the same
sweeping terms that Scalia did. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 28, at 14 (citing
Paine, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1062 (K.B. 1696), as authority that “[t]his right to
confrontation was a bright-line rule. Even if a witness died, his prior ex parte
statement to a government officer could not be admitted against the accused because
the defendant ‘could not cross-examine’ the declarant.”). This treatment overstated the
significance of the Paine ruling in the same way that Justice Scalia did.
The professors’ amicus brief gave a more accurate rendition of Paine than
that given by Justice Scalia and by the Petitioner’s brief insofar as it correctly noted
that the case pertained only to “misdemeanor cases”:
[J]ustices of the peace were required by statute to examine felony witnesses,
and these examinations were admissible at trial, even though the witness
had not been cross-examined, if the examination was taken under oath and
the witness was then unavailable. This treatment – which almost certainly
was one of the chief abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed –
was a continuing source of controversy, and in 1696, in the celebrated case of
Rex v. Paine, the court refused to extend it to misdemeanor cases; eventually,
the practice was abolished by statutes for felony cases as well.
Professors’ Brief, supra note 28, at 10 (emphasis added). However, this statement was
misleading in other respects. First, the final statement in the quoted passage was
misleading insofar as it evaded a rather material fact – no English statute made crossexamination a requirement for admitting a Marian deposition of witness in a criminal
trial until 1848 – more than a half century after the framing of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. Second, it is notable that the brief cited no evidence for the
claim that the Confrontation Clause was aimed at the “abuse” of Marian depositions of
witnesses. There does not appear to be any substance to that claim; rather, framingera American sources routinely endorsed the admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses in felony trials. See infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
104
There are five reports of the evidentiary ruling by the Court of King’s
Bench in Paine: (1) King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (Modern Reports
edited by William Nelson and published in 5 editions beginning in 1711; see MAXWELL,
supra note 80, at 304-05 (entry 88); (2) Rex v. Paine, 1 Salk. 281, 91 Eng. Rep. 246 (the
reports of William Salkeld, published in six editions from 1717 to 1795; see MAXWELL,
supra note 80, at 308 (entry 111)); (3) Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 90 Eng. Rep. 527 (the
reports of Roger Comberbach, published in a single edition in 1724; see MAXWELL,
supra note 80, at 298 (entry 33)); (4) Rex v. Pain, Holt 294, 90 Engl. Rep. 1062 (the
reports of Cases Determined by Sir John Holt, published in one edition in 1738; see
MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 301 (entry 64)) (this report appears to be a reprint of
Comberbach’s); and (5) Rex v. Payne, 1 Ld. Ray. 729, 91 Eng. Rep. 1387 (the reports of
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different picture of the case. First, they indicate that it is quite
unlikely that Paine actually adopted the positive aspect of
Crawford’s cross-examination rule – the notion that the
deposition could have been admissible in the misdemeanor trial
if the arrestee had been permitted a prior opportunity for crossexamination. Instead, they indicate that the judges actually
ruled that valid depositions could not be taken in misdemeanor
cases at all. Second, the other reports – along with the
arguments of counsel in the Modern Reports version – make it
clear that Paine did not hold any adverse implications for the
admissibility of Marian depositions in felony cases. Let me
explain these two points.
1. The Absence of Any “Cross-Examination Rule” for
Misdemeanor Cases
Perhaps because Justice Scalia focused on only the
Modern Reports version of Paine – in which the judges were
reported as having referred only to the defendant’s having “lost
the benefit of a cross-examination” 105 – he treated the case as
having ruled that a deposition of an unavailable witness could
be admitted if, but only if, there had been a prior opportunity
for cross-examination. However, that treatment overlooked the
possibility that the case simply meant that there was no
authority for a justice of the peace to ever take a deposition in a
misdemeanor case, and thus a deposition could never be
Robert, Lord Raymond, published in five editions from 1743 to 1832; see MAXWELL,
supra note 80, at 307-08 (entry 105)). There was also a sixth report of the case that did
not address the evidentiary issue: King v. Paine, Carth. 405, 90 Eng. Rep. 834
(Carthew’s Reports) (discussing the elements of the offense of seditious libel, but not
discussing the evidentiary issue).
In addition to the varied spellings of the defendant’s name, these reports
also give varied dates for the decision. The reports in Modern Reports and in Salkeld’s
Reports indicate the case was decided in Hillary Term (that is, January), of the seventh
year of the reign of William III, which would be 1695. However, Comberbach’s Reports
and Holt’s Reports give the date as Hillary Term of the eighth year of William III,
which would be 1696, and Carthew’s Reports gives the year as the ninth year of
William III, which would be 1697. Lord Raymond’s Reports do not give any year.
Because the exact year is of no consequence for present purposes, I follow Justice
Scalia’s lead and use 1696.
These multiple reports of a single case are a product of the unsystematic
nature of case reporting during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Individual
judges or barristers collected and published their own notes of cases in which they had
been involved or during which they had been present, usually toward the end of their
careers. Happily, the English Reports often identify cases that are the subject of more
than one report by one or more “s.c.” (same case) citations that appear immediately
after the style of a case.
105
See supra text accompanying note 102.
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properly sworn or admitted as evidence in a misdemeanor
trial. 106
In the Modern Reports version of Paine, most of the
arguments of counsel did not relate to the cross-examination
point; rather, they had to do with whether a justice of the peace
possessed any legal authority to administer a sworn deposition
in a misdemeanor case. 107 Additionally, the other reports of
Paine indicated that the judges concluded that a justice of the
peace simply had no authority to take a deposition in a
misdemeanor prosecution.
The report of Paine in
Comberbach’s Reports (reprinted in Holt’s Reports), indicates
that the judges gave alternative grounds for rejecting the
deposition. That version of Paine mentioned the lack of an
opportunity for cross-examination as one reason to exclude the
deposition, but it also stated, as a second reason for excluding
the deposition, that there was a “difference” between
misdemeanor and felony cases because the Marian statutes
created authority “to take” depositions in felony cases – the
implication being that there was no comparable authority in
misdemeanor cases. 108 In addition, the two other versions of

106
None of the cryptic reports of Paine spell out this logic, but it flows from
the structure of legal authority for the taking of depositions. The office of the justice of
the peace was rooted in statutory authority. The Marian statutes explicitly directed a
justice to take depositions in a felony case, so there was positive statutory authority for
taking a deposition in a felony prosecution. However, there was no comparable grant
of authority for a justice to take a deposition in a misdemeanor case. Hence, because a
justice had no grant of authority to take such a deposition, he had no authority to
administer an oath in that situation. Moreover, because an unsworn deposition could
not be evidence, this meant that a deposition taken in a misdemeanor case could not be
evidence. This logic was spelled out in one of the later cases cited by Scalia, which
rejected a non-Marian deposition in a felony case because the deposition was
“extrajudicial” and the justice of the peace therefore had no authority to administer an
oath for a deposition outside of Marian statutory authority. See infra notes 192-94 and
accompanying text. Thomas Starkie also spelled out this logic in his commentary on
evidence law. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
107
After noting that the Marian statutes gave justices “power” to take
depositions of witnesses in felony cases, defendant’s counsel in Paine asserted that
“[b]efore the making [of the Marian statutes] no single justice had power to take the
information of witnesses against criminals, neither could the conservators at common
law take such depositions . . . .” 5 Mod. at 164, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585. As used in this
context, “conservators” were the common-law antecedents of justices of the peace.
108
The reports of Paine by Comberbach and Holt stated that:
the Court would not allow [the deposition of the deceased person] to be given
in evidence, for two reasons.

1. It appears, that the defendant was not present when the examination was
taken, so that he could not cross-examine him.
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Paine in Salkeld’s Reports and in Lord Raymond’s Reports
indicated that the deposition was rejected only because of the
lack of authority for the taking of depositions in misdemeanors.
Significantly, those two reports of Paine did not even mention
the defendant’s loss of the opportunity for cross-examination;
instead, they simply contrasted the Marian statutory authority
for taking and admitting depositions in felony trials to the
misdemeanor prosecution at hand. 109
Thus, if one considers all of the Paine reports, it appears
that the judges rejected the deposition first because there was
no authority for a justice of the peace to even take a deposition
in a misdemeanor case, and second because the deposition was
invalid insofar as it did not meet the usual cross-examination
standard derived from deposition practice in civil litigation and
chancery proceedings. 110 However, if there was no authority for
a justice of the peace to take a deposition in a misdemeanor
case, then it is unclear how such a deposition could have
constituted admissible evidence even if cross-examination had
been allowed. 111
Hence, although the notion that a testimonial statement
of an unavailable witness should be admissible if there had
2. There is a difference between capital offenses and cases of misdemeanour,
for in the case of felony the justices are by [the Marian statutes] to take the
examinations in writing, and certify them to the [felony trial court] . . . .
Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527. See also Holt at 295, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
In context, the second reason given in these reports seems to be a rejection
of the “strongly urged” argument of the Attorney-General, as prosecutor, that “before
the [Marian] statutes as well as since, justices of the peace . . . might take examination
as well for misdemeanors as felony . . . .” Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527. See also
Holt at 296, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
109
The only reason given by the judges as to why the deposition in Paine could
not be admitted in Salkeld’s Reports was that the Marian statutory authority for
admitting depositions in felony trials “cannot be extended farther than the particular
case of feleny, and therefore not to this [misdemeanor] case.” Paine, 1 Salk. at 281, 91
Eng. Rep. at 246 (citation omitted). Similarly, Lord Raymond’s Reports indicated that,
in contrast to the Marian authority for admitting “informations” of deceased witnesses
in felony trials, “no such information can be given in evidence” in “misdemeanors, or in
civil actions, or appeals of murder.” Payne, 1 Ld. Raym. at 730, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387.
(An appeal of murder was a private prosecution initiated by relatives of a deceased, in
contrast to a prosecution brought in the name of the crown. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 65, at 308-12.)
110
Cross-examination was required for depositions in civil actions or chancery
proceedings. See infra note 127.
111
See supra note 106 (explaining the logic of deposition authority). There is
evidence that the absence of statutory authority for the taking of depositions in
misdemeanors was viewed as the more fundamental aspect of the Paine ruling.
Specifically, when a leading eighteenth-century commentator provided a short synopsis
of the ruling, he referred only to the lack of statutory authority but deleted a reference
to the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination. See infra note 141 and
accompanying text.
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been a prior opportunity to cross-examine may seem to make
sense in the context of the types of pretrial adversary hearings
that occur in modern practice, it is quite doubtful that Paine
actually adopted that view of depositions. Instead, Paine
appears to have meant that depositions could be taken only if
there was statutory authority to do so. Indeed, although the
treatises and manuals published after Paine mentioned the
exclusion of the deposition in that case, they did not mention
any instances of depositions being admitted in later
misdemeanor cases. 112 Hence, it is doubtful that depositions
actually were even taken in misdemeanor cases after Paine.
2. Paine Actually Affirmed the Admissibility of Marian
Depositions in Felony Trials
Justice Scalia also misinterpreted Paine insofar as he
suggested that the case adopted an across-the-board crossexamination standard that applied even to the admission of
Marian depositions in felony cases. Likewise, he misdescribed
the post-Paine situation when he suggested there were any
“doubts” on that score. There is no historical evidence of any
“doubts”; rather, the reports of Paine explicitly stated that the
ruling in that case did not apply to Marian depositions in felony
cases.
In the Modern Reports version that Scalia cited, the
cryptic statement of the judges’ ruling made no reference to
Marian depositions in felony cases. However, that version of
the ruling must be read in light of defense counsel’s previous
assertion that Marian procedure was not involved in the
misdemeanor case before the court:
this [misdemeanor libel] case was not like an information before a
coroner, or an examination by justices of the peace of persons
accused and afterwards committed for felony, because they have
power by [the Marian statutes] to take such examinations both of the
fact and circumstances, and to put it in writing and certify it at the
next general gaol delivery. 113

112
See infra text accompanying note 129 (GILBERT (1754)); text accompanying
notes 139-41 (HAWKINS, PLEAS).
113
King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 164, 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B. 1696) (citation
omitted). “Fact” referred to the crime that had been committed. See supra note 66.
The “general gaol delivery” was a felony trial court. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65,
at 266-68.
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Thus, in the Modern Reports version Paine’s counsel explicitly
acknowledged that a Marian deposition would have been
admissible in a felony trial.
In addition, each of the other three versions of Paine
reported that the judges themselves reiterated the rule that
Marian depositions of deceased witnesses were admissible in
felony cases, without any mention of cross-examination.
Comberbach’s and Holt’s version cited Hale’s statement in his
Methodical Summary regarding the admissibility of Marian
depositions 114 and quoted the judges as stating:
[t]here is a difference between capital offenses and cases of
misdemeanours, for in the case of felony the justices are by the
[Marian statutes] to take the examinations in writing, and certify
them to the [felony trial court], &c. and if the party be dead or
absent, they may be given in evidence. 115

Similarly, Salkeld’s report stated:
[e]t per Cur. Upon advice with the Justices of the Common Pleas, in
cases of felony such depositions before a justice, if the deponent die,
may be used in evidence by the [Marian statute]. But this cannot be
extended farther than the particular case of feleny, and therefore not
to this [misdemeanor] case. 116

Likewise, Lord Raymond reported:
per Curiam, in indictments for felony, by [the Marian statutes], such
informations may be read, the deponent being dead. But in
indictments or informations for misdemeanors, or in civil actions, or
appeals of murder, no such information can be given in
evidence . . . . 117

Thus, the crucial point – a point that one does not learn
from Justice Scalia’s opinion – is that every one of the four
versions of the evidentiary ruling in Paine indicated that the
114

See Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 359, 90 Eng. Rep. 527, 527 (K.B. 1724) (citing
HALE, SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 263); Pain, Holt at 295, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062 (citing
HALE,’ SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 263) (the passage cited is that quoted supra text
accompanying note 81).
115
Pain, Comb. at 358, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527; Pain, Holt at 295, 90 Eng. Rep. at
1062.
116
Rex v. Paine, 1 Salk. 281, 281, 91 Eng. Rep. 246, 246 (citation omitted).
(“Et per Cur.” indicates that this statement was “by the court,” that is, the judges’
ruling.)
117
Rex v. Payne, 1 Ld. Raym. 729, 729-30, 91 Eng. Rep. 1387, 1387. (An
appeal of murder was a private prosecution initiated by relatives of a deceased, in
contrast to a prosecution brought in the name of the crown. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 65, at 308-12.) (The term “per Curiam” indicates the statement was the ruling of
the court.)
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prohibition against the admission of a deposition as evidence in
that misdemeanor trial had no effect on the rule that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses were admissible in felony
trials. Moreover, although later treatise writers seem to have
read Paine to also prohibit the use of a deposition of an
unavailable witness in a felony trial if the deposition were
improperly taken outside of Marian procedure, 118 they also
reiterated that Paine did not limit the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses in felony trials. 119
Thus, the reports of Paine show that it definitely did not
create a rigid “cross-examination rule” applicable to felony
trials. Indeed, because depositions were routinely taken under
the Marian statutes in felony prosecutions, but were unlikely
to have been taken outside of that statutory authority, 120 the
rule reiterated in Paine had the practical effect of making
depositions of unavailable witnesses routinely admissible in
felony trials.
Thus, the basis for Justice Scalia’s suggestion that there
were “some doubts” about the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses after Paine is unclear. 121
Indeed, the most significant feature of Scalia’s suggestion is
that he did not actually identify any expression of these
“doubts” in a historical source. Instead, he merely asserted
that the admissibility of depositions in felony trials was “only”
by the authority of the Marian statutes, which is hardly the
same thing. 122 In that context, he offered a cryptic citation to
118
The treatises interpreted Paine to prohibit the admission of depositions
unless they were taken within the authority of the Marian statutes. See infra text
accompanying note 129 (GILBERT (1754)); text accompanying note 141 (HAWKINS,
PLEAS).
119
See infra text accompanying note 129 (GILBERT (1754)); text accompanying
note 141 (HAWKINS, PLEAS); text accompanying note 147 (BULLER).
120
It does not appear that there would have been any legal authority for a
justice of the peace to take a deposition in a felony case outside of Marian procedure.
See supra note 106; see also infra notes 192-94, 225 and accompanying text.
121
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46 (2004). There was no mention of
any doubts regarding Paine’s meaning in the briefs filed in Crawford. Petitioner’s brief
simply misstated Paine as though it applied to felonies as well as misdemeanors, while
the professors’ amicus brief recognized that Paine addressed only misdemeanor
prosecutions. See supra note 103.
122
Although Justice Scalia was correct when he asserted that Marian
depositions were admissible because they were authorized by statute, the authority he
cited was not available when the Confrontation Clause was framed. Scalia cited dicta
to that effect from a 1790 English case. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing King v.
Eriswell, 3 T. R. 707, 710, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 (K.B. 1790) (Grose, J.) (dicta
regarding Marian statutes); id. at 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823-24 (Kenyon, C. J.)
(same)). Note, however, the Framers would not have been aware of that 1790 case
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Baron Geoffrey Gilbert’s leading treatise on the law of
evidence. 123 However, that source deserved more attention
than Scalia gave it.
D.

The Descriptions of Paine in the Leading Treatises

During the framing era, treatises were an especially
important source of legal information in America. Because law
libraries were private and sets of case reports were expensive,
few American lawyers or judges had access to anything like a
comprehensive collection of English cases.
The English
treatises were more widely available, 124 and the treatises were
when the Confrontation Clause was framed in the summer of 1789. See infra notes
172-75 and accompanying text.
In addition, Eriswell was of doubtful relevance. In fact, when Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited Eriswell in his concurring opinion as a case that admitted a deposition,
Justice Scalia discounted the significance of that case because “Eriswell was not a
criminal case at all, but a Crown suit against the inhabitants of a town to charge them
with care of an insane pauper.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 n.5.
123
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing LORD CHIEF BARON GEOFFREY GILBERT,
LAW OF EVIDENCE 65, 215 (Capel Lofft ed. 1791 [hereinafter GILBERT (1791)]). See also
SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE BY A LATE LEARNED JUDGE (Dublin 1754)
(reprinted in facsimile by Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979) [hereinafter GILBERT (1754)].
This treatise was published posthumously and republished in several later editions
from 1756 to 1801 [hereinafter GILBERT (1756); GILBERT (1760); GILBERT (1769);
GILBERT (1777)]. See MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 379 (entry 5). The 1756, 1760, 1777,
1791 editions are available in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80. Another
edition of this treatise was reprinted in Philadelphia in 1788 [hereinafter GILBERT
(Philadelphia 1788)], microformed on Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, no.
21113 (Readex) [hereinafter Imprints].
124
A guesstimate of the relative availability of preframing copies of English
sources in framing-era America can be made on the basis of the number of copies now
shown as available in American public libraries in the Worldcat listing of the Online
Computer Libraries Center.
See Online Computer Libraries Center,
http://www.oclc.com (showing that there are the following numbers of pre-framing
copies of the five case reporters that reported Paine: 21 copies of Modern Reports, 1
copy of Salkeld’s Reports, 61 copies of Comberbach’s Reports, 50 copies of Holt’s
Reports (which reprinted Comberbach’s), and 11 copies of Lord Raymond’s Reports).
The same source shows that there are the following numbers of preframing copies of the leading treatises: 89 copies of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown (see
infra note 132) [there are also 59 copies of the 1787 edition of that treatise, most of a
1788 Dublin printing, that probably began to be imported about the time the Bill of
Rights was framed]; 7 copies of Hawkins’s Summary of Crown Law (see infra note 133);
59 copies of Hale’s Summary (see supra note 80); 123 copies of Hale’s History of the
Pleas of the Crown (see supra note 82); 45 copies of Gilbert’s Evidence (see supra note
123) [there are also 25 copies of the 1788 American edition of Gilbert’s evidence treatise
that was printed on the eve of the framing of the Bill of Rights (see infra note 131)];
and 77 copies of Buller’s nisi prius treatise (see infra note 147) [there are also 37 copies
of a 1788 New York printing of this treatise].
Although this data gives only a crude indication of the relative availability
of these volumes during the framing-era, it seems apparent that framing-era
Americans would have been more likely to have formed their view of the admissibility
of Marian depositions from the treatises, rather than directly from case reports.
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also important because the justice of the peace manuals
printed and widely used in colonial and framing-era America
excerpted the more important passages from the treatises. 125
What did the leading eighteenth-century treatises on
evidence and criminal procedure have to say about Paine and
the admissibility of depositions in criminal cases? Scalia did
cite Gilbert’s evidence treatise, but wrote only “compare 1
Gilbert, Evidence, at 215 ([Marian depositions] admissible only
‘by Force ‘of the Statute’’), with id. at 65.” 126 However, the cited
passages in Gilbert’s treatise did not suggest that Paine had
given rise as to any “doubts” about the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses in felony cases. 127
After stating that a coroner’s Marian examination of a
deceased or unavailable witness would be admissible in a

I am indebted to Professor Sybil Marshall and the library staff at the
University of Tennessee College of Law Library for this data.
125
See infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
126
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing GILBERT (1791), supra note 123, at 65, 215
(the odd internal quotation marks reflect editor Lofft’s replacement of an earlier
citation to the Marian statutes themselves)).
127
Id. Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the passage at page 65 of Gilbert’s
treatise was relevant was inapt; it merely stated that a deposition in a civil suit or
chancery proceeding was inadmissible against a person who was not a party in the case
in which the deposition was taken:
“For on the same principles of Natural Justice, on which the Rule at the
Common Law, respecting Verdicts in Evidence is founded:” a Deposition
cannot be given in Evidence against any person that was not party to the
suit; and the Reason is, that he had not Liberty to cross examine the
Witnesses, and it is against natural Justice that a Man should be concluded
in a Cause to which he was never a Party.
“And consequently, on the other Side,” a Man shall never take Advantage of a
Deposition that was not party to the suit: for if he cannot be prejudiced by the
Deposition, he shall never receive any Advantage from it: for this would
create the greatest Mischief that could be: for then a Man that never was
party to the Chancery Proceedings, might use against his Adversary all the
Depositions that made against him, and he, in his own Advantage, could not
use the Depositions that made for him; because the other party not being
concerned in the suit, had not the Liberty to cross examine, and therefore
cannot be encountered with any Depositions out of the Cause.
GILBERT (1791), supra note 123, at 65 (emphasis in original). Although this passage
shows that cross-examination was expected in civil depositions –which no doubt is the
source of the reference to the lack of cross-examination in Paine –there is nothing in
Gilbert’s treatise to suggest that that aspect of civil procedure cast any doubt on the
contrary rule regarding Marian depositions in felony cases.
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felony trial, 128 Gilbert’s treatise discussed Paine and the
admissibility of Marian depositions of witnesses taken by a
justice of the peace. Specifically it stated that
the Court would not allow the Examinations of [the deceased
witness] to be given in Evidence, because Paine was not present to
cross-examine, and tho’ tis Evidence in Indictments for Felony in
such case by Force 2, 3 Phil. and Mary, Capt. 10. yet ‘tis not so in
Informations for Misdemeanors in Civil Actions or Appeals of
Murder. 129

Significantly, this discussion
admissibility of Marian depositions in
altered as late as the 1791 London
considerable additions and alterations

of Paine and the
felony cases was not
edition, even though
were made to other

128

A coroner’s deposition of a witness would have been taken in the context of
a possible homicide, so a subsequent trial in which such a deposition might have been
admitted would have been for felony. Moreover, a coroner’s deposition of a witness was
provided for in the Marian statutes. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Gilbert’s treatise stated the following regarding the admissibility of coroner’s
depositions (which he termed “examinations”):
A Witness examined before the Coroner but upon the Trial is either dead or
so ill that he is not able to travel, if Oath be made of the Truth of this Fact,
the Examination of such Witness so dead or unable to travel, may be read;
but the Coroner must first make Oath that such Examinations are the same
which were taken before him upon Oath, without any Addition or Alteration;
because the Examinations are in these Cases the utmost Evidence that can
be procured, the Examinant himself being prevented in coming by the Act of
God.
And much more so are such Examinations Evidence and to be read on the
Trial when it can be proved on Oath, that the Witness is detained and kept
back from appearing by the means and procurement of the Prisoner, for he
shall never be admitted to shelter himself by such evil Practices on the
Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong.
So if Oath be made that a Witness examined before the Coroner has been
sought for against the Trial, and though all Endeavours have been used, yet
he cannot be found, in such case his Examinations may be read; because I
suppose it is to be presumed that the Witness is dead when he cannot be
found after the strictest Enquiry.
GILBERT (1754), supra note 123, at 99-100. This passage was unchanged through the
1777 London edition. See GILBERT (1756), supra note 123, at 140-41; GILBERT (1760),
supra note 123, at 140-41; GILBERT (1769), supra note 123, at 140-41; GILBERT (1777),
supra note 123, at 138. However, the final paragraph was deleted in the substantially
revised four-volume 1791 edition edited by Capel Lofft. GILBERT (1791), supra note
123, at 214-15.
129
GILBERT (1754), supra note 123, at 100 (emphasis added). Statutory
citations are to the Marian statutes. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. (An
appeal of murder was a private prosecution initiated by relatives of a deceased, in
contrast to a prosecution brought in the name of the crown. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 65, at 308-12).
Justice Scalia cited but did not quote the Gilbert passage I have quoted in
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46; see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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passages in that edition. 130 This passage was also unchanged in
the 1788 American edition. 131 Hence, the editors of those later
editions apparently did not think there had been any change in
the rule regarding the admissibility of Marian depositions in
felony trials.
Thus, Justice Scalia understated the degree to which
Gilbert’s treatise endorsed the admissibility of Marian
depositions. Moreover, he apparently overlooked a passage of
at least as much significance from the leading treatise on
criminal law and procedure.
1. What Hawkins’s Treatise said about Marian
Depositions and Paine
The leading eighteenth-century treatise on criminal
procedure was Sergeant William Hawkins’s two-volume Pleas
of the Crown, first published in 1716-1721, and republished in
several later editions into the nineteenth century. 132 An
abbreviated version of the treatise was also published as A
Summary of Crown Law in 1728. 133 Like the earlier statement
in Sir Matthew Hale’s Methodical Summary 134 (note that
Hawkins’s treatise and Summary were written and published
after Hale’s Methodical Summary was published but before

130
See GILBERT (1756), supra note 123, at 141-42; GILBERT (1760), supra note
123, at 141-42; GILBERT (1769), supra note 123, at 141-42; GILBERT (1777), supra note
123, at 139; GILBERT (1791), supra note 123, at 215.
131
See GILBERT (Philadelphia 1788), supra note 123, at 139.
132
Hawkins’s two-volume treatise was initially published in 1716 (volume 1)
[hereinafter 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS] and 1721 (volume 2) [hereinafter 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS]
(photo reprint 1978) (commonly cited as “Hawk P.C.” in eighteenth-century materials).
Subsequent editions were published in 1724, 1739 [hereinafter 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS
(1739)], 1762 [hereinafter 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1762)], 1771 [supra note 18], 1787 [supra
note 18], 1788 (a Dublin reprinting of the 1787 edition) [hereinafter 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS
(1788)], 1795 [hereinafter 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1795)], and 1824. The 1787 and 1795
editions were edited by Thomas Leach, who updated the 1787 edition with additional
textual notes and substantially expanded the 1795 edition to four volumes. See, e.g.,
MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 362-63 (entry 37). The 1739, 1771, 1787, 1788 and 1795
editions are available in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80.
The title “Sergeant” indicated that Hawkins was an experienced, high
status barrister in the superior English courts at Westminster. See 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 53, at 26-27.
133
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A SUMMARY OF THE CROWN LAW (1728) (two volumes)
[hereinafter, HAWKINS, SUMMARY]. See MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 363 (entry 38).
The original 1728 edition is available in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80.
One bibliographic work indicates this work was republished in 1770. See BRIDGMAN’S
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 (Richard W. Bridgman ed., London, 1807).
134
See supra text accompanying note 80.
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Hale’s full treatise was published 135), Hawkins’s treatise stated
that “It seems settled” that a Marian deposition of an
unavailable witness (he used the term “informer”) “may be
given in evidence at a felony trial”:
Sect. 6. It seems settled, That the Examination of an Informer taken
upon oath, and subscribed by him either before a coroner upon an
Inquisition of Death in pursuance of 1 & 2 Ph. & M. 13. or before
Justices of Peace in pursuance of 1 & 2 Ph. & M. 13. and 2 & 3 P. &
M. 10. upon a Bailment or Commitment for any Felony, may be
given in evidence at the Trial of such inquisition, or of an Indictment
for the same felony, if it be made out by Oath to the Satisfaction of
the Court, that such Informer is dead, or unable to travel, or kept
away by the Means or Procurement of the Prisoner, and that the
Examination offered in Evidence is the very same that was sworn
before the Coroner or Justice, without any Alteration whatsoever. 136

Hawkins also made a nearly identical statement regarding the
admissibility of Marian depositions in his Summary. 137
Hawkins’s passage on the admissibility of Marian
depositions in his treatise is especially noteworthy for present
purposes because he stated two conditions for the admission of
such a deposition: first, sworn testimony as to the
unavailability of the witness (which was not satisfied simply by
an Oath that the witness could not be found 138); and, second,
sworn testimony as to the accuracy of the record of the
deposition. However, he said nothing about a requirement of
an opportunity for cross-examination. Hawkins’s reference to
situations in which a witness was “kept away” by the defendant
may also reveal a pragmatic basis for the rule of admissibility –
135
HALE, SUMMARY, supra note 80 (published in 1678); 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS,
supra note 132 and 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132 (published in 1716-21);
HAWKINS, SUMMARY, supra note 133 (published in 1728); and HALE, HISTORY (1736),
supra note 82 (published in 1736).
136
2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132, at 429 (citations omitted).
137
See 2 HAWKINS, SUMMARY, supra note 133, at 420-21:
Sect. 5. The Examination of an Informer taken on Oath, and subscribed by
him, either before a Coroner on an Inquisition of Death, in Pursuance of 1 &
2 Ph. & Ma. 13, or before Justices of the Peace in Pursuance of 1 & 2 Ph. &
M. 13. and 2 & 3 Ph. & Ma. 10. on a Bailment or Commitment for any Felony,
may be given in Evidence at the Trial of such Inquisition, or of an Indictment
for the same Felony, if it be made out by Oath, to the Satisfaction of the
Court, that such Informer is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away by the
Procurement of the Prisoner, and that the Examination offered in Evidence is
the very same that was sworn before the Coroner &c . . . .
138
Hawkins also wrote:
Sect. 7. But it hath been adjudged, That it is not sufficient to authorize the
Reading such an Examination, to make Oath that the Prosecutors have used
all their Endeavours to find the Witness, but cannot find him.
2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132, at 430.
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there were no police agencies that could provide protection for
witnesses.
In his treatise, Hawkins also discussed Paine as a rule
for an “indictment for libel” – that is, for a misdemeanor trial. 139
Although he noted that the Modern Reports report of Paine had
referred to the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination, he
neither said nor implied that Paine imposed that standard on
Marian depositions; rather, he again noted the admissibility of
Marian statutes depositions in felony procedure:
Sect. 10. But it is said to have been adjudged in the seventh Year of
Will. 3. by the Court of King’s Bench upon Advice with the Justices
of the Common Pleas, upon an indictment for a Libel, that
Depositions taken before a justice of Peace relating to the fact could
not be given in evidence, though the Deponent were dead; and that
the Reason why such Depositions may be given in evidence in felony
depends upon the Statutes of P. and M.; And that this cannot be
extended farther than the particular Case of Felony. But in the
report of this Case in 5 Mod. it is said that the Reason why such
Depositions could not be read was because the Defendant was not
present when they were taken, and therefore had not the Benefit of a
cross Examination. 140

Thus, Hawkins’s treatise explained that the deposition
had been inadmissible in Paine both because Marian procedure
did not authorize the taking of depositions in misdemeanor
prosecutions and also because the defendant did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Interestingly,
however, when Hawkins discussed Paine in a shorter passage
in his Summary, he mentioned only the lack of authority for
the taking of depositions in misdemeanor cases, but did not
mention the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine,
suggesting that Hawkins regarded the lack of authority for the
taking of depositions in misdemeanor cases as the more
fundamental reason for the exclusion of the deposition in
Paine. 141 Thus, the contrast that Hawkins drew in both works
139
2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132, at 430. It is curious that Hawkins
referred to an “indictment,” because all of the reports of Paine described the case as
proceeding upon an “information.” However, indictments were not necessarily limited
to felonies during the eighteenth century; rather, serious misdemeanors were also
subject to “indictment” by grand jury.
140
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Note that Hawkins referred to
both of the grounds offered by the judges for rejecting the deposition. See supra note
108 and accompanying text.
141
A comparable but shortened passage on Paine also appeared in Hawkins’s
shorter 1728 “Summary,” supra note 133, although Hawkins cited only Salkeld’s report
of Paine in this version, but omitted any reference to the Modern Reports version in
which the loss of cross-examination had been mentioned:
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between misdemeanor and felony procedure makes it clear that
he did not question the admissibility of a deposition of a
witness in a felony trial. Notably, although Thomas Leach did
insert some notes into Hawkins’s text when he edited the 1787
edition of this treatise, and even added entirely new sections
when he substantially expanded the 1795 edition, he did not
alter the passages on Marian depositions or Paine (although he
did add related material in the 1795 edition, as discussed
below). 142
Moreover, as I discuss below, Hawkins’s statements on
these points are especially significant because they were also
widely reproduced in the justice of the peace manuals printed
and used in colonial and framing-era America, 143 as well as in
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century editions of
other widely used works such as Jacob’s Law-Dictionary. 144

Sect. 7. But it is said to have been solemnly adjudged that Depositions taken
before a Justice of Peace concerning a Libel, cannot be given in Evidence on
the Trial of an Indictment for such Libel, tho’ the Witness be Dead, and that
the Reason why such Depositions are Evidence in Felony depends on the
Statutes of Ph . & Ma.
2 HAWKINS, SUMMARY, supra note 133, at 421 (emphasis omitted).
142
See 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1739), supra note 132, at 429-30; 2 HAWKINS,
PLEAS (1762), supra note 132, at 429-30; 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1771), supra note 18, at
429-30; 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1787), supra note 18, at 605-06; 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1788),
supra note 132, at 605-06; 4 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1795), supra note 132, at 421-22, 423).
Not surprisingly, when Leach edited the 1795 edition, he added additional
sections relating to the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases that he had published in 1789 in the
first edition of his Crown Cases, discussed infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
He did not suggest that those cases altered the rules Hawkins had previously set out,
but his added material suggested that an arrestee should have an opportunity of
contradicting or cross-examining the witness during a Marian deposition. See infra
notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
143
See infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
144
GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (1729) [hereinafter JACOB’S LAW
DICTIONARY] [some later editions omit the word “New”]. This dictionary was first
published in 1729, and republished to the tenth edition in 1782. T.E. Tomlins then
published expanded editions in 1797 (2 volumes) and several nineteenth century
editions. See MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 9 (entry 33). All of the eighteenth-century
editions are available in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80; none of the
London editions have page numbers. In addition, a six volume American edition was
published in Philadelphia in 1811 (reprinted in facsimile by The LawBook Exchange
2000).
The entry for “Deposition” in the 1729 first edition also states:
Depositions of Informers &c. taken upon Oath before a Coroner, upon an
Inquisition of Death, or before Justices of Peace on a Commitment or
Bailment of Felony, may be given in Evidence at a Trial for the same Felony,
if it be proved on Oath that the Informer is dead, or unable to travel, or kept
away by the Procurement of the Prisoner; and Oath must be made that the
Depositions are the same that were sworn before the Coroner or Justice,
without any Alteration. 2 Hawk. P.C. 429.
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However, Justice Scalia apparently never considered the two
most significant passages from Hawkins’s treatise, although he
did cite Hawkins’s treatise for another, less significant point
that appeared one page prior to the passages I have quoted. 145
2. What Buller Wrote About Marian Depositions
A mid eighteenth-century commentator also essentially
echoed Hawkins’s views on the admissibility of Marian
depositions.
Francis Buller gained prominence when he
published a one-volume treatise on trial practice in 1767, and
later became a judge of the Court of King’s Bench. 146 His
treatise, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi

JACOB’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra (pages not numbered). The citation to “2 Hawk. P.C.
429” is to the passage from Hawkins’s treatise set out supra text accompanying note
136.
The entry for “Evidence” in the 1729 first edition states:
Depositions before a Coroner, are admitted as Evidence, the Witnesses being
dead. 1 Lev. 180. Likewise they have been admitted where a Witness hath
gone beyond Sea. 2 Nels. Abr. 760. The Confession of a Prisoner before a
Magistrate, &c. may be given in Evidence against him: And the Examination
of an Offender need not be on Oath, but must be subscribed by him, if he
confesses the Fact; and then be given in Evidence upon Oath by the Justices
of the Peace who took the same. The Examination of Others must be on
Oath, and proved by the Justice or his Clerk, &c. as to their Evidence, if they
are dead, unable to travel, or kept away by the Prisoner. H.P.C. 19, 262. Kel.
18. 55. Wood’s Inst. 647. The Examination of an Informer before a Justice,
taken on Oath and subscribed, may be given in Evidence on a Trial, if he be
dead, or not able to travel, &c. which is to be made out on Oath. 2 Hawk.
P.C. 429.
Id. (pages not numbered). The citation to “H.P.C. 262” is to the passage from Hale’s
Summary set out supra note 81 and accompanying text (note that Hale’s larger treatise
had not yet been published when Jacob first published his dictionary); “2 Hawk. P.C.
429” is again a citation to the passage from Hawkins’s treatise set out supra text
accompanying note 136.
The subsequent 1773 and 1782 editions (which are most germane to
assessing the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause) repeat these
passages. They also appear in the 1797 edition, which also added a paragraph, as set
out infra note 150.
The 1811 first American edition of Jacob’s Law-Dictionary reprinted the
passages from the 1797 London edition. See 2 JACOB’ LAW-DICTIONARY, supra, at 24849 (entry for “Deposition”); id. at 444, 454-55 (entry for “Evidence”).
So far as I can determine, Jacob said nothing regarding Paine or the taking
or admitting of depositions in misdemeanor cases, which suggests that it was not done.
See supra text accompanying note 112. Likewise, he said nothing about an opportunity
for cross-examination in any passage about the deposition or examination of a witness
in a criminal case.
145
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45 (2004) (citing 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS
(1787), supra note 132, ch. 46, § 3, at 603-04). The section cited by Justice Scalia is one
page ahead of Hawkins’s passage on the admissibility of Marian depositions in § 6 of
the same chapter, as quoted in the text accompanying note 136.
146
See 8 EDWARD FOSS, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 252-53 (1864; reprinted 1966).
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Prius, was republished in six London editions to 1793, and was
reprinted in New York in 1788. 147
After noting several situations in which depositions
could not be admitted in civil cases, and specifically noting that
depositions were inadmissible “where there cannot be CrossExamination, as Depositions taken before Commissioners of
Bankrupts,” Buller stated that Marian depositions “shall be
read against the Offender upon an Indictment, if the Witnesses
be dead.” 148 This passage was unaltered in later editions, 149 and
was also added to the post-framing 1797 London and 1811
Philadelphia editions of Jacob’s Law-Dictionary. 150 Notably,
Buller also expressed no “doubts” about the admissibility of
Marian depositions, and he said nothing about conditioning
their admissibility on cross-examination, even though he had
noted just before this passage that lack of an opportunity for
cross-examination did bar use of depositions in civil cases.
147

FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT
NISI PRIUS (first published 1767; republished in several editions to 1793). See
MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 335 (entry 3). Virtually all of the editions are available in
Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80 [hereinafter BULLER (Dublin 1768);
BULLER (London 1772); BULLER (Dublin 1785); BULLER (London 1789); BULLER
(London 1790); BULLER (London 1793)]. The first American printing of this treatise
was in New York in 1788. See JAMES, supra note 55, at 184 (entry 64).
“Nisi Prius” was the term for the trial jurisdiction exercised by the judges
of the superior courts at Westminster when they traveled to other parts of England to
hold jury trials. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 57, 59.
148
BULLER (Dublin 1768), supra note 147, at 341:
[I]f the Witnesses examined on a Coroner’s Inquest be dead, or beyond Sea,
their Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is an Officer appointed on
Behalf of the Public, to make Enquiry about the Matters within his
Jurisdiction; and therefore the Law will presume the Depositions before him
to be fairly and impartially taken.–And by [the Marian statutes] Justices of
the Peace shall examine of Persons brought before them for Felony, and of
those who brought them, and certify such Examination to the next GaolDelivery; but the Examination of the Prisoner shall be without Oath, and the
others upon Oath, and these Examinations shall be read against the Offender
upon an Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead.
149
See BULLER (London 1772), supra note 147, at 238; BULLER (London 1789),
supra note 147, at 230-31; BULLER (Dublin 1785), supra note 147, at 242; BULLER
(London 1793), supra note 147, at 242.
150
The following paragraph was added to the 1797 expanded edition of Jacob’s
Law-Dictionary immediately after the passage from the entry on “Evidence” quoted
supra note 144:
By Stats. 1 & 2 P. & M. c. 13. 2 & 3 P. & M. c. 10. Justices of peace shall
examine persons brought before them for felony, and those who brought
them, and certify such examination to the next gaol-delivery: but the
examination of the prisoner shall be without oath, and the others upon oath;
and these examinations shall be read against an offender upon an
indictment, if the witnesses be dead. Bull. N.P. 242.
GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY (1797) (pages not numbered) (entry for
“Evidence”). This passage also appeared in the 1811 Philadelphia edition.
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Thus, the post-Paine statements in the leading treatises
by Hawkins, Gilbert, and Buller (like Hale’s pre-Paine
writings) did not express or leave room for any “doubts” at all
about the admissibility of Marian depositions of unavailable
witnesses in felony trials. 151 Although eighteenth-century
Americans would likely have understood from English sources
that a Marian deposition would have been admissible in a
felony trial only if a witness was deceased, gravely ill, or
prevented from attending by the defendant, 152 there is no
evidence that they would have thought that Paine undercut or
limited the rule that Marian examinations of such unavailable
witnesses were admissible in felony cases, without regard to
whether there had been any prior opportunity for crossexamination. Moreover, contrary to Justice Scalia’s telling, the
relevant evidence does not indicate any change in that settled
rule prior to the framing of the Confrontation Clause.
E.

The 1787, 1789, and 1791 English Cases

Justice Scalia compounded his error regarding postPaine “doubts” about the admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses when he asserted that later English
cases decided in 1787, 1789, and 1791 had eliminated any such
doubts by “reject[ing]” the “statutory derogation” of Marian
procedure. 153 Indeed, he wrote as though these three English
cases had firmly established a rigid cross-examination rule,
151

The reader might wonder what Blackstone had to say. He did not address
the subject of the admissibility of Marian depositions of witnesses in his Commentaries.
The fact that he did not is not of any significance; Blackstone gave only a rudimentary
treatment of criminal procedure and of evidence in criminal trials because his
Commentaries were actually intended as an introductory overview for students of the
law. Indeed, Blackstone also wrote little about criminal trial procedure itself; the
statement by Blackstone that Justice Scalia cited in Crawford regarding the
importance of oral testimony was actually taken from Blackstone’s discussion of the
presentation of evidence in trials in civil actions. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43, citing 3
Blackstone, supra note 53, at 373-74.
152
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 136 (quoting Hawkins’s passage).
153
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5:
As we have explained, to the extent that the Marian examinations were
admissible, it was only because the statutes derogated from the common law
. . . . Moreover, by 1791 even the statutory-derogation view had been rejected
with respect to justice-of-the-peace examinations – explicitly in King v.
Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-04, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789), and King v.
Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-84 (1791), and by
implication in King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330,
331-32 (1787).
Justice Scalia appears to have located these cases through his own research; there was
no reference to any of these cases in any of the briefs filed in Crawford.
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applicable even to the admissibility of Marian depositions,
prior to the ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791:
by 1791 (the year the Sixth Amendment was ratified), [English]
courts were applying the cross-examination rule even to
examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases. See King v.
Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-563, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-384 (1791);
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-504, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353
(1789); cf. King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-461, 168 Eng. Rep.
330, 331-332 (1787) . . . 154

However, this set of claims also collapses on inspection.
For one thing, all of these three English cases were published
too late to have informed the Framers’ thinking. For another,
it would not have mattered if the Framers could have become
aware of them because none of the cases challenged the
admissibility of a Marian deposition or imposed a crossexamination standard on a Marian deposition.
1. The 1787, 1789, and 1791 English Cases Could Not
Have Informed the Original Meaning of the
Confrontation Clause
When Justice Scalia cited English cases decided in 1787,
1789, and 1791 in Crawford, he implicitly adopted what might
be termed a last-minute conception of original meaning. That
is, he assumed that even an English case decided on the very
eve of ratification of the Bill of Rights constitutes evidence of
the original meaning of a provision of the Bill. Although this
last-minute conception of original meaning was far from novel,
it exposed serious historical misunderstandings.
a. General Historical Objections to Last-Minute
Originalism
Although Americans had good reason to pay close
attention to statements regarding criminal procedure rights in
English legal sources during the grievances and controversies
that led up to the American Revolution, 155 that changed when
154
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47. In yet another passage, Justice Scalia also
asserted that these three cases revealed that “the common law in 1791 conditioned
admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. at 54. See also infra note 184.
155
See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986); BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
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the American states declared their independence in 1776:
English decisions after that date were no longer
authoritative. 156 In addition, the criminal procedure provisions
in the federal Bill of Rights were decidedly not novel. The
newly independent states had articulated criminal procedure
protections in the state declarations of rights adopted between
1776 and 1784, and it seems unlikely that many English
sources were imported during the Revolutionary War years
1775-1783, when the state declarations were adopted. Hence,
the state declarations essentially constitutionalized the rights
that had been articulated in English sources published prior to
1775. 157 Moreover, the criminal procedure clauses included in
the federal Bill of Rights simply reiterated the protections that
156

American independence meant, among other things, that a ruling in an
English case decided after July 2, 1776 did not constitute law in an American state
unless and until a court in that state actually adopted that ruling. Indeed, some state
constitutions were quite explicit as to the cut-off date at which English common law
and statute law were absorbed as the law of the new state. For example, New York set
it at April 19, 1775 – the date of the battle of Lexington. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XXXV, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
168, 177-78 (William F. Swindler ed., 1978).
Moreover, available evidence suggests that American state courts were
sometimes reluctant to adopt English innovations during the decades immediately
following the Revolution. For example, although an important innovation in English
arrest law was announced in the 1780 case Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep.
230 (K.B. 1782) (holding that a constable who made an unlawful warrantless arrest
was not subject to trespass liability if he acted on the basis of a charge of felony made
by another person), that case was not even mentioned, let alone followed in an 1814
Pennsylvania decision on the same subject, Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Penn. 1814)
(holding a constable liable for trespass damages for an unlawful warrantless felony
arrest). See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 634-36. Indeed, Jesse Root,
Chief Justice of Connecticut, asserted a complete break with English common law in
the Preface to his 1798 Connecticut Reports. 1 JESSE ROOT, REPORTS OF CASES
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT ERRORS 1789-1793, at iii-ix
(1899). Hence, unless there is specific evidence that Americans knew of or relied upon
an English source published after 1775, that source should not be assumed to
constitute evidence of framing-era American law.
157
Between 1776 and 1784, eight of the twelve American states (counting
Vermont) that adopted state constitutions also responded to the pre-revolutionary
grievances by adopting declarations of rights as part of their constitutions. These
included Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina (all in 1776),
Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784). See Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 668 n.326. The state declarations included settled
understandings of criminal procedure protections. See id. at 670. All eight included
the confrontation right, sometimes stated as a right to “meet” face-to-face the witnesses
against the defendant. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 402-13 (Neil H. Cogan ed.
1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL] (setting out criminal trial provisions of the initial
state declarations of rights). However, it is likely that the disruptions of the
Revolutionary War (1775 to 1783) limited the importation of English legal sources
during the period in which the state declarations were written. Moreover, the later of
these declarations were largely modeled on the earlier declarations. See Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 668-74.
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the states had previously adopted. Madison made only a few
innovations in the criminal procedure provisions he proposed
for the federal Bill, and no additional innovations were
introduced during the deliberations of the First Congress. 158
Thus, the original understanding of the federal criminal
procedure amendments essentially reflected criminal procedure
rights described in English sources as of 1775. Hence, when
these historical aspects are taken into account, it is highly
unlikely that any English doctrine first announced after 1775
informed the original American public understanding of a
criminal procedure provision of the federal Bill. 159
However, even putting these general objections to lastminute originalism aside, it is also evident that the 1787, 1789,
and 1791 English cases that Justice Scalia cited were invalid
evidence of original meaning if one considers when the reports
158
The complaints that were made about the absence of a federal Bill during
the ratification debates of 1787-1788 also drew upon the omission of the rights already
articulated in the state declarations. See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788) (referring to protections provided by Virginia
constitution regarding jury trial and related rights and complaining of absence of such
protections in proposed federal constitution), reprinted in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 44548 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Henry]; Abraham
Holmes, Remarks at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (referring to protection
against general warrants in Massachusetts constitution and complaining of absence of
such protection in proposed federal constitution), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 11112 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Holmes].
Additionally, when James Madison drafted the initial proposals for a federal Bill, he
sought to facilitate adoption of a federal Bill by eschewing controversial topics and
limiting his proposals for a federal bill of rights largely to those already proclaimed in
the state declarations and proposals. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHT AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 34, 36 (1957). Likewise, the First Congress did not add any
novel criminal procedure provisions beyond those proposed by Madison.
Madison’s innovations can be readily identified by comparing his proposals
with the earlier state provisions. Madison did innovate in using the custom-search
warrant standard of “probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment. See Davies, Original
Fourth, supra note 2, at 703-06. He innovated in using the phrase “due process of law”
in place of the traditional phrase “law of the land.” See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2,
at 408-15. And he innovated in using the novel “be a witness against himself” phrasing
of the right against self-incrimination. See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1008-09.
Otherwise, his proposals were not innovative.
159
Using 1775 as the date for assessing the relevance of English materials can
sometimes make a significant difference in the common-law content associated with
the Bill of Rights. English court rulings during the 1780s – including some of those
reported in Leach’s Crown Cases – made a variety of innovations that relaxed
standards pertaining to the initiation of criminal prosecutions but elaborated aspects of
the jury trial itself. See, e.g., supra note 156 (discussing the 1780 ruling in Samuel);
infra notes 180-82 (discussing the 1783 ruling in Warickshall). Thus, the “common
law” that can be extracted from Leach’s reports may seem a little less foreign to
modern investigatory criminal procedure than the more rigorously accusatory
procedure of the pre-Revolutionary era.
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of those cases were first published, rather than simply when
the cases were decided in London. 160
b. The Too-Late Publication of Leach’s Crown
Cases
Americans had no way to learn of an English ruling
until a published report of the case was printed, the volume
containing the report was shipped to America, distributed
throughout the states, and Americans purchased and read the
volume. 161 Moreover, during the eighteenth century there was
always some delay between the decision of a case and the
publication of a report of the case – a half-century delay in the
instance of one case cited in Crawford. 162 Thus, even if one
160

I initially recognized the importance of the date when an English case was
published when I examined claims that Professor Amar had made about the original
Fourth Amendment. Amar had cited a 1785 English case as authority that writs of
assistance were not equivalent to general warrants. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth
Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 77-80
(1996) (citing Cooper v. Boot, 4 Dougl. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785)). Likewise, he
cited the same case for a statement Lord Mansfield had made regarding the supposed
immunizing effect a warrant had on an officer’s trespass liability. Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 778 (1994) (citing Cooper,
4 Dougl. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785)). However, upon researching Cooper, I
discovered that the earliest report of the case had not been published prior to 1801, so
it was plain that the statements in it could not have informed the Framers’
understanding in 1789. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 561 n.19.
161
It does not appear there could have been alternative sources of
information. For example, although English court decisions of broad public import
were sometimes reported in American newspapers, those reports tended to be very
cryptic, and they did not convey the sort of detail that a practicing lawyer would
require. See, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 563-65 n.22 (discussing
newspaper accounts of the Wilksite general warrant cases). Moreover, the cases Scalia
cited were hardly of broad public import. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 4347 (2004). In addition, although an American who was in London when a decision was
rendered might have learned of a decision first-hand, it seems unlikely that that he
could have shared that information with many other Americans.
162
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the 1739 ruling in King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach
12, 13, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (Old Bailey 1739), as historical evidence that a sworn
affidavit of a deceased accomplice could be admitted as evidence in a framing-era
criminal trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72. In response, Justice Scalia asserted that
Westbeer was irrelevant because it “was decided a half-century [before the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment] and cannot be taken as an accurate statement of the law in
1791.” Id. at 54 n.5.
However, this exchange was pointless. Westbeer is irrelevant to the
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment because it was never published until
Thomas Leach included it in his Crown Cases, which was not published until May 1789
at the earliest (see infra note 177 and accompanying text) – fifty years after the
decision, but too late to have informed the framing of the Confrontation Clause. As I
argue in the text that follows, all of the cases in Leach’s Crown Cases were published
too late to have informed American thinking prior to the framing of the Confrontation
Clause in the summer of 1789. See infra notes 163, 177, 182 and accompanying text.
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ignores the general defects of last-minute originalism, it should
be obvious that the date when a report of the case was initially
published in London, plus at least a few months, marks the
earliest date by which Americans could have learned of the
content of the case. However, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist both repeatedly ignored this basic consideration in
Crawford. 163
Even if one were to accept Scalia’s use of 1791, the year
the Bill of Rights was ratified, as the appropriate cutoff for
relevant evidence of original meaning, the fact is that the 1791
case that Scalia cited was not published in London until some
time in 1792. 164 Thus, the 1791 case (the only one among the
three that Scalia cited that actually mentioned “crossexamination” 165) had no conceivable bearing on the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
Additionally, although numerous previous Supreme
Court opinions and commentaries have mechanistically treated
the date of ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 as though it
163
For example, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist sparred over the
1787, 1789, and 1791 cases, see infra, and sparred over Westbeer, as discussed supra
note 162, even though all of those cases were never reported until Thomas Leach’s
Crown Cases was published in London in May 1789 at the earliest, see infra note 177,
and thus could not have informed American thinking when the Confrontation Clause
was framed in the summer of 1789. Likewise, Rehnquist also misrelied upon another
case first published in the same volume of reports. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202
(K.B. 1779)).
Scalia and Rehnquist also dueled over statements appearing in King v.
Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790). Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. 46,
54 n.5 (opinion of the Court, written by Scalia), with id. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). However, Eriswell was never published – or even decided – until after the
Confrontation Clause was framed in 1789. Scalia and Rehnquist showed similar
disregard for whether the American Framers had access to a source when they cited
the 1791 edition of Gilbert’s evidence treatise, rather than earlier editions that were
available in framing-era America. See, e.g., id. at 45 (opinion of the Court); id. at 70
n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). As previously noted, Scalia even used an account of
Raleigh’s trial that was not published until four decades after the framing. See supra
note 50.
164
Justice Scalia cited the report of the 1791 ruling in King v. Dingler that
now appears in the English Reports. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (citing King v.
Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-84 (1791)). However, the English
Reports reprint the 1815 fourth edition of Crown Cases. Dingler could not have
appeared in the first edition, which was published in 1789. See infra note 177. It
seems highly likely that Dingler would have been first published in the one-volume
second edition (I have not been able to examine the second edition; no copy of that
edition is included in Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80). Bibliographic
sources show the second edition was published in 1792. See, e.g., MAXWELL, supra note
80, at 303 (entry 78) (showing second edition of Crown Cases published 1792);
BRIDGMAN, supra note 133, at 190 (same).
165
See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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were the appropriate date for assessing the doctrinal content of
the original meaning of a provision in the Bill of Rights 166 – as
Scalia and Rehnquist both did in Crawford 167 – ratification is
not the germane date.
It makes no sense to refer to an original meaning that
did not emerge until after the members of the First Congress
and the members of nine state legislatures had already
approved the Bill. When the Virginia legislature provided the
tenth approval necessary for the Bill to become operational in
December 1791, 168 it possessed authority only to accept or reject
the amendments already proposed – not to revise their
content. 169 Hence, the original meaning has to refer to the
public meaning of the text at the time the First Congress
approved the language of the amendments – the date when the
text was framed.
Indeed, Justice Scalia seems to have

166

A variety of opinions have construed a provision of the Bill of Rights
according to the law as of the date of ratification of the Bill, as of 1791, or as of the date
of the “adoption” of the Bill (which appears to refer to ratification). See, e.g., Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 331, 339, 345-46 n.14 (2001) (Fourth Amendment);
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (First Amendment freedom of speech); id.
at 372-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379, 382 (1993)
(Fourth Amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966, 987 (1991) (Eighth
Amendment); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
564 (1990) (Seventh Amendment); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669-70 (1989) (First Amendment Establishment Clause);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989) (Opinion of the Court)
(Seventh Amendment); id. at 77, 84, 86 (White, J., dissenting); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980) (Opinion of the Court) (Fourth Amendment); id. at 606
(White, J., dissenting); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335, 336, 337
(1979) (Opinion of the Court) (Seventh Amendment); id. at 345-46, 347, 349
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 284 n.29, 380, 382 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Eighth Amendment); id. at 428.
167
Justice Scalia referred to “1791” or the date of “ratification” several times.
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (referring to English cases decided “by 1791 (the
year the Sixth Amendment was ratified)”); id. at 54 n.5 (“in 1791”). Similarly, although
Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to the “framing” of the Sixth Amendment at one point
in his concurring opinion, id. at 72 (referring to “English law at the time of the
framing”), at others he referred to the “ratification of the Sixth Amendment,” id. at 71,
or “1791,” id. at 72. At still another point he referred to the state of the law at the
“time of the founding.” Id. at 69 n.1.
168
See DUMBAULD, supra note 158, at 50 (noting that Virginia did not provide
the final approval necessary for the ratification of the Bill of Rights until December
1791).
169
“Ratification” means – and meant – a principal’s retroactive approval of an
agent’s prior act. See, e.g., 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Noah Webster ed., 1st ed. 1828) (defining “ratification” as: “1. the act of ratifying,
confirmation. 2. the act of giving sanction and validity to something done by another;
as the ratification of a treaty by the senate of the United States.”).
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acknowledged as much in prior opinions 170 (and Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged as much in Crawford itself 171).
The text of the Bill of Rights, including the
Confrontation Clause, was formally approved by the First
Congress for submission to the states on September 25, 1789. 172
Realistically, however, the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause became fixed even earlier.
The
legislative record shows that there was no alteration of the text
following the report of the committee of eleven on July 11,
1789, and the only change that committee made from the
proposals Madison had offered on June 8 – the deletion of the
redundant words “accusers and” – appears to have been
Moreover, Madison
stylistic rather than substantive. 173
appears to have taken his language for the proto confrontation
clause from New York’s 1788 proposals for amendments. 174
Additionally, there is no indication of any debate regarding the
confrontation right when the House of Representatives took up
the proposed amendments during August, or when the Senate
later approved them (although the record for the Senate is
almost nonexistent). 175 Hence, as a historical matter, the text
170
For example, Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in
a previous Confrontation Clause case in which Thomas discussed the original meaning
of the Confrontation Clause in terms of the understanding of the “drafters” of that
Clause. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring) (discussing what “the drafters of the Sixth Amendment intended”). In
addition, Scalia referred to the “framing” of the Fourth Amendment in the 1999
decision Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (stating that the first
consideration in assessing the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth
Amendment should be “whether a particular governmental action . . . was regarded as
an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed”).
171
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (referring to
“English law at the time of the framing”).
172
See Agreed Resolution of September 25, 1789, reprinted in COMPLETE BILL,
supra note 157, at 385, entry 12.1.1.28.a.
173
The proto confrontation clause James Madison proposed on June 8, 1789
referred to an accused’s right “to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses
against him.” See COMPLETE BILL, supra note 157, at 285, entry 12.1.1.1.a. The
Committee of Eleven’s report on July 28, 1789, simply deleted the words “accusers and”
from Madison’s “accusers and witnesses against him.” See id. at 387, entry 12.1.1.3
(“to be confronted with the witnesses against him”). There was no subsequent change
in the text of the Clause; the same language appeared in the Agreed Resolution of
September 25, 1789. See id. at 400, entry 12.1.1.28.a (“to be confronted with the
witnesses against him”). It seems likely that “accusers and” was simply thought to be
redundant with “witnesses against him” because a complainant could be a “witness” in
a criminal prosecution.
174
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
175
There is no record of any discussion of the Confrontation Clause in the
records of the debates in the House regarding the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. See COMPLETE BILL, supra note 157, at 387-91, entries 12.1.1.4 through
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of the Confrontation Clause was framed no later than the
summer of 1789.
The date of the framing matters because the 1787 and
1789 English cases Scalia cited were published in Thomas
Leach’s Crown Cases, 176 and the one-volume first edition of that
work became available in London no earlier than – though
possibly later than – May of 1789 177 – no more than roughly a
month before Madison proposed what became the
Confrontation Clause, and two months before the Committee of
Eleven proposed the final language.
Hence, taking into account the time required to ship
(literally) that volume to America and distribute it to
customers, it is questionable whether copies of Leach’s Crown
Cases were available to Americans at all when the
Confrontation Clause was framed during the summer of 1789.
Moreover, it is a virtual certainty that the members of the First
Congress who framed the federal Bill would not have put aside

12.1.1.12 (report of debates in the House of Representatives on August 17, 18, and 21,
1789). There is no comparable record of the debates in the Senate, but the Senate did
not propose any alteration of the Confrontation Clause to the House. See Senate
Resolution of September 9, 1789 in COMPLETE BILL, supra note 157, at 395, entry
12.1.1.19 (“to be confronted with the witnesses against him”).
176
See supra text accompanying note 154 (indicating that the reports of the
1787 ruling in Radbourne and of the 1789 ruling in Woodcock were published in “1
Leach” and that that volume is reprinted in 168 English Reports). However, the
English Reports reprint the 1815 fourth edition of Leach’s Crown Cases. (As a general
rule, the English Reports reprints only the final edition of the earlier nominate
reports.) The single-volume 1789 first edition of Leach’s Crown Cases (available in
Eighteenth Century Collections, supra note 80) was slightly smaller than the first
volume of the fourth edition. Specifically, the first edition contains 190 cases and runs
to cases decided in 1789; in contrast, the first volume of the 1815 fourth edition
reprinted in the English Reports contains 244 cases and runs to cases decided in 1791.
I have confirmed that the reports of Radbourne and Woodcock did appear in the first
edition.
177
Bibliographic works show that the first edition of Leach’s Crown Cases was
published in 1789, but give only the year of publication. See, e.g., MAXWELL, supra
note 80, at 303 (entry 78). However, the earliest possible date for the printing of the
first edition of Crown Cases is evident from the fact that one of the last cases in that
volume reported a proceeding during the “April session 1789” of the Old Bailey. See
John Wilkins’s Case, CROWN CASES 444 (1st ed. 1789) (“At the Old Bailey April Session
1789”). In addition, the Old Bailey Session Papers indicate that the April 1789 session
was held “[o]n Wednesday, the 22d of April, 1789, and the following days.” See
www.oldbaileyonline.org/facsimiles/1780s/178904220001.html (presenting cases from
the April 1789 session; last day of session not given). Hence, assuming that the actual
printing would have taken a few weeks, it is a virtual certainty that the volume could
not have been available for sale in London prior to sometime in May 1789, although it
might have been published some time later than that.
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the crucial work of forming a new government 178 simply to read
the latest reports of ordinary criminal trials from England. 179
Thus, although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford was
not the first Supreme Court opinion to cite a case from Leach’s
Crown Cases as though it constituted evidence of the original
meaning of a provision of the Bill of Rights, 180 and although
Chief Justice Rehnquist did likewise in Crawford, 181 all of those
citations amount to prochronistic errors. A case that was first
published in Leach’s Crown Cases cannot constitute valid
evidence of how the American Framers understood the Bill of
178
Several members of the First Congress even objected to taking up the
proposal for the Bill of Rights during the summer of 1789 on the ground that there was
more pressing business to attend to regarding the formation of the new federal
government and the provision of revenue for it. See, e.g., 5 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1034-42 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980) (reprinting the legislative record of
responses to Madison’s proposal that the House take up a Bill of Rights in June 1789
and showing that several members objected to taking up the subject because of other
pending legislation relating to matters such as the revenue and the establishment of a
federal judiciary); see also ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
1776-1791, at 206-07 (1955) (noting that “there were continual outcries” by members of
the House “that more important business was pressing”).
179
Leach’s Crown Cases was novel insofar as it presented reports of run-ofthe-mill criminal trial rulings. Previous case reporters had concentrated on the
appellate rulings or quasi-appellate rulings on reserved issues in the superior courts at
Westminster. See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV.
499, 555, 560 n.363 (1999) (noting that the English Reports contain largely reports
from the “central royal courts” and that Leach’s Crown Cases is the earlier of only two
reporters of “nominate reports” of ordinary criminal trials included in the English
Reports).
180
See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 551-52 (1897) (citing “Rex v.
Thompson, (1783) 1 Leach, (4th ed.) 291” and “Cass’ case, (1784) 1 Leach, 293” as
pertinent authority for construing the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination). See also infra note 181.
Commentators have also misrelied on cases from 1 Leach’s Crown Cases in
making arguments about original meaning. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 857, 916-17 (1995) (describing King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep.
234 (Old Bailey 1783), as “the leading English case [regarding the admissibility of
physical evidence discovered by means of an improperly obtained confession] when the
U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791”).
181
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Crawford also treated 1791
as the relevant date for assessing the relevance of English cases and cited a number of
cases that were first published in Leach’s Crown Cases. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 72 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach
12, 13, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (Old Bailey, 1739)); id. at 69-70 (citing King v. Brasier, 1
Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779)); id. at 73 (citing King v. Woodcock, 1
Leach 500, 502-04, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-54 (Old Bailey 1789)).
Chief Justice Rehnquist also implied that decisions in 1 Leach were
relevant to the original content of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428
(2000). See id. at 433 (citing King v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-18, 122-23, 168 Eng. Rep.
160, 161, 164 (K.B. 1775) [incorrectly cited as “1783”]; King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach
262, 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (Old Bailey 1783) [incorrectly cited as “K.B.”]).

162

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

Rights (a point I made in an article that was submitted to the
Court in another case during the same term in which Crawford
was decided). 182
The 1787, 1789, and 1791 English cases that Justice
Scalia presented as though they comprised decisive authority
for his cross-examination rule were actually irrelevant for
assessing the Framers’ understanding of the confrontation
right. However, that was not the only problem with his
reliance on those cases – they also did not show what his
opinion implied.
2. What the 1787, 1789, and 1791 Cases Actually
Stood For
As noted above, Justice Scalia claimed that the 1787,
1789, and 1791 English cases had “rejected” what he termed
the “statutory derogation view” under which Marian
depositions were admitted into evidence without regard to
Unfortunately, he stated that claim
cross-examination. 183
rather cryptically, and he did not say anything further that
clarified its meaning. 184 I think that the claim can be construed
182

Because some justices and commentators had suggested or implied that
the 1783 decision King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng Rep. 234 (Old Bailey
1783), constituted evidence of the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, see supra notes 180-81, I explained, in an article on the
original understanding of that right, that Leach’s Crown Cases had been published too
late to provide credible evidence of the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment right.
See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1023-28.
During the same term as Crawford, the Court addressed the issue of the
admissibility of the physical “fruits” of an unwarned confession in United States v.
Patane, 524 U.S. 630 (2004). In Patane, counsel for the defendant submitted a
prepublication copy of my article and counsel explicitly called the Court’s attention to
my discussion of the invalidity of treating the Warickshall case as evidence of the
original meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Happily, none of the justices invoked
original meaning of the Fifth Amendment right or history in the decision in Patane –
although there is no reason to assume that my article accounts for that silence.
Unfortunately, the information regarding the inappropriateness of treating a case
reported in Leach’s Crown Cases as evidence of the original meaning of a provision in
the Bill of Rights does not seem to have come to the attention of Justice Scalia, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, or the clerks who were involved in writing the opinions in Crawford
during the same term.
183
See supra text accompanying note 153.
184
Justice Scalia’s statements regarding these three cases sometimes implied
more than was literally said. Indeed, considering that these three cases were crucial to
his historical claim, it is noteworthy that he actually said very little about them. For
example, when he first cited the three cases in his opinion, he said only that they
showed that English “courts were applying the cross-examination rule even to
examinations taken by justices of the peace in felony cases[.]” Crawford, 541 U.S. at
46; see supra text accompanying note 154. However, this claim regarding “felony
cases” could be read to refer only to the point that depositions which were improperly
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in two slightly different ways, and that it is useful to
disentangle these two possible interpretations as far as
possible.
One way to understand Scalia’s “reject[ion]” claim –
which I think is the most natural way to read what he wrote in
the context of his other statements, and which I suspect is how
many readers of Crawford understand it – is that these three
cases had ruled that Marian depositions were inadmissible
unless there had been an opportunity for cross-examination in
that particular case. In this section, I show that the cited cases
did not say that the admissibility of a deposition depended
upon a prior opportunity for cross-examination and thus they
do not support this strong version of Scalia’s “reject[ion]” claim.
The other possible interpretation of Scalia’s “reject[ion]”
claim, which is somewhat more nuanced, is that crossexamination simply always was, or at some point in time had
become, a standard feature of Marian deposition practice itself,
and thus Marian procedure actually satisfied the common-law
cross-examination rule that Scalia attributed to Paine. I think
this version of the “reject[ion]” claim is evident in early
nineteenth-century English commentaries and in a discussion
by Wigmore that Scalia cited and apparently drew inspiration
from. 185 Thus, in the next section, I inquire whether there is
taken outside of Marian procedure (as was the case with Woodcock and Dingler) would
have been inadmissible. Thus, that sentence could mean merely that some depositions
in felony cases were occasionally ruled inadmissible. However, if that was the
meaning, the assertion would have been of little consequence for the argument.
Likewise, Justice Scalia wrote in a later passage that the three cases
“reveal[ed] [that] the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent
witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. However, in this statement he did not explicitly say
anything about depositions admissible under the Marian statutes. The statement
would be of virtually no consequence, however, unless it had been meant to include
Marian depositions. Looking at these two statements alone, one might suspect that
they were artfully written to lead the reader to imagine that they had claimed more
than was actually said.
However, Justice Scalia also made a third statement in which he wrote
that the three cases “rejected” the “statutory derogation view.” See id. at 54 n.5.
Because Scalia had used “statutory derogation” to describe the rule of admissibility
under the Marian statutes, see supra text accompanying note 153, this statement
would appear to indicate that Scalia must have meant for all three passages to assert
that the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases somehow altered the rule of admissibility under
the Marian statutes themselves, even if he was not very explicit as to precisely how
they altered it.
185
Immediately after Scalia’s first citation to the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases
in Crawford (Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler), Scalia also cited “3 Wigmore § 1364,
at 23” and wrote:
Early 19th-century treatises confirm that [cross-examination] requirement.
See 1 T. STARKIE, EVIDENCE 95 (1826); 2 id., at 484-92; T. PEAKE, EVIDENCE
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evidence that cross-examination may have become a feature of
English Marian practice by the end of the eighteenth century. I
conclude, regarding this other version of the claim, that
although evidence suggests some English judges may have
begun to treat cross-examination as an aspect of Marian
procedure roughly with, or shortly after, the time of the
framing, no statements to that effect had been published in
time to have informed the American understanding of the
confrontation right when the Confrontation Clause was framed
in 1789.
a. The 1787, 1789, and 1791 Cases Did Not
Restrict the Admissibility of Marian
Depositions of Unavailable Witnesses
The 1787, 1789, and 1791 English cases did not “reject”
the previously stated rule that Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses were admissible in felony trials.
Likewise, they did not limit the admissibility of such
depositions according to whether there actually had been an
opportunity for cross-examination of the witness. None of
those cases actually ruled that a Marian deposition of an
unavailable witness was inadmissible in a felony trial, or even
questioned the admissibility of a genuine Marian deposition of
an unavailable witness.
Instead, one case discussed an
admissible deposition of an unavailable witness and the other
two cases discussed depositions that were inadmissible for the
sole reason that they were taken outside of Marian procedure.
None of these three cases stood for the proposition implied in
Justice Scalia’s opinion – that a Marian deposition of an
unavailable witness would be inadmissible unless there had
been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
i.

The 1787 Case

In King v. Radbourne, the earliest of the three cases
cited by Scalia (albeit with a “cf.” signal), a trial judge ruled
63-64 (3d ed. 1808). When Parliament amended the statutes in 1848 to make
the requirement explicit, see 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17, the change merely
“introduced in terms” what was already afforded the defendant “by the
equitable construction of the law.” Queen v. Beeston, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 527,
529 (Ct. Crim. App. 1854) (Jervis, C.J.).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 (footnote omitted). I discuss these commentaries and
statements infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
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that a deposition of a deceased victim was admissible in a trial
for petty treason and murder. The judge described the
deposition at issue as having been taken “in the presence of the
prisoner” and “heard by the prisoner,” presumably at the time
of arrest. 186 However, the case report said nothing about the
prisoner (that is, the arrestee) having any opportunity to take
part in the deposition or to pose any questions to the
deponent. 187 Further, there is a ready explanation for the
explicit reference to the “presence of the prisoner.” Radbourne
was not a simple murder case; because the defendant was a
servant and had killed her mistress she was also charged with
petty treason, a form of treason. 188 Thus, evidence in the trial
was subject to the explicit requirement in the treason statutes
– but not in the Marian felony statutes – that all evidence of
treason be taken “in the presence of” the accused. 189 However,
there is no reason to conclude that the “in the presence of”
language in Radbourne imposed any condition on the
admissibility of a Marian deposition of an unavailable witness
in a trial that involved only a felony charge. 190

186

King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459, 461, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (Old
Bailey 1787).
187
Id. at 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331-32.
188
See id. at 457, 168 Eng. Rep. at 330 (indictment for “feloniously and
traitorously” killing her mistress); id. at 462, 168 Eng. Rep. at 333 (court refers to
indictment for “petty treason”). A conviction for petty treason, a capital crime, could
result in an extremely harsh form of execution. See the discussion of “petit treason” at
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 75, 203-04.
189
Radbourne, 1 Leach at 461-62, 168 Eng. Rep. at 333 (“[S]tatutes 5 & 6
Edw. 6, c. 11 s. 12 [which pertained to treason] . . . require[] . . . that the said accusers
shall, if then living, be brought in person before the party so accused, and avow what
they have to say against him; and these statutes not being repealed by the 1 & 2 Phil.
and Mary, c. 10, which orders that all trials of treason shall be according to the course
of the common law.” (emphasis added)). Note, however, that the treason statute said
nothing regarding an opportunity for the accused person to cross-examine the witness,
and that the treason statute contained an exception for a statement of a deceased
witness (“if then living”).
The defendant in Radbourne was acquitted of petty treason because “the
statute 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, s. 22,” required the evidence of two witnesses for petty treason,
and that requirement was not met. However, she was nevertheless convicted of
murder and executed for that crime. Radbourne, 1 Leach at 461-63, 168 Eng. Rep. at
332-33.
190
However, Thomas Peake later cited Radbourne as though it did carry an
implication for Marian depositions in an 1802 English commentary on evidence. See
infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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ii. The 1789 Case
Unlike Radbourne, the 1789 and 1791 cases Justice
Scalia cited did rule that depositions taken from dying victims
were inadmissible in murder trials (although the 1789 case
allowed the statement to be admitted as a dying declaration 191).
However, neither case excluded a Marian deposition; rather,
the depositions in those felony cases were excluded precisely
because they did not conform to Marian procedure.
In the 1789 case King v. Woodcock, a justice of the peace
had taken the deposition of a victim of a beating who died prior
to the defendant’s trial for murder. 192 During the trial, the
judge, Chief Baron Eyre, noted that the deposition could not be
admitted under the Marian statutes because it had not been
taken in connection with the defendant’s arrest, as provided for
in the Marian statutes. 193 Specifically, because the justice of
the peace had taken the deposition separately at the poorhouse to which the victim had been taken prior to the arrest,
rather than in connection with the arrest, Eyre concluded that
the magistrate had acted “extrajudicial[ly]” beyond his
authority. As a result, the deposition was legally unsworn and
inadmissible for that reason. 194 Eyre also commented that
because of the circumstances in which the deposition was
191

See King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-03, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-54
(K.B. 1789) (leaving jury to determine whether the victim deponent knew she was
dying, and thus whether her statement was admissible as a dying declaration; jury
convicted defendant of murder, and defendant was executed). The usual framing-era
rule was that only sworn statements could constitute evidence. See infra notes 297-98.
However, it appears that a speaker’s anticipation of imminent death was thought to
assure truthfulness to the same degree as an oath. Thus, the dying declaration
exception to the usual requirement of an oath applied only if there was proof that the
speaker was aware that he or she was about to die. As explained in the text following,
the judge in Woodcock ruled that the deposition was not properly authorized and thus
not properly sworn, so it could not be admitted into evidence as a valid deposition;
however, because it was taken when the speaker was aware of imminent death, it could
be admitted, even though not sworn, as a dying declaration. In contrast, if there was
no evidence that the speaker was aware of imminent death, then the statement would
be inadmissible. See infra note 198.
192
Woodcock, 1 Leach at 500-01, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352.
193
Id. at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
194
Id. at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353 (reporting that the judge stated that
because the deposition (“examination”) of the victim was taken outside of Marian
procedure, the deposition was not “upon oath, judicially taken” and, hence, the court
“must strip this examination of the sanction to which it would have been entitled, if it
had been taken pursuant to the directions of the Legislature”). Note that this reflects
the logic of deposition authority set out supra note 106. The judge’s description of the
deposition as “extrajudicial” appears to mean that the deposition would have been
invalid as evidence and inadmissible even if the arrestee had been present when it was
taken and even if the arrestee had been allowed to cross-examine the witness.
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taken, “the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of
contradicting the facts [the deposition] contains.” 195 However,
the case report did not indicate that Eyre referred to the lack of
an opportunity for cross-examination as such, and that silence
is noteworthy because he did refer to cross-examination in the
context of a trial. 196
Moreover, contrary to the implication a reader might
draw from the citation to Woodcock in Crawford, Eyre did not
question – let alone “reject[]” 197– the admissibility of a Marian
deposition. To the contrary, he explicitly stated that “[a
Marian] deposition, if the deponent should die between the
time of the examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be
substituted in the room of that given viva voce testimony which
the deponent, if living, could alone have given, and is admitted
of necessity as evidence of the fact.” 198
195

Woodcock, 1 Leach at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
Id., 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. Baron Eyre referred only to the “opportunity of
contradicting,” not of cross-examining, when discussing the inadmissibility of the outof-court deposition. The omission of cross-examination is noteworthy because he had
previously referred to testimony during a trial as being “in the presence of the prisoner,
and received under all the advantages which examination and cross-examination can
give.” Id. at 501, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352. Eyre’s comment that the prisoner could not
“contradict” the witness’s statement seems to refer to what the arrestee could say; he
may have meant that the prisoner would be unfamiliar with what the witness had said
when the prisoner attempted to exculpate himself. See infra text accompanying notes
218-19.
However, Professor Langbein has treated the reference to “contradict” in
Woodcock as “the first judicial mention of [the want of cross-examination] rationale for
excluding what we would call hearsay . . . .” LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note
79, at 238. Langbein’s assessment that this was the first mention of cross-examination
is especially significant because he based that assessment on his examination of the
Old Bailey Session Papers as well as the published case reports. Id. In particular, he
noted that when judges excluded a statement of an allegedly murdered boy in an
earlier 1785 case in the Old Bailey, they referred solely to the fact that it was unsworn,
but did not mention any concern with the lack of cross-examination. See id. at 238
n.267. Thus, although I am not convinced that Langbein was correct in viewing Eyre’s
comments in Woodcock as a reference to cross-examination, Langbein’s analysis of the
1785 case does make it fairly certain that the concern with cross-examination did not
appear any earlier than the 1789 ruling in Woodcock.
197
See quotation from Crawford supra note 153 (describing Woodcock as
having “rejected” the “statutory derogation view” that Marian depositions were
admissible without regard to cross-examination).
198
Woodcock, 1 Leach at 501-02, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
But beyond this kind of evidence [taken during trials,] there are also two
other species which are admitted by law: The one is the dying declaration of
a person who has received a fatal blow; the other is the examination of a
prisoner, and the depositions of the witnesses who may be produced against
him, taken officially before a Justice of the Peace, by virtue of a particular
Act of Parliament [i.e., the Marian statutes], which authorizes Magistrates to
take such examinations, and directs that they shall be returned to the Court
of Gaol Delivery. This last species of deposition, if the deponent should die
between the time of the examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be
196
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iii. The 1791 Case
Like Woodcock, the report of the 1791 case King v.
Dingler dealt with a deceased victim’s deposition that had been
taken outside of Marian procedure. A magistrate had taken
the deposition of the dying victim the day after the arrest,
rather than in connection with the arrest. 199 The defendant’s
counsel argued that when Marian procedure is followed, “the
prisoner may have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of
cross-examination” but that “as the prisoner was not present,
no judicial examination has been taken, as he could not have
the benefit of cross-examination.” 200 (As I discuss below, this
case, the report of which was not published until 1792, 201 seems
to be the first in which there was an explicit assertion, albeit
only by counsel, that a prisoner would have had a right to
cross-examine during a Marian deposition of a witness. 202)
However, the report of Dingler does not indicate that the judge
referred to a loss of cross-examination in his ruling. Rather, it
states only that “[t]he Court, on the authority of the case cited
[that is, Woodcock] admitted the objection, and refused to
receive the examination into evidence.” 203
Thus, this case also did not “reject[]” the rule that
statements taken from absent witnesses pursuant to the
Marian statutes were admissible in felony trials. 204 Except for
counsel’s novel hypothetical claim, the case did not address

substituted in the room of that viva voce testimony which the deponent, if
living, could alone have given, and is admitted of necessity as evidence of the
fact.
Id. at 501-02, 168 Eng. Rep. At 352-53 (citation omitted); see also the statement quoted
regarding the “legislative sanction” for admitting properly taken Marian depositions in
the parenthetical supra note 194.
199
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791). The
defendant had already been “committed” to await trial when the deposition was taken
“[o]n the ensuing day.” Id. The introductory case note also states that the deposition
was taken “in the absence of the prisoner,” id., but that probably was added when the
English Reports were published in the mid-nineteenth century.
200
Id. at 562, 384. The prosecuting counsel conceded that the deposition was
“not taken strictly in pursuance of [the Marian statutes],” but there is no record of any
comment on the cross-examination argument. Id.
201
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
202
See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
203
Dingler, 2 Leach at 562, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384. Unlike Woodcock, the
deposition in Dingler did not constitute a dying declaration. See id., 168 Eng. Rep. at
384 (counsel for the crown conceded that the deposition was not a dying declaration).
204
See quotation from Crawford set out supra note 153 (describing Dingler as
having “rejected” the “statutory derogation view” that Marian depositions were
admissible without regard to cross-examination).
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Marian depositions. The bottom line is that none of the three
cases Scalia cited actually dealt with the admissibility of
Marian depositions.
b. The Possibility That Marian Procedure Itself
Provided an Opportunity for CrossExamination
The more nuanced interpretation of Justice Scalia’s
claim that the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases “rejected” what he
termed the “statutory derogation view” 205 is that those cases
demonstrated that Marian procedure itself provided an
opportunity for cross-examination. Was that the case?
Did Marian procedure itself usually include an
opportunity for a defendant to cross-examine an adverse
witness during the taking of the witness’s deposition?
Unfortunately, it does not appear that any direct evidence of
how Marian depositions were taken has survived.
For
example, I have not located any reports of surviving copies of
Marian depositions. In addition, the short descriptions of
Marian procedure in the treatises and justice of the peace
manuals stop short of prescribing actual practice beyond
requiring that an accuser or witness be deposed under oath.
The published cases and commentaries do seem to indicate that
English practice was moving in the direction of providing an
opportunity for cross-examination as an aspect of Marian
procedure itself toward the end of the eighteenth century.
However, the salient point for the present inquiry is that no
published statement to that effect had appeared in any source
that the American Framers could have had access to in 1789
(or even in 1791).
The Marian statutes themselves did not say anything
about cross-examination. Although they provided that the
examination of the arrestee and the depositions of witnesses
were to be taken in connection with bailment or commitment of
an arrestee, and although those processes would have promptly
followed an arrest, the statutes did not even say that the
arrestee had to be present during the depositions of
witnesses. 206 The only statement I have located as to whether
205

See supra note 153.
In fact, the Marian statutes set out the requirement of the “examination” of
the arrestee first, and then refer to the requirement of taking the “information” of the
witnesses who brought the arrestee. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
206
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arrestees were present for a Marian witness deposition is a
statement by an English historian in an 1883 work to the effect
that Marian depositions were not taken in the prisoner’s
presence – although that writer presented no evidence for that
conclusion. 207 (Justice Scalia cited that historical work for
another proposition, but did not mention that specific
statement in Crawford, 208 although Justice Thomas had quoted
that statement in a prior opinion that Justice Scalia had joined,
and that statement was also invoked in two briefs filed in
Crawford. 209) Of course, it also goes without saying that, even
if the arrestee had been present for the taking of a witness’s
Marian deposition, he would not have been represented by
counsel at that time.
The important point is that none of the published
statements about Marian depositions that were available in
America prior to the framing of the Confrontation Clause make
any reference to the arrestee being present during the taking of
a witness’s deposition. For example, the statement by the
judges in the Modern Reports version of Paine – that the
deposition should be inadmissible because “the defendant was
not present when they were taken, and therefore had not the
benefit of a cross examination” – plainly did not refer to Marian
207
1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 221 (1883) [hereinafter 1 J. STEPHEN] (contrasting the taking of depositions
of witnesses under the Marian statutes and under “the statute of Victoria,” (the 1848
legislation discussed infra note 227 and accompanying text)). Stephen asserted that in
Marian procedure “[t]he prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present”
during depositions of witnesses. Id. He also asserted that “there is evidence to show
that the prisoner was not allowed even to see [such depositions].” Id.
Stephen did not set out evidence for either claim, however, it appears that
the defendant was not given access to a witness’s Marian deposition during the early
nineteenth century. See Harrison’s Case, 1 Lewin 67-68, 168 Eng. Rep. 962 (Lancaster
Sp. Assizes 1829) (refusing defense counsel’s request to see “the depositions taken
before the magistrate” because “[i]t is against the rule”). If one assumes that the
general trend in English law was to increase the protections afforded the defendant,
this suggests that defendants also would not have been permitted to see Marian
depositions during the eighteenth century.
208
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (citing 1 J. STEPHEN, supra
note 207, at 326) (quoting Stephen’s book on the emergence of a demand for crossexamination after the famous treason trials of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries).
209
Justice Thomas had previously quoted Stephen’s statement in his
concurring opinion, joined by Scalia, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992)
(“These interrogations [by magistrates] were ‘intended only for the information of the
court. The prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present.’ 1 J. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 221 (1883).”). The quoted statement by
Stephen was also quoted or cited in two briefs filed in Crawford. See Petitioner’s Brief,
supra note 28, at 13 (quotation); Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 28, at
11 (citation and paraphrase).
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deposition procedure because the judges had clearly stated that
Marian felony procedure did not apply to the misdemeanor case
at hand. 210 Hence, it appears that the judges in Paine were
simply saying that the deposition offered did not comport with
the usual procedure for non-Marian depositions, derived from
chancery and civil procedure. 211
Similarly, none of the pre-framing editions of the
treatises by Hale, Hawkins, Gilbert, or Buller suggested that
Marian depositions called for the arrestee to be present or
allowed for the arrestee to cross-examine the witness. 212 It is
especially noteworthy that both Hale and Hawkins identified
several conditions that had to be met for a Marian deposition to
be admitted, but did not include cross-examination, or even the
taking of the deposition in the presence of the arrestee, among
them. 213 Similarly, it is noteworthy that Hawkins and Gilbert
described the reference to cross-examination in the Modern
Reports version of Paine as being distinct from Marian
depositions. It seems unlikely they would have drawn that
distinction if they had understood that Marian depositions
provided an opportunity for cross-examination. 214 The silence
in the treatises as to the presence of the arrestee is significant
because it strongly suggests that the arrestee played no role in
Marian deposition practice. Surely, if cross-examination had
been understood to be a usual feature of Marian procedure,
someone would have written as much.
Likewise, the apparently unquestioned rule that a
Marian deposition of an unavailable witness taken by a coroner
was admissible in a subsequent felony homicide trial seems to
refute any assumption of an implicit cross-examination
standard. 215 Because no one would necessarily have been
210
King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165 (K.B. 1696); see also supra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
211
An opportunity for cross-examination was a requisite for a valid deposition
in civil litigation. See supra note 127 (setting out Gilbert’s discussion of crossexamination in depositions taken in civil cases).
212
See supra notes 81, 83 (HALE), 128 (GILBERT), 136 (HAWKINS, PLEAS), 137
(HAWKINS, SUMMARY), 148 (BULLER), and accompanying text.
213
See supra notes 83 (HALE), 136 (HAWKINS, PLEAS), 137 (HAWKINS,
SUMMARY), and accompanying text.
214
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Hawkins’s
juxtaposition of the reference to the loss of cross-examination in Paine with the
admissibility of Marian depositions in felony trials).
215
The Marian statutes provided for depositions before a coroner. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text. Moreover, a deposition taken by a coroner of a witness
who had died, was unable to travel, or was detained by means or procurement of the
accused was admissible in a subsequent homicide – that is, felony – trial. See, e.g.,
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accused or arrested for homicide prior to the conclusion of a
coroner’s inquest into a suspicious death, depositions taken by
a coroner would not necessarily even have been taken in the
presence of the person later accused, let alone have provided an
opportunity for that person to cross-examine witnesses. Thus,
although Justice Scalia passed quickly over the subject of
coroner’s depositions, 216 it seems quite unlikely that crossexamination could have been a condition for admitting into
evidence Marian depositions taken by coroners.
It is true that post-framing English authorities
suggested that Marian procedure might involve crossexamination – but the important point is that the published
statements to that effect became available in America only
after the Confrontation Clause already had been drafted. The
first published suggestion – hint might be more accurate – that
Marian depositions provided an opportunity for crossexamination appeared in the 1789 Woodcock case (which,
again, the Framers could not have been aware of when the
Confrontation Clause was framed 217). Even there, Baron Eyre
commented only that because the non-Marian deposition at
issue had been taken in the defendant’s absence, “the prisoner
therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts [the
deposition] contains,” but did not refer to the defendant’s lost
opportunity to cross-examine as such. 218 Of course, one cannot
be sure that Eyre did not simply conflate “contradict” and
“cross-examine,” but he may well have intended to distinguish
between the two. In particular, being present and hearing a
deposition might have been advantageous to a defendant even
if he was not permitted to pose questions to the witness. If a
defendant was not present when a deposition was taken, and
also was not provided with a copy of a witness’s deposition
(which seems to have been the rule 219), the defendant would
supra notes 136 (HAWKINS, PLEAS), 137 (HAWKINS, SUMMARY), 128 (GILBERT), 148
(BULLER), and accompanying text. Note that Peake still recognized the admissibility of
depositions taken by coroners in his 1802 commentary. See infra note 223.
216
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 47 n.2 (2004) (stating that “[t]here is
some question whether the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination
applied as well to statements taken by a coroner, which were also authorized by the
Marian statutes,” but basing that “question” primarily on nineteenth-century
American state cases, while omitting any mention of the statements from the treatises,
set out supra note 215, endorsing the admissibility of such depositions).
217
See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
218
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep.352, 353 (Old Bailey
1789); see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
219
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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have been at a disadvantage in preparing his own statement
for his own Marian examination as well as his defense for trial.
Thus, not being present for a witness’s deposition would have
been a disadvantage even if the defendant would not have been
permitted to cross-examine the witness during the deposition.
In any event, however, it was not until the 1791 Dingler case
(which was not published until 1792, after even the ratification
of the Bill of Rights) that there was an explicit suggestion made
by defense counsel that the defendant would have had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness if Marian procedure
had been adhered to when the deposition was taken. 220
Admittedly,
there
is
evidence
that
English
commentators soon expansively construed Woodcock and
Dingler as though they meant that Marian procedure should
provide for cross-examination. Thomas Leach, who published
those cases in 1789 in his Crown Cases, commented on those
two cases when he published a substantially revised and
expanded edition of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown in 1795 (six
years after the framing of the Bill of Rights). Although he did
not alter the passages from the earlier editions of Hawkins’s
treatise regarding both the admissibility of Marian depositions
of unavailable witnesses and Paine, 221 he added an entirely new
section, with marginal citations only to the 1789 Woodcock and
1791 Dingler cases, to the effect that an arrestee would have an
opportunity to contradict or cross-examine witnesses during
the post-arrest Marian procedure. 222
Seven years later (thirteen years after the framing of
the American Bill of Rights), Thomas Peake’s 1802
commentary cited the 1787 Radbourne case as though it had
220

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136, 140 and accompanying text.
222
Leach added the following section to Hawkins’s treatise:
Sect. 25. And it has been held, that an examination of a person murderously
wounded, taken by a justice of the peace, at the poor-house of the parish, on
oath, and regularly signed, but in the absence of the prisoner, cannot be read
in evidence on the subsequent trial of the prisoner for murder, for it is taken
extrajudicially, and not as the statutes of Phillip and Mary direct, in a case
where the prisoner is brought before him in custody, and he has the
opportunity of contradicting or cross-examining as to the facts alledged.
4 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1795), supra note 132, at 423 (emphasis omitted). Note that this
discussion of Woodcock treats the reference to the “extrajudicial” character of the
deposition as though it referred to the lack of cross-examination. However, the case
report actually used the term “extrajudicial” in connection with the lack of any
authority for a justice of the peace to take a deposition outside of Marian post-arrest
procedure. Baron Eyre’s comment about the lack of an opportunity for contradicting
the accusations was stated as a separate point. See supra note 195 and accompanying
text.
221
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imposed a requirement that Marian depositions be taken “in
the presence” of the arrestee, but did not mention an
opportunity to cross-examine as such. 223 In 1818 (twenty-nine
years after the framing), a case report was published in London
in which an English judge expressly treated an opportunity for
cross-examination as a condition for admitting a Marian
Then in 1824 (thirty-five years after the
deposition. 224
223

THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-41
(Philadelphia 1802) [hereinafter PEAKE, EVIDENCE]; (reprinted London 1808)
[hereinafter PEAKE, EVIDENCE (1808)]; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
47 (2004) (citing PEAKE, EVIDENCE (1808), at 63-64). The relevant passage is as follows
(I have indicated in brackets where the case citations in the margins appear to relate to
the text):
While on the subject of depositions, it may not be improper to mention those
taken by Magistrates under the [Marian statutes] . . . . On these statutes it
has been holden; that if in a case of felony one magistrate takes the
deposition on oath of any person in the presence of the prisoner, whether the
party wounded, or even an accomplice; and the deponent dies before the trial,
the depositions may be read in evidence; but if the prisoner be not present at
the time of the examination, it cannot be read as a deposition taken on oath
[marginal citation to Radbourne], though in cases where a party wounded
was apprehendsive of, or in imminent danger of death, it may be received as
his dying declaration [a marginal citation indicates this refers to Dingler].
This act of parliament only extends to cases of felony, and therefore such
examination cannot be read on an information for a libel [a marginal citation
indicates this refers to Paine].
In like manner depositions taken before a coroner, may, in case of the death
or absence beyond sea, of the witness, be used on a trial for murder.
PEAKE, EVIDENCE at 40-41. Scalia cited the comparable passage from the third 1808
edition. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 (citing PEAKE, EVIDENCE (1808), at 63-64).
Note that Peake ignored the petty treason aspect of the 1787 Radbourne
case and incorrectly asserted that it meant that Marian depositions were inadmissible
unless they were taken “in the presence of” the arrestee. Note, too, that Peake did not
refer to a cross-examination requirement as such.
224
See King v. Smith, Holt 614, 171 Eng. Rep. 357 (Newcasle Summer
Assizes 1817) (case report published 1818). The issue was whether a Marian
deposition of a deceased victim was properly admitted in a murder trial. Justices of the
peace had begun taking the deposition of the victim of an assault before the accused
was brought into the room, but the deposition taken up to that point was then read to
the accused, and he was given an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, but declined
to do so. According to Holt’s report, Chief Baron Richards, who presided over the trial,
observed that although the Marian statutes did not mention that a witness’s deposition
had to be taken in the presence of the prisoner, “the decisions established the point,
that the prisoner ought to be present, that he might cross-examine.” Nevertheless,
because the accused was given an opportunity to cross-examine but declined to do so,
Richards ruled that the deposition was admissible, and the accused was convicted of
murder. Id. at 616-17, 171 Eng. Rep. at 360. Significantly, the only prior decision cited
in the case report was the 1787 decision in Radbourne (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 186-90); hence, it appears that that case was the authority that
Richards referred to.
Prior to the execution of sentence, Richards referred the issue of the
admissibility of the deposition to the Twelve Judges of England (of which he was one),
and that body affirmed the conviction; the defendant was then executed. Id. at 616,
171 Eng. Rep. at 360.
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framing), Thomas Starkie’s commentary on the law of evidence
cited the 1789 Woodcock and 1791 Dingler cases – without
actually discussing them – in the course of advocating that
Marian depositions should provide for cross-examination. 225
There are two other reports of the case. A report by Starkie gave a similar
description of the issue and ruling at trial. See King v. Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 171 Eng.
Rep. 622, 623 (1820). Another report by Russell and Ryan indicates that there were
actually two issues regarding the admission of the deposition – whether the deposition
had been taken in conformity with the Marian statutes and whether an examination
taken when the charge was assault and robbery could be admitted, after the victim
died, in a trial for the different charge of murder. See King v. Smith, Russ. & Ry. 339,
340-41, 168 Eng. Rep. 834, 835 (1825).
Although this case went to the Twelve Judges, none of the three reports
does more than report that that body affirmed the admissibility of the deposition.
Hence, it is unclear precisely what issue the Twelve Judges addressed.
225
THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1824);
see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 (citing 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 95 (1826) [hereinafter 1 STARKIE (1826)]; 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 484-92 (1826) [hereinafter 2 STARKIE
(1826)]). I have located only an 1826 Boston reprinting of the first edition of this work.
The first passage cited by Scalia is a general statement: “Thus the
depositions of witnesses before magistrates, under the statutes of Philip and Mary, are
not evidence, unless the prisoner had an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses
(q) . . . .” 1 STARKIE (1826), supra, at 96, cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47.
Footnote (q) cites a later discussion of depositions in the second volume.
That latter discussion first describes the Marian statutes and then states that Marian
“depositions in case of felony, being warranted by [the Marian] statutes, become
evidence in particular cases, upon general principles of evidence, that objection having
been removed by the statutes which would otherwise have operated to their exclusion,
namely, that they were extra-judicial. 2 STARKIE (1826), supra, at 486. (Note that this
restates the logic of authority regarding depositions set out supra note 106.)
A subsequent passage asserts that “the prisoner has had the power to
cross-examine the witness [when the Marian deposition was taken], but this was at a
time and under circumstances very disadvantageous to the prisoner.” 2 STARKIE
(1826), supra, at 487. This work then states the following:
It must be proved, that the depositions were taken conformably with the
statutes, since any other would be extra-judicial; that they were taken on
oath; that they were taken in the presence of the prisoner; for where the
informations are taken by a magistrate, the words of the statute strongly
imply that the prisoner is supposed to be present, for the Justice is to take the
examination of the prisoner, and the information of those who bring the
prisoner; and if they were to be taken in the prisoner’s absence he would lose
the benefit of cross-examination, and consequently the evidence, in principle,
would not be admissible; the effect of the statutes, seems to be not to alter
any rule of evidence, but only to make a particular proceeding regular, which
otherwise would have been irregular, and so leave it subject to the ordinary
rules of evidence (c).
2 STARKIE (1826), supra, at 487-88 (emphasis in original) (notes (a) and (b) omitted).
However, it is significant that Starkie cited no authority regarding the need for crossexamination or for the presence of the prisoner except that footnote (c) at the end of the
passage cited a statement, in dicta, by of one of the judges in the 1790 Eriswell case,
King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 (K.B. 1790) (discussed supra
note 122), who had referred to the 1696 ruling in Paine (discussed supra notes 98-123
and accompanying text). He also referred to the 1789 ruling in Woodcock (discussed
supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text) and the 1791 ruling in Dingler (discussed
supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text). See 2 STARKIE (1826), supra, at 488-89.
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Although Parliament did not address the crossexamination issue when it revised Marian procedure in 1826, 226
Parliament did make cross-examination a condition for
admitting depositions of witnesses in felony trials in 1848
(fifty-nine years after the framing of the Confrontation
Clause). 227 Then in 1854, Chief Judge Jervis of the English
Court of Criminal Appeals (who had been a principal author of
the 1848 statute) suggested that even before the 1848
legislation, the “equitable construction” of the Marian statutes
had implied that there should be an opportunity for crossexamination during Marian depositions of witnesses. 228 And,
later still, Wigmore followed Starkie and cited the 1789
Woodcock case in a discussion of the emergence of crossexamination as a test for admitting hearsay (although he did
not refer to the Confrontation Clause itself in that
discussion). 229
However, the noteworthy point for present purposes is that Starkie cited no authorities
between the 1696 ruling in Paine and the 1789 ruling in Woodcock. It is also
significant that Starkie asserted only that the statute “strongly impl[ies]” that the
prisoner need be present, and that a deposition would be inadmissible “in principle” if
there had not been cross-examination. All in all, although the passage clearly endorses
a cross-examination requirement for Marian depositions, it stops short of showing that
any such rule had already become settled.
226
See generally 7 Geo. IV, c. 64 (1826) (Eng.).
227
11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17 (1848) (Eng.). The statute provided that a
deposition of a witness could be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial if the witness
was dead or unable to travel and the prisoner had had a full opportunity of crossexamination.
228
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 (quoting Regina v. Beeston, 29 Eng. Rep. L. &
Eq. 527 (Ct. Crim. App. 1854) (Jervis, C.J.)). In Beeston, the English judges ruled that
a deposition of an unavailable witness could be admitted in a trial for murder even
though the charge at the time the deposition had been taken had been for grievous
wounding. Chief Judge Jervis stated that the admission of the deposition was proper
because the defendant “had a full opportunity of cross-examination” when the
deposition of the deceased victim had been taken. Beeston, 29 Eng. Rep. at 529. Jervis
also commented that the 1848 statute, which explicitly required an opportunity for
cross-examination as a condition for admission of a deposition as evidence, had
“introduced in terms the principle that the prisoner should have the full opportunity of
cross-examination, which he formerly had only by the equitable construction of the
law.”
Id.
Although Jervis’s statement may suggest that “equitable” English
magistrates might have permitted defendants to cross-examine witnesses during
Marian depositions sometime prior to the 1848 legislation, it hardly amounts to direct
evidence that cross-examination had become part of Marian depositions in England by
1789, let alone that the Framers of the Confrontation Clause would have been aware of
any such development.
229
See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 1364, at 23 n.58 and accompanying text;
see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 (citing 3 WIGMORE, supra). However, a close
examination of this discussion reveals that Wigmore is not a trustworthy historian.
For example, Wigmore asserted that the “general rule, from the early 1700s, was
clearly understood to exclude alike sworn and unsworn statements made without
opportunity . . . for cross-examination.” 3 WIGMORE, supra (text preceding note 51).
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Woodcock, Dingler, and the subsequent expansive
characterizations of those cases by Leach, Peake, and Starkie
indicate that a cross-examination standard for Marian
depositions probably emerged in England sometime prior to the
1848 legislation, most likely in the course of a more general
elaboration of the law of evidence by judges and commentators.
However, those sources do not indicate that cross-examination
had become a regular part of English Marian procedure prior to
the last decade or so of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the
absence of earlier evidence of a cross-examination rule seems to
be consistent with what is known regarding the more general
shift in the law of evidence from concern with oaths to concern
with cross-examination toward the end of the eighteenth
century. 230 The important point for assessing the original
However, the only evidence given for that “general rule” was a statement by a New
York judge “writing just two centuries later” in an 1889 case! Id. & n. 60.
Additionally, Wigmore downplayed the significance of the rule of
admissibility regarding Marian depositions by omitting any mention that such
depositions were standard in felony cases. For example, he referred to statutory
authorization for the admission of “the sworn examination of witnesses before justices
of the peace in certain cases” without identifying felony cases as the “certain cases.” Id.
(text preceding note 58). Likewise, when discussing Paine, Wigmore stated that “the
use of examinations before coroners and justices rested on the special statutory
authority given them to take such depositions” – but again did not state that that
“special” authority applied generally to felonies. Id. at n.52.
Similarly, Wigmore cited Woodcock as a case in which “[the record of a]
justice of the peace’s examination of the victim of an assault [was] excluded.” Id. at
n.58. However, that was not very accurate: the court actually ruled in Woodcock that
because the deposition was not taken within Marian procedure, the statement was
“extrajudicial” and thus, as a legal matter, did not actually constitute a sworn
statement taken by a justice of the peace. See supra text accompanying note 194.
It should also be noted that Wigmore did not discuss the original meaning
of the Confrontation Clause itself, but merely concluded that a prior opportunity for
cross-examination had become a condition for admitting hearsay statements by “the
end of the 1700s.” See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 1364, at 23. Of course, “the end of
the 1700s” is a decade too late for assessing the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment.
230
The appearance of the statements in the nineteenth-century commentaries
is consistent with the pattern that Professor Gallanis noted in his study of the
emergence of hearsay doctrine. Specifically, Gallanis found that concern with hearsay
was focused on lack of an oath until virtually the end of eighteenth century, when the
lack of an opportunity for cross-examination emerged as the primary concern. 2 M.
POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS (William David Evans,
Esq., trans., Philadelphia, 1826). He noted that in the English treatises, “[t]he more
modern concern – the absence of cross-examination – appeared first in Lofft’s 1791
revision of Gilbert,” and that the lack of cross-examination did not emerge as a
stronger concern than the concern with the lack of an oath until an 1826 treatise. See
Gallanis, supra note 179, at 533 (discussing 2 GILBERT (1791), supra note 123 at 890,
and SIR WILLIAM EVANS’S APPENDIX ON EVIDENCE, contained in 2 M. POTHIER,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS (William David Evans, Esq.,
trans., Philadelphia, 1826)). See also Gallanis, supra note 179, at 537 (reporting that
discussions of the purpose of the hearsay rule generally centered on the need for an
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meaning of the Confrontation Clause is that all of these
English statements regarding cross-examination in Marian
depositions were published too late to have informed the
framing of the Confrontation Clause in 1789.
The bottom line for the present inquiry is that the
statements in the English authorities that were available in
America early enough to have informed the original meaning of
the Confrontation Clause did not indicate that crossexamination had become an aspect of Marian deposition
procedure or that an opportunity for cross-examination had
become a condition for admitting a Marian deposition of an
unavailable witness. Rather, the English authorities available
in America prior to the framing simply indicated that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses were admissible as
evidence in felony trials.
Thus, regardless of which way one construes Justice
Scalia’s claim that the 1787, 1789, and 1791 cases “rejected”
the “statutory derogation view,” it is clear that the English
authorities that were available in framing-era America did not
indicate that the admissibility of a Marian witness deposition
depended upon an opportunity for cross-examination. Indeed,
the weight of the evidence from American framing-era sources
indicates that Americans simply understood that Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses were admissible evidence
in felony trials.
F.

What Framing-Era American Sources Show

Of course, the absence of a cross-examination rule for
Marian depositions in English sources does not necessarily rule
out the possibility that Americans might have developed a
stronger conception of the confrontation right on their own.
Justice Scalia asserted that post-framing American state cases
indicate that framing-era Americans had embraced his crossexamination rule. Specifically, he made several assertions to
the effect that “numerous early state-court decisions make
oath during the eighteenth century and on the desirability of cross-examination during
the nineteenth century).
Professor Langbein seems to concur with Gallanis’ analysis. For example,
Langbein notes that concern with cross-examination was “muted” during the
eighteenth century. LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 79, at 238, 245.
Likewise, Langbein has indicated that a concern with cross-examination was not
apparent as late as a 1785 Old Bailey case, but appeared for the first time in the 1789
Woodcock case. See supra note 196.
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abundantly clear that the Sixth Amendment incorporated the
common-law right of confrontation and not any exceptions the
Marian statutes supposedly carved out from it.” 231
However, here too, Justice Scalia’s evidence falls short
of supporting his claim. Specifically, only one of the American
cases that Scalia cited was both relevant and genuinely “early.”
Moreover, he ignored other framing-era American sources that
indicated continued acceptance of the admissibility of Marian
depositions of unavailable witnesses.
1. Justice Scalia’s “Numerous Early State-Court
Decisions”
In all, Justice Scalia cited eleven cases from seven
American states decided between 1794 and 1858 as evidence
that his cross-examination rule was part of the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 232 However, cases
decided more than a few decades after the framing do not
constitute valid evidence of original meaning. Rather, because
conditions changed rapidly during the early decades of the
Republic – and because criminal justice institutions began to
change as well – the value that post-framing statements hold
for making backward-looking inferences about what the
Framers “must have” thought at the time of the framing falls
off rather sharply as the distance from the framing-era
increases. 233

231
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 n.5. See also id. at 54 (referring to “[t]he
numerous early state decisions applying the [cross-examination rule]”); id. at 50
(referring to “[m]any” such decisions).
232
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing (starting with the earliest): (1) State v.
Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794); (2) State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229
(Super L. & Eq. 1807); (3) Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59 (Err. & App. 1821); (4)
Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701, 708 (1827); (5) State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. 607, 608-10
(App. 1835); (6) Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 437 (1837); (7) Bostick v.
State, 22 Tenn. 344, 345-46 (1842); (8) State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124 (App. L. 1844);
(9) Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 485-88 (1850); (10) United States v. Macomb, 26 F.
Cas. 1132, 1133 (No. 15,702) (C.C. Ill. 1851); (11) State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 435-36
(1858)).
233
Post-framing statements can be important evidence of discontinuity. For
example, if one traces a modern conception back in time, and it disappears from
doctrinal statements before one gets to the framing, that is a strong indication that the
modern conception arose only after the framing. See, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth,
supra note 2, at 611-18 (noting that the absence of any references to a “reasonableness”
standard in post-framing discussions of search and seizure principles indicates that
there was no such concept in the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment).
However, post-framing statements, standing alone, are less potent as
evidence of what was included in the original meaning, because there usually is no way
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The significant point is that only two of the “numerous
early” state cases that Scalia cited were decided prior to 1820 –
that is within three decades of the framing. The others were
simply too distant from the framing to constitute plausible
evidence of original meaning. 234 Moreover, one of those two
cases, the 1807 Tennessee ruling in State v. Atkins, actually
was not germane. 235 Thus, Scalia’s American evidence boils
down to a single source, the 1794 North Carolina case State v.
Webb. 236

to discern whether they actually reflect a continuing understanding or merely the
appearance of a novel understanding.
234
By 1820, published endorsements of cross-examination had appeared in
the post-framing English commentaries by Leach, see supra note 222, and Peake, see
supra note 223, and also in a published report of Smith, see supra note 224. Hence,
American state court decisions that adopted a cross-examination rule after that date
may simply reflect post-framing developments, rather than the original American
understanding of the confrontation right.
Of course, later American commentaries are of no more relevance. In
addition to citing the nineteenth-century state cases, Justice Scalia also stated that
“[n]ineteenth-century treatises confirm the [cross-examination] rule,” and cited 1 JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OR,
PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1093, at 689 (2d ed. 1872);
THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *318 (1868).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. However, this amounts to mere rhetorical padding. No one
could seriously propose that sources from the latter half of the nineteenth century
constitute evidence of the original meaning of a provision of the Bill of Rights.
235
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (citing Atkins, 1 Tenn. at 229). As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted, Atkins did not adopt Scalia’s cross-examination rule regarding
depositions because it excluded a statement that had been subjected to crossexamination during a previous trial. Id. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Rehnquist
was correct on that point, but an additional clarification is in order. The Atkins court
ruled that testimony of a deceased witness given in a previous misdemeanor trial for
petty larceny in a lower court could not be admitted during a trial de novo in a higher
court despite the opportunity for cross-examination in the first trial. That ruling likely
reflected the lack of any written record of prior testimony from the earlier lower court
misdemeanor trial (there were no court reporters or transcripts in such courts). Unlike
a Marian deposition, for which there was a written record, the prior testimony could be
established only by the oral testimony of someone who had heard the prior trial – and
that rendition would obviously be inexact or subject to abuse. Thus, there was a
general rule that oral evidence regarding the testimony given in a prior trial was
inadmissible. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1771), supra note 18, at 430 § 12;
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 172-73 (James Parker ed., printed by John Patterson for
Robert Hodge, New York City, 1788) (microformed on Imprints, supra note 123, at no.
21359) [hereinafter CONDUCTOR GENERALIS]. However, prior to 1807 authorities on
the law of evidence also recognized that the written record of a deposition was more
trustworthy than an oral account of testimony from a previous trial. See, e.g., 1
GILBERT, (1791) supra note 123, at 62 (written depositions are superior evidence to live
testimony regarding evidence given at a prior trial). Thus, Atkins does not shed any
light on the admissibility of a written record of a deposition.
236
Webb, 2 N.C. 103; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (citing and discussing
Webb).
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Webb does offer support for Scalia’s position. The
prosecutor in Webb sought to admit a deposition from a witness
in South Carolina in a felony horse stealing trial in North
Carolina. As the locations indicate, the deposition could not
have been taken in proximity to Webb’s arrest. The prosecutor
asserted that the deposition was admissible under several
English authorities, although the authorities actually were not
on point. 237 The North Carolina judges responded as follows:
These [English] authorities do not say that depositions taken in the
absence of the prisoner shall be read, and our act of Assembly, 1715,
ch. 16, clearly implies the depositions to be read, must be taken in
his presence; it is a rule of the common law, founded on natural
justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had
not the liberty to cross-examine; and though it be insisted that the
act intended to make an exception in this instance, to the rule of the
common law, yet the act has not expressly said so, and we will not,
by implication, derrogate from the salutory rule established by the
common law. 238

The North Carolina statute referred to was a shortened
paraphrase of the Marian statutes. 239 As the judges recognized,
the statute did not explicitly require that the depositions of
witnesses be taken in the arrestee’s presence. Nevertheless,

237
Webb, 2 N.C. at 139 (noting that the prosecutor cited, among other
authorities, 2 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 284 (see third passage set out
supra note 83); 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132, at 429 (see passage set out supra
text accompanying note 136); and King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 713, 100 Eng. Rep. 815,
819 (K.B. 1790) (discussed supra note 122)).
The cited English authorities did not really address the situation in Webb –
the deposition in South Carolina was not taken in connection with the arrest that
presumably had occurred in North Carolina. Webb, 2 N.C. at 103. Rather, the facts in
Webb were essentially the same as that in the English Woodcock and Dingler cases, in
which the depositions were not taken in connection with the arrest of the defendant, as
contemplated by the Marian statute. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
238
Webb, 2 N.C. at 103.
239
In pertinent part, the North Carolina statute provided that:
no person within this province shall be committed to prison for any criminal
matter, until examination thereof be first had before some magistrate; which
magistrate shall admit the party to bail, if bailable, and shall record the
examination of the party, and also the full matter given in evidence, both
against him and for him, with all concurring circumstances; and shall take
recognizance, with good and sufficient securities, to our Sovereign Lord the
King, for the informer to appear and prosecute, as the laws of the kingdom of
Great Britain and this province do direct; and likewise all evidences for the
King to appear, and give evidence against the criminal, at the next court,
where the matter is cognizable, ensuing such examination; which
examination and recognizance so taken, shall be returned to the office of the
court wherein the matter is to be tried . . . .
An Act to direct the method to be observed in the examination and commitment of
criminals, 1 Public Acts of the General Assembly, ch. 16 (North Carolina, 1715).
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they found it appropriate to infer that requirement, and then
linked the “in the presence” requirement to the importance of
“the liberty to cross-examine.” 240
Webb does indicate that within five years after the
framing of the Confrontation Clause, North Carolina judges
were resisting the use of depositions as evidence unless there
had been some opportunity to cross-examine. However, it is
noteworthy that the judges rested their decision on “natural
justice” rather than on any precedent or other published
authority. It is also noteworthy that other American evidence
– sources that Scalia overlooked – indicate that the
admissibility of Marian depositions of absent witnesses was
still widely accepted in framing-era America.
2. The Evidence in Framing-Era American Justice of
the Peace Manuals
Justice of the peace manuals were a type of legal
encyclopedia covering matters likely to be relevant to a justice
of the peace or similar judicial officer. Because the manuals
published in America were relatively inexpensive and widely
used, and were edited with an eye toward the law applicable in
the American colonies and states, those published prior to the
framing of the federal Bill of Rights provide one of the most
direct sources of evidence we have regarding how Americans
understood criminal procedure during the framing era. 241
Notably, these manuals typically included both descriptions of
Marian procedure and quotations of Hawkins’s statement
endorsing the “settled” admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses. 242
For example, when Joseph Greenleaf published an
“abridgment” of a leading English manual in Boston in 1773, 243
240

See quotation supra note 239 and accompanying text.
For a listing of framing-era English and American justice of the peace
manuals, see Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 278-81 nn.121-22. The prefaces to the
American manuals often recite that the English material has been edited with a view
to presenting what is relevant in America generally, or in the particular colony or state
for which the manual was intended.
242
See supra text accompanying note 136 (Hawkins’s statement that the
admissibility of Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses “seems settled”).
243
AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER
(Joseph Greenleaf ed., Boston 1773) (reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123, at no.
12702) [hereinafter ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S]. This American manual was based on the
English manual, RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (first
published in London in 1755, and reissued in numerous later editions until 1869; see
MAXWELL, supra note 80, at 225-26, (entry 15)).
241
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he included a summary of Marian procedure in the entry for
“Examination.” 244 In the entry for “Evidence,” he repeated
Hawkins’s statement that “[i]t seems settled,” that a Marian
deposition of an unavailable witness could be admitted in a
felony trial, 245 and also quoted Hawkins’s description of
Paine. 246 A similar treatment appeared in a 1774 manual that
Richard Starke edited for Virginia. 247
Although Starke
described the somewhat “peculiar” procedure for examining
arrestees and witnesses in felony cases in Virginia, 248 he cited
Hale as authority that the sworn deposition of an unavailable
witness could be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial, 249 and
also quoted Hawkins on the “settled” rule that a Marian

244
245

ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S, supra note 243, at 131.
Id. at 118 (repeating the paragraph quoted supra text accompanying

note 136).
246

Id. (repeating the paragraph quoted supra text accompanying note 140).
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (Richard Starke
ed., Williamsburg, Va. 1774) (reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123, at no. 13637)
[hereinafter STARKE]. See also THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE (George Webb ed., Williamsburg, Va., 1736), reprinted in Imprints, supra note
123, at no. 4101 (an earlier manual published in Virginia) [hereinafter WEBB]. That
earlier work had endorsed the admissibility of Marian depositions taken by a coroner.
Id. at 140 (entry for Examination) (stating that “[i]f Witnesses examined before the
Coroner, are dead, or unable to travel, and Oath made thereof; such Examinations may
be read at the Trial, the Coroner making Oath, that they are the same, and not altered.
Lord Morley’s Case”). Notably, however, there are no citations to the treatises by
Hawkins or Hale in that manual; rather, the citations are only to older English works.
See generally id. Hence, Webb’s manual was quite obsolete by the framing era.
248
STARKE, supra note 247, at 114-15. In his entry for “Criminal,” Starke did
not cite the Marian statutes but instead noted that Virginia, by a colonial statute, had
created a multi-justice of the peace “Court of Examination,” which he described as a
procedure “peculiar to this Colony.” Id. at 115. In Virginia procedure, following an
arrest for a criminal offense, a justice of the peace was “thoroughly to examine as well
the Prisoner as Witnesses; and if the Fact [i.e., the crime] appears to him, on mature
Deliberation, to amount to a Felony, or to be of such Nature as to affect the Life or
Member of the Person charged,” the justice was to commit the arrestee to the county
jail, summon other justices to convene a court of examination, and take recognizances
of the witnesses to appear and testify. Id. at 114. Thus, it appears that the “court of
examination” was added to the usual post-arrest procedures, including Marian
depositions, rather than that it replaced them.
249
Id. at 116 (providing a form for “Information of A Witness” to be used by a
single justice, and stating that this deposition “being sworn to be truly taken by the
Justice, may be given in Evidence on the Trial against the Prisoner, if the Witnesses be
dead or not able to travel” (citing 1 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82, at 586
[passage quoted supra note 83])). Starke also made other statements that indicate that
the Marian statutes were understood to be in effect in Virginia. See id. at 31, 35-37
(discussing the provisions of the Marian statutes regarding bail under the entry for
“Bail”).
247
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deposition of an unavailable witness could be admitted, as well
as Hawkins’s discussion of Paine. 250
A 1788 edition of Conductor Generalis, a widely used
manual published in New York City, gave the same
treatment. 251 This manual also included a paraphrase of the
Marian statutes, 252 and also repeated Hawkins’s passage on the
“settled” admissibility of Marian depositions of unavailable
witnesses, as well as his description of Paine. 253
The treatment of Marian depositions in the 1788 edition
of Conductor Generalis corresponds to other evidence of the
continued importance of Marian procedure in framing-era New
York. In 1787, when the state legislature was in the process of
sorting through which English statutes to retain and which to
jettison, the legislature chose to reenact the Marian statutes. 254
In addition, the understanding of the confrontation right in
New York is of particular interest because the first Congress
was meeting in New York City in June, 1789, when James
Madison proposed the amendments that became the federal
Bill of Rights. Moreover, Madison appears to have borrowed
much of the language for what became the Sixth Amendment
verbatim from the amendments proposed by the New York
ratifying convention in 1788. Those proposals included a

250
Id. at 143 (entry for “Evidence,” subtitle “Of Written Evidence”) ((citing 2
HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132, at 429-30) (restating the paragraphs by Hawkins set
out supra text accompanying notes 136, 140)).
251
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 235. There is also a slightly different
1788 edition, printed by Hugh Gaine in New York City (reprinted in Imprints, supra
note 123, at no. 21358). There were earlier manuals that also used this title, though
their contents were quite different. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 280 n.122.
252
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 235, at 176-77 (entry on
“Examination”) (reciting the requirement that a justice of the peace “take . . . the
information of them that bring [the arrestee]”).
253
Id. at 168 (entry on “Evidence”) (citing 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS, supra note 132,
at 429, 430 (restating the paragraphs by Hawkins set out supra text accompanying
notes 136, 140)).
254
New York began the process of deciding which English statutes to reenact
and which to dispose of in 1786. See “An Act for revising and digesting the laws of this
State,” passed April 15, 1786. Marian procedure was reenacted in 1787. See “An Act
concerning justices of the peace,” passed January 30, 1787 (requiring the justice to
whom a person arrested for “any treason, misprison of treason, murder, manslaughter
or felony” was brought to “take the examination of such prisoner and information of
those that bring him or her of the fact and circumstances thereof” and to put the
information in writing and certify that record to the trial court); An Act touching the
bailment of persons, passed February 16, 1787 (same substance); An Act concerning
coroners, passed Feb. 14, 1787 (requiring coroners to make a written record of evidence
given by witnesses if an inquest led to an indictment for murder or manslaughter).
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confrontation clause that tracked that which Madison
proposed. 255
Additionally, a 1788 manual authored by a prominent
South Carolina judge for that state 256 also described Marian
procedure. 257 This manual reiterated Hawkins’s statement
regarding the “settled” admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses and also cited a statement by Hale to the
same effect. 258 In addition, a somewhat cursory 1791 North
Carolina manual reiterated Marian procedure, though it did
not address the admissibility of Marian depositions. 259
255
The 1788 New York proposals for amendments included the following
language: “And that in all Criminal Prosecutions, the Accused ought to be informed of
the cause and nature of his Accusation, to be confronted with his accusers and the
Witnesses against him, to have the means of producing his Witnesses, and the
assistance of Council for his defense.” See, e.g., COMPLETE BILL, supra note 157, at 401
(entry 12.1.2.2) (proposal from the New York state ratifying convention, July 26, 1788).
Madison added the right to a speedy trial and clarified the “means” for
obtaining favorable witnesses, but otherwise tracked this language and used exactly
the same language for the confrontation right as the New York proposal:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id. at 385 (entry 12.1.1.1.a) (speech by James Madison in the House of Representatives,
June 8, 1789).
256
THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (Philadelphia, W. Aiken &
Son 1788), reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123, at no. 21472 (the identifying page in
Imprints misstates the date as “1778” while the copy itself shows 1788) [hereinafter
SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE]. The name of the author does not appear in the manual
itself; however, it has been attributed to Judge John Faucheaud Grimké. See MICHAEL
STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 6-7 (1980).
257
SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE, supra note 256, at 199-201 (entry for
“Examination”). There are also references to Marian procedure in other entries. See,
e.g., id. at 50 (bail); id. at 190 (admissibility of examination of arrestee).
258
Id. at 184 (entry titled “Evidence”) (repeating the two paragraphs from
Hawkins’s treatise set out supra text accompanying notes 136, 140). See also id. at 200
(entry titled “Examination”) (stating with regard to “information” taken under oath
from witnesses under Marian procedure “13. And the said information, being upon the
trial, sworn to be truly taken, by the justice, or his clerk, may be given in evidence
against the prisoner, if the witnesses be dead, or not able to travel” (citing “1 H.H. 586”
(quoting the second passage set out supra note 83)).
259
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND OF SHERIFFS,
CORONERS, &C. 124 (Francois-Xavier Martin ed., New Bern, N.C. 1791) (reprinted in
Imprints, supra note 123, at no. 23535) (discussing the 1776 North Carolina statute
enacting Marian procedure set out supra note 239).
An earlier 1774 manual published in North Carolina had noted the
admissibility of depositions of a deceased witness that had been taken by a coroner.
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 159 (James Davis ed., New
Bern, N.C. 1774) (“Depositions taken before the Coroner may be admitted for Evidence,
if the Witness be dead. 1 Lev. 180.”) (reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123, at no.
13236).
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However, another somewhat less detailed manual published by
Eliphalet Ladd in 1792 in New Hampshire contained both a
shortened description of Marian procedure that included Hale’s
statement that the deposition of an unavailable witness is
admissible at trial 260 and a quotation of Hawkins’s passage
regarding the “settled” admissibility of a Marian deposition of
an unavailable witness, although it omitted Hawkins’s
discussion of Paine. 261 Indeed, the 1811 first American edition
of Jacob’s Law Dictionary also cited Hale’s and Hawkins’s
statements
regarding
the
admissibility
of
Marian
depositions. 262
Moreover, I cannot find any American source that
questioned the admissibility of Marian depositions of
unavailable witnesses prior to a 1794 Virginia manual
authored by William Waller Hening. 263 In contrast to Starke’s
1774 Virginia manual, 264 Hening asserted that the Marian
statutes were not in force in Virginia, apparently on the ground
that they had not been reenacted by the state legislature after
independence. 265 In addition, Hening criticized the Marian
examination of an arrestee as a derogation of the common-law
260
BURN’S ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 156-58 (Eliphalet Ladd
ed., Dover, N.H. 1792) (entry for “Examination”) (reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123,
at no. 24161) (describing Marian procedure); id. at 158 (stating that “the said
information [of a witness] being upon the trial sworn to be truly taken by the justice or
his clerk, may be given in evidence against the prisoner if the witnesses be dead or not
able to travel,” citing 1 HALE, HISTORY, supra note 82, at 586 [the second passage
quoted supra note 83]).
261
Id. at 132 (entry for “Evidence”) (quoting only the paragraph from
Hawkins’s discussion set out supra text accompanying note 136, but omitting
Hawkins’s description of the ruling in Paine, set out supra text accompanying note
140).
262
See supra note 144.
263
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE (William Waller Hening ed., “entered for
publication” 1794, printed in Richmond, Va., 1795) [hereinafter NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE]
(reprinted in Imprints, supra note 123, at no. 28823). Hening also compiled Virginia
statutes.
264
See supra notes 247-48.
265
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 147 (entry for “Criminals”)
(stating that the “statute of England of Ph. & M. which not having been adopted by our
legislature, is consequently not in force,” and that “[t]he practice of taking the
information of the witness in writing, by the justice, depends upon the same statute of
Ph. & M. above mentioned, . . . and for the reasons just mentioned, I conceive, is not in
force in this country.”).
At the time Hening wrote, Virginia was still unique among the states in
having created a “Court of Examination” which may have been the predecessor of the
modern preliminary hearing. See supra note 248. Hening described the court of
examination as being “peculiar to the laws of this commonwealth.” NEW VIRGINIA
JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 147. However, the court of examination was created prior
to independence at a time when the Marian statutes were perceived to be in effect. See
the statements in Starke’s earlier Virginia manual, discussed supra note 248.
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right against self-accusation, 266 and also questioned the
propriety of admitting depositions of unavailable witnesses at
trial:
The doctrine laid down in the books, that the examination of a
witness taken before a magistrate in pursuance of [the Marian
statutes], may be read against a criminal in case of the death of a
witness, or his inability to attend, is liable to these objections: – that
the prisoner may be concluded by evidence however objectionable the
witness may be in point of interest, guilt, &c. and that the accused
party has not the same advantage of cross examination, which he
would posess before a court, with the assistance of counsel. 267

For present purposes, it is noteworthy that Hening
candidly recognized that the admissibility of Marian
depositions was still “the doctrine laid down in the books.”
Thus, it appears that he was not asserting that there already
was a rule against admitting such depositions, but only that
there should be such a rule. It is also noteworthy that he did
not cite any of the three 1787, 1789, or 1791 cases Scalia relied
upon in Crawford, even though they had been published in
London several years before Hening published his manual. 268
Apparently Hening either was unfamiliar with those cases, or
did not find them to be pertinent to the topic.
Hening’s Virginia commentary, coupled with the Webb
decision in neighboring North Carolina, might indicate
movement toward placing greater emphasis on a criminal
defendant’s right to cross-examination within a decade of the
framing of the federal Bill. However, they are hardly sufficient
to support the claim Justice Scalia made in Crawford – that a
rigid cross-examination rule was already part of framing-era
American law. That is especially so given the consistent
statements to the opposite effect that appeared in the earlier,
framing-era American manuals that addressed the issue.
Taken collectively, the framing-era manuals constitute strong
evidence that Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses
266
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 147 (stating that “the power of
examining the prisoner himself and committing his examination to writing” under
Marian procedure was “repugnant to the common law, as will appear not only from
Lambard (Eiremarch, b. 2. c. 7) where he observes that, [the Marian statutes were] the
first warrant given for the examination of a felon in English law: but from judge
Blackstone, who says that at the common law, no man was bound to betray himself
[nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum]: and his fault was not to be wrung out of himself,
but rather to be discovered by other means, and other men.” See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 65, at 296).
267
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, supra note 263, at 148 (entry for “Criminals”).
268
See supra notes 164, 176-77 and accompanying text.
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were regarded as admissible evidence in felony trials in
framing-era America, without regard to an opportunity for
cross-examination. 269
G.

Summary Regarding the “Cross-Examination Rule”

The validity of historical claims depends solely upon the
available evidence, not on institutional authority or the office of
the person who asserts the claim. Although Justice Scalia
wrote as though the Framers of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause would have understood that there was
already a rigid cross-examination rule regarding the admission
of any deposition in a criminal case, the salient points are that
he did not identify valid evidence for that claim and he omitted
significant evidence that showed the opposite. The available
historical evidence actually refutes both aspects of the “crossexamination rule” that Justice Scalia asserted. First, the fact
that framing-era legal authorities quite consistently endorsed a
“settled” rule that Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses
were admissible evidence in felony trials shows that Scalia was
incorrect when he asserted that a prior opportunity for crossexamination was a rigid requirement for admitting an out-ofcourt statement. 270 Second, the framing-era rule that only a
statement made under a validly administered judicial oath
could constitute valid evidence shows that Scalia was also
incorrect in asserting that a prior opportunity for crossexamination would have been sufficient to permit the
admission of an out-of-court statement in a criminal trial. 271
Thus, both aspects of Justice Scalia’s assertion of a framing-era
269
Unfortunately, it does not appear to be possible to reconstruct actual
practice regarding the admission of Marian depositions in the American colonies or
early states because there do not seem to be any records of the evidence admitted in
colonial or framing-era trials. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (16641776), 134 n.328 (1970 reprint) (noting that less than abundant records of activities of
justices of the peace in New York provide some evidence of the taking of depositions of
witnesses during the mid-eighteenth century); id. at 635 (concluding that “[t]he royal
officials in New York do not seem to have admitted any right to cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing [i.e., a Marian examination]”); id. at 636 (lamenting that “[t]he
casual way in which any remembrance of evidence was noted in court [records] makes
it difficult to determine how far the sworn examination was employed in New York”).
Professor George Thomas has informed me that, in an on-going study of
New Jersey colonial court records, he has come across one instance of a reference to a
witness’s “examination” included among the list of witnesses who testified in a criminal
trial.
270
See supra notes 124-52, 241-69 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 106-12, 193-94 and accompanying text.
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“cross-examination rule” were only historical fiction. (And
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s response on these points also
suffered from errors. 272)
However, does the historical admissibility of Marian
depositions actually hold any implications for contemporary
confrontation doctrine? At one level, the admissibility of
Marian depositions plainly disproves Justice Scalia’s claim of a
rigid framing-era cross-examination rule. However, are there
any specific implications for current procedure that can or
should be drawn from an aspect of Marian procedure when
Marian procedure itself disappeared well over a century ago?
Similarly, does the historical requirement that all evidence be
taken under oath hold any implications for the way that we
should now understand the confrontation right, given that
modern evidence law no longer makes a valid oath a
requirement for admissible evidence? How does one apply
these facets of framing-era accusatory procedure in the context
of the very different investigatory criminal procedure that we
use today? Can they be applied? If so, should they be applied?
Puzzles of this kind are not confined to the specific issue of a
cross-examination requirement. They also arise with regard to
Justice Scalia’s broader claim regarding the original scope of
the Confrontation Clause.
III.

THE ORIGINAL SCOPE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Justice Scalia also claimed in Crawford that “[t]he
constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law
right of confrontation . . . reflects an especially acute concern
272
Like Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist also ignored the important
passages in Hawkins’s treatise – even though he cited another less significant passage
that appeared only one page earlier. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 70 n.3 (2004) (citing “2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 46, § 4, p. 604, n.3 (T. Leach 6th ed.
1787).”) The more significant passages, from the same chapter were sections 6 and 10,
at 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS (1787) supra note 18, at 605-06, (quoted supra text accompanying
notes 136, 140). Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist also overlooked the discussions of
Hawkins’s and Hale’s statements in the American justice of the peace manuals,
discussed supra notes 241-69 and accompanying text. Instead, he also offered cases
that were published too late to have informed the Framers’ original understanding of
the Confrontation Clause as evidence of original meaning. See supra notes 162
(discussing Westbeer), 163 (discussing Brasier and Eriswell), 191 (discussing
Woodcock). Likewise, although he cited the 1769 edition of Gilbert’s evidence treatise,
which was available prior to the framing, for one point, he inexplicably relied on the
1791 expanded edition of that treatise for another point, although the latter was
published too late to have informed the original meaning. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70
n.2 (citing GILBERT (1769), supra note 123, at 152); id. at 70 n.3 (citing GILBERT (1791),
supra note 123, at 216).
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with a specific type of out-of-court statement.” 273 Specifically,
he asserted that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
He also asserted that
evidence against the accused.” 274
statements made today during a police interrogation should fall
within the set of “testimonial” statements to which the Clause
applies, because such statements bear a “striking resemblance”
to depositions taken by framing-era justices of the peace. 275
However, Justice Scalia also asserted that the text and
history of the Clause carry a negative implication; namely, that
the Framers’ “focus” on depositions 276 “suggests that not all
hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” 277
Instead, the Clause was meant to reach only a “core class of
‘testimonial’ statements” 278 that include “formal statement[s] to
government officers” but not “off-hand, overheard remark[s]” or
“casual remark[s].” 279 Thus, notwithstanding that Crawford
stopped short of “definitively” limiting the confrontation right
to testimonial hearsay, 280 Justice Scalia announced toward the
end of his opinion that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at

273

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 50.
275
Id. at 52.
276
Id. at 50 (“focus”), 51 (same). See also id. at 53 (“even if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary
object”), 60 (“core concerns of the [Confrontation] Clause”).
277
Id. at 51.
278
Id.
279
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (stating that “[a]n offhand, overheard remark . . . bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the
Confrontation Clause targeted”); id. (distinguishing “casual remark to an
acquaintance” from “formal statement”).
280
Justice Scalia wrote:
Members of this Court and academics have suggested that we revise our
doctrine to reflect more accurately the original understanding of the
Clause . . . . They offer two proposals: First, that we apply the Confrontation
Clause only to testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by
hearsay law . . . . In White, we considered the first proposal and rejected it.
502 U.S. at 352-53. Although our analysis in this case casts doubt on that
holding, we need not definitively resolve whether it survives our decision
today, because [the statement at issue] is testimonial under any definition.
Id. at 60-61 (2004) (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-43 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31 (1997); Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998)).
274
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issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford
the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.” 281
Judging from the presentations made during the
Crawford symposium, the precise boundary assigned to this
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction will be of huge practical
significance. 282 But do the “text” and “history” really mandate
that the reach of the confrontation right should be limited to
“testimonial” hearsay?
A.

The Nonhistorical Character of the Testimonial/
Nontestimonial Distinction

In Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist took issue with
Justice Scalia’s claim regarding the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. Specifically, he asserted that “[t]he Court’s distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary
to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our current
doctrine [in Roberts].” 283 Rehnquist was clearly correct on this
point. Although Scalia prochronistically wrote as though the
Framers used or were familiar with his testimonial/
nontestimonial distinction, 284 he did not identify any framingera source that distinguished between testimonial and
nontestimonial hearsay. So far as I can tell, none did. That
distinction simply had not appeared by the time of the framing.
Hence, Justice Scalia was not applying a historical
definition of the scope of the Confrontation Clause when he
employed the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction. Indeed,
Justice Scalia effectively conceded as much when he shoehorned a statement made during a contemporary police
interrogation into the class of testimonial statements that the
Framers were supposedly focused on. 285 However, it is patent
281

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
See generally Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of
the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
283
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
284
For example, Justice Scalia wrote, “[t]he historical record also supports a
second proposition: that the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at
53-54 (emphasis added). The sentence prochronistically implied that the “Framers”
were conversant with the “testimonial” category; but they were not.
285
Id. at 66-67.
The addition of police interrogation to the class of
“testimonial” statements was a departure from the description of testimonial
statements that Justice Scalia had previously endorsed by joining Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992). In White, Thomas,
wrote that “the Court has assumed that all hearsay declarants are ‘witnesses against’ a
282
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that the Framers were also unfamiliar with police
interrogation, because that practice, like police departments
themselves, did not arise until well into the nineteenth
century. 286
Thus, Justice Scalia’s claims about the scope of the
Clause did not merely involve a direct application of a
historical boundary; rather, they amounted to his own
translation of historical doctrine to the modern setting. Was
his translation valid?
I think Justice Scalia overreached what legitimately can
be derived from the authentic original meaning. The problem
does not lie in his statements regarding what the Framers
opposed; they clearly did seek to prohibit trial by deposition
when live testimony was possible. Rather the problem arises
in the negative inference Justice Scalia drew to the effect that
the Framers would not have been concerned with less formal
sorts of hearsay evidence – and, hence, that the Confrontation
Clause need not reach “nontestimonial” hearsay at all. This
claim amounts to a historical false dichotomy, and it reflects a
political judgment more than a historical analysis.
defendant within the meaning of the Clause” but that assumption “is neither
warranted nor supported by the history or text of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 359
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Likewise, Thomas asserted that “[t]here
appears to be little if any indication in the historical record that the exceptions to the
hearsay rule were understood to be limited by the simultaneously evolving commonlaw right of confrontation.” Id. at 362. Additionally, Thomas asserted that, in light of
the reference to “witnesses against him,” id. at 364, in the text of the Confrontation
Clause, “[a]s a matter of plain language, however, it is difficult to see how or why the
Clause should apply to hearsay evidence as a general proposition.” Id. at 362-63.
Instead, Thomas endorsed a “narrower reading” of the Confrontation Clause, under
which the Clause would apply only to “the “discrete category of testimonial materials
that was historically abused” which was composed of “formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” Id. at 365. Thomas did
consider the possibility of viewing a “victim’s statements to [an] investigating police
officer” as “the functional equivalent of in court testimony because the statements
arguably were made in contemplation of legal proceedings,” but he implied that
attempting to include such statements might make the scope of the Clause unclear and
unworkable. Id. at 364. He did not suggest that statements to police were historically
comparable to those to which the historical confrontation right had applied. See
generally id.
286
As I have previously explained, peace officers such as constables had no
authority to interrogate anyone at the time of the framing. See Davies, Original
Fourth, supra note 2, at 749 n.574. Indeed, because peace officers were required to
promptly take any arrestee to a justice of the peace, there was no opportunity for them
to interrogate an arrestee. See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1030. The practice of
police interrogation emerged informally during the nineteenth century when relaxed
standards for arrest allowed police to arrest earlier in the development of a case, and
when a temporal gap developed between arrest and the issuing of formal charges by a
prosecuting agency and the testing of probable cause for the arrest by a magistrate. Id.
at 1030-33.
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What Do “Text” and “History” Actually Reveal About the
Scope of the Confrontation Right?

What does the text of the Confrontation Clause actually
tell us? The critical phrase for assessing the scope of the
Prior to
Clause is “witnesses against” the “accused.” 287
Crawford, some justices and commentators had suggested that
this phrase was ambiguous enough to be open to a variety of
meanings. 288 However, in Crawford, Justice Scalia asserted
that “the constitutional text . . . reflects an especially acute
concern” with a “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.” 289
There is no doubt that the Framers understood
“witnesses against him” in the Confrontation Clause to include
persons who gave formal testimony – sworn testimony – during
the course of a criminal prosecution.
Moreover, if one
understands accusatory procedure, “witnesses against him”
also would have included persons who gave sworn depositions
to a justice of the peace at the time an arrest was made as well
as in later proceedings. 290 In fact, the “witnesses against [the
accused]” who testified at trial typically would have been the
same persons who had given depositions at the time of arrest,
so the same persons typically would have been “witnesses”
throughout the prosecution.
However, although the Framers plainly would have
included persons who gave formal testimony as “witnesses
against him,” it is unclear that they meant for the
confrontation right to stop there. For one thing, although
Scalia offered definitions of “witness” in a historical dictionary,
those definitions are less definitive than Scalia suggested;
“witness” also carried the colloquial meaning of a person who
had observed an event. 291 Hence, if person A testified about a
287

See supra text accompanying note 6.
Justice Scalia alluded to this when he wrote: “The Constitution’s text does
not alone resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to
mean those who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or
something in between.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43 (citations omitted). See also
White, 502 U.S. at 358-60 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (discussed supra
note 285). Scalia had previously suggested that the phrase “witnesses against him”
need not cover hearsay evidence at all but merely referred “to those who give testimony
against the defendant at trial.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
289
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
290
See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
291
Justice Scalia cited Noah Webster’s 1828 American dictionary as evidence
that “witnesses” meant those who “bear testimony” and “testimony” meant “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
288
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statement person B had made about a crime, A would be a
“witness” because he testified formally, but B’s hearsay
statement could also be that of a “witness” in the colloquial
sense. 292
In addition, because “hearsay” was defined during the
eighteenth century as one person repeating an unsworn
statement made by another, it is not clear that a Marian
deposition would have been commonly regarded as a form of
hearsay at the time of the framing. Instead, because Marian
depositions were validly sworn and recorded by a judicial
officer, they seem to have been regarded simply as a form of
written evidence. 293 Nevertheless, there were some references

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (pages unnumbered)) [the citation was in error insofar as
the definitions referred to appeared in volume 2; however, both volumes are sometimes
bound as one in modern reprints]. However, “bear testimony” appears only in the
definition of the intransitive verb “to witness.” Although that definition shows that
“witnesses” could have referred to formal testimony, other definitions in that dictionary
show that “witnesses” could also have carried a much broader and looser meaning. For
example, Webster’s definition of the noun “witness” included “testimony” but also
included the alternate meaning “[a] person who knows or sees any thing; one who was
personally present; as, he was an eye-witness.” See 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (pages unnumbered) (definitions of
“WITNESS, n.,” nos. 1 and 3). Indeed, Scalia had previously quoted this broader
definition of “witness” in his dissenting opinion in Craig. 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also White, 502 U.S. at 360 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting the same definition of “witness” as in Craig).
292
See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 228-29 (2005).
293
For example, Hale discussed Marian depositions as a form of judicial
record comprising written evidence. See 2 HALE, HISTORY (1736), supra note 82 at 52,
quoted supra text accompanying note 83. Likewise, Hawkins distinguished the
discussion of depositions from hearsay in his chapter on evidence. The first section
discussed “Where the Confession of the Defendant or the Depositions of others out of
Court may be allowed as Evidence” and included sections 3 through 13 of that chapter.
See HAWKINS, PLEAS (1771), supra note 132, at 429-31. The second section then
discussed “How far Hearsay is Evidence,” id. at 429, and set that out in a single section
as follows:
Sect. 14 As to the second Particular, viz. How far Hearsay is Evidence: It
seems agreed, That what a Stranger has been heard to say is in Strictness no
Manner of Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not only because it is not
upon Oath, but also because the other Side hath no Opportunity of a crossExamination; and therefore it seems a settled Rule, that it shall never be
made use of but only by way of Inducement or Illustration of what is properly
Evidence; yet it seems that what the Prisoner had been heard to say at
another Time, may be given in Evidence for him, as well as against him, and
also what a Witness hath been heard to say at another Time, may be given in
Evidence in order either to invalidate or confirm the Testimony which he
gives in Court.
Id. at 431. Thus, it does not appear that Hawkins regarded depositions as hearsay.
Similarly, Gilbert’s treatise discussed Marian depositions and Paine in
connection with confessions and Marian examinations of arrestees. See supra note 129
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to “hearsay” as an abuse in the famous cases that prompted the
articulation of the confrontation right. For example, Raleigh,
during his trial, complained of “hear-say” evidence. 294 Likewise,
Chief Justice John Marshall referred to the constitutional right
to confrontation when discussing the admissibility of a hearsay
statement in one of the Burr conspiracy trials in 1807 –
although that occurred nearly two decades after the framing of
Bill of Rights. 295
The main reason why the Framers’ attitude toward
informal hearsay is unclear, however, is that they did not have
the same understanding of the law of hearsay evidence or of
the liberal exceptions to the ban against hearsay that we now
do. Rather, as Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted in Crawford,
modern scholarship indicates that “at the time of the founding
the law had yet to fully develop the exclusionary component of
the hearsay rule and its attendant exceptions.” 296
and accompanying text. However, he made no mention of depositions in his discussion
of “hearsay.” See infra note 297.
The 1789 Woodcock and 1791 Dingler English cases cited by Scalia are also
noteworthy in this regard because, even though they ruled that a deposition taken
outside of Marian procedure was “extrajudicial” and not properly sworn, neither of
those reports characterized the invalid and inadmissible depositions as “hearsay.” See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47 (citing King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-04, 168 Eng.
Rep. 352, 353 (Old Bailey 1789); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep.
383, 383-84 (Old Bailey 1791)). Although these cases were published too late to have
informed the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment, they do provide evidence
that invalid depositions still had not come to be described as “hearsay” in legal
materials that were produced roughly contemporaneously with the framing of the Bill
of Rights.
294
Raleigh seems to have complained of “hear-say” only once in the account of
his trial in State Trials. See Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. at 20 (quoting Raleigh as
saying “there is a law of two Accusers; one of his own knowledge, another by hear-say”).
There is also an instance in Throckmorton’s trial of hearsay in the sense of
one witness stating what another had said. A Deposition given by the Duke of Suffolk
related what Lord Thomas Grey had said regarding Throckmorton’s conduct.
Throckmorton objected “But what doth the principal author of this matter say against
me, I mean the lord Thomas Grey, who is yet living? Why is not his Deposition brought
against me, for so it ougth to be, if he can say any thing?” The Trial of Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton, 1 How. St. Tr. 869, 883-84 (1554); see also id. at 886 (“There is also for
proof . . . the duke of Suffolk’s Confession, with whom I never had conference; and
therefore he avouched the take of his brother’s mouth.”).
295
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
296
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 n.1 (citing Gallanis, supra note 179, at 534-35;
Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 738-46 (1993)). Note
that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formulation, based on recent scholarship, differs from
Justice Thomas’s previous historical claim, apparently referring to the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause, that “[t]here appears to be little if any
indication in the historical record that the exceptions to the hearsay rule were
understood to be limited by the simultaneously evolving common-law right of
confrontation.” White, 502 U.S. at 362 (Thomas J., joined by Scalia J., concurring)
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The Embryonic Understanding of Hearsay During the
Framing-Era

Because the oath was the critical requisite for valid,
admissible evidence in framing-era doctrine, and because
“hearsay” was understood to refer to any statement by a
witness that repeated an unsworn statement by another
person, the doctrinal rule was that “[h]earsay is no evidence.” 297
(This appears, for example, to be the basis for the rule that one
person’s confession could not be used as evidence against
another; because confessions were unsworn, they could not
constitute evidence in the usual sense. Thus, although there
was an exception that permitted using a confession against the
speaker himself, the requirement that evidence be sworn
prohibited admitting the confession as evidence against
someone else. 298) Moreover, it appears that few “exceptions”
(emphasis added). Thomas’s statement appears to have prochronistically projected the
nineteenth-century development of exceptions to the ban against hearsay evidence
back to the earlier period when the right of confrontation emerged. However, the
historical record indicates that the right of confrontation preserved in the Sixth
Amendment predated the articulation of exceptions to the ban against hearsay
evidence during the nineteenth century.
297
In Gilbert’s words:
Hearsay is no Evidence . . . though a Person Testify what he hath heard upon
Oath, yet the Person who spake it was not upon Oath; and if a Man had been
in Court and said the same Thing and had not sworn it, he had not been
believed in a Court of Justice; for all Credit being derived from Attestation
and Evidence, it can rise no higher than the Fountain from whence it flows,
and if the first Speech was without Oath, an Oath that there was such a
Speech makes it no more than a bare speaking, and so of no Value in a Court
of Justice, where all Things were determined under the Solemnities of an
Oath . . . .
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70 n.2 (quoting GILBERT (1769), supra note 123, at 152). See also
LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 79, at 237 (noting that a hearsay statement
was regarded as “no evidence” because it was unsworn).
298
The initial authority for this rule was Case of Thomas Tong, Kelyng, J. 17,
84 Eng. Rep. 1061 (K.B. 1662) [hereinafter Tong’s Case]. The issue in this case was
whether a coconspirator in treason could be a witness at trial against other
conspirators. The judges ruled he could, and stated that “persons who are equally
culpable” of treason with those who are on trial could be called as witnesses at trial and
were not incompetent to testify because of their involvement. Id. at 17-18, 84 Eng.
Rep. 1062. However, the judges also recognized that a “confession” is “only evidence
against the party himself who made the confession, but cannot be made use of as
evidence against any others whom on his examination he confessed to be in the
treason.” Id. at 18-19, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1062 (emphasis added).
The crucial premise of this second statement in Tong’s Case was that the
“confession” of a confederate referred to was one that had been obtained prior to trial
during the unsworn Marian post-arrest “examination” of the co-conspirator by a justice
of the peace. See the italicized phrase in the preceding paragraph; see also id., 84 Eng.
Rep. at 1062 (noting that the confession that had been made during an examination by
a “privy councellor” was equivalent to a confession made during an examination by a
justice of the peace). Hence, Tong’s Case simply stood for the rule that an unsworn
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regarding hearsay were recognized by the framing era. 299 In
pretrial confession given during an examination could not constitute “evidence” against
another person. In contrast, any testimony given by a coconspirator in court during a
trial would have been sworn, and thus could constitute evidence.
Unfortunately, the meaning of this rule is easily misunderstood if one does
not understand the implicit historical distinction between sworn and unsworn
statements. In Crawford, although Crawford’s wife had not been charged with a crime
in the case (Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 28, at 4), Crawford claimed she was an
“accomplice” or at least a “potential accomplice” and thus that his wife’s statement
should be excluded under the common-law rule that an “accomplice’s” confession was
inadmissible against anyone but the accomplice himself or herself. See id. at 9 (citing
Tong’s Case, Kelyng J. at 17, 18, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1061-62). However, as explained
above, Tong’s Case did not base the framing-era rule on the mere status of a witness
being an accomplice, let alone merely a “potential accomplice.” Petitioner’s invocation
of the supposed “accomplice confession” rule was merely an example of ripping the
common-law rule from the now lost common-law context.
Unfortunately, the justices have also failed to grasp that the rule in Tong’s
Case regarding the inadmissibility of a confession by another person simply reflected
the unsworn nature of a confession taken during a Marian examination of an arrestee,
as contrasted to the admissibility of a sworn Marian deposition of a witness. Thus, in
Crawford, Justice Scalia cited the framing-era rule against the use of a confession as
evidence against another person as though it constituted part of the more general
development of a right of confrontation. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45 (stating that
historical “authorities also stated that a suspect’s confession could be admitted only
against himself, and not against others he implicated”). Justice Breyer previously
made the same error. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citing Tong’s Case as though it stated a general principle of face-to-face
confrontation). The professors’ brief in Crawford also cited the confession rule as
though it reflected a more general concern with confrontation. See Professors’ Brief,
supra note 28, at 11 n.7. However, the inadmissibility of a confession against anyone
except the confessor simply reflected the basic evidentiary requirement that only sworn
statements could constitute valid evidence. An unsworn confession was inadmissible
against others regardless of any consideration of the right to confrontation.
299
Commentators have generally concluded that the hearsay exceptions that
are a salient aspect of modern evidence law developed only after the framing of the Bill
of Rights. For example, Professor Mosteller has written that:
The historical record is clear . . . that hearsay exceptions were not considered
a substitute for cross-examination at the time of the promulgation of the
Confrontation Clause. Courts recognized only a handful of exceptions, each
with a specialized history that could not be easily generalized. If we were to
take our cue from the exceptions in effect at the time of the framing, the
result would be a very restrictive one regarding the admission of hearsay in
criminal cases. In general, if a statement was considered hearsay, it was
inadmissible except in a very limited number of exceptions and where the
declarant was unavailable, with death generally the only form of
unavailability recognized.
Thus, at the time Congress ratified the Sixth Amendment, the
hearsay/Confrontation Clause analysis was quite protective of the criminal
defendant. Not insignificantly, if hearsay and the Confrontation Clause
applied, the statement was excluded except under very narrow
circumstances.
Mosteller, supra note 296, at 745-46. See also the views of Professor Gallanis set out
infra note 304.
The amicus brief of the United States in Crawford drew a more expansive
picture of hearsay exceptions by claiming that “late 18th century” law recognized the
following exceptions to hearsay regarding “dying declarations, regularly kept records,
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Crawford, Justice Scalia identified only two hearsay exceptions
that might date from that period: an exception for a “dying
declaration” (where the declarant’s anticipation of imminent
death was viewed as prompting truthfulness to a comparable
degree as an oath), 300 and a possible exception for a
“spontaneous declaration.” 301
One reason that the law of hearsay was still
undeveloped in the framing era is that the less formal trial
procedure of that period did not permit the exclusion of hearsay
testimony to the degree that modern trial procedure does. The
judge could prevent a witness from testifying if the witness
were deemed incompetent, or the judge could prevent the
reading of a deposition if it had been taken improperly.
However, there does not seem to have been any effective
procedure for preventing a witness from repeating an out-ofcourt statement made by another person in the hearing of the
jury. For one thing, the jury was not sent out of the courtroom
during the discussion of evidentiary matters in eighteenthcentury criminal trials. For another, witness testimony was
not as structured by a question and answer format as is now
the case, and there apparently was often no opportunity for
counsel to object before a witness repeated a hearsay statement
in the course of his or her testimony. Instead, if a witness did
repeat a hearsay statement, the judge instructed the jury that
hearsay was “no evidence” and that the jury should not give
any credit to the hearsay statement. 302 The more rigorous
co-conspirator declarations, evidence of pedigree and family history, and various kinds
of reputation evidence.” Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 28, at 13 n.5.
However, the salient point is that most of those exceptions applied only to civil matters;
only the dying declaration and co-conspirator declarations exceptions were likely to
arise in criminal trials. Moreover, the historical basis for the “co-conspirator
declaration” exception referred to is dubious. See supra note 298.
Commentators also have sometimes overstated the historical exceptions to
the ban against hearsay that were pertinent to criminal trials and the confrontation
right. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 94 (1997) (asserting that “surely all hearsay cannot be
unconstitutional. At common law, the traditional hearsay ‘rule’ was notoriously unruly, recognizing countless exceptions to its basic preference for live testimony,” but
offering no evidence to support that historical assertion).
300
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 56 n.6 (describing dying declarations as the
only exception to the ban against hearsay that would have permitted the admission of
testimonial statements in criminal trials by 1791).
301
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 22 n.8 (noting that “in 1791” such an exception
would have been narrowly construed “to the extent the hearsay exception for
spontaneous declarations existed at all”).
302
Langbein reports that in framing-era practice in England, issues of the
admissibility of evidence were discussed in front of the jury. See LANGBEIN,
ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 79, at 249. He also reports that, although hearsay was
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modern notion that hearsay should be excluded from the jury’s
hearing appears to have developed only as the criminal trial
became more complex and testimony became more formally
structured during the nineteenth century. 303 As a result, the
“exceptions” to the rule against hearsay evidence also
developed largely only during the nineteenth century – after
the oath became a less important factor in assessing the
validity of evidence.
The important point is that the Framers simply did not
consider the application of the confrontation right to the types
of informal hearsay evidence that are now commonly admitted
as evidence in criminal trials, because they did not anticipate
the possibility that informal hearsay could or would become
widely recognized as valid “evidence” in its own right. 304
Rather, both the modern understanding of hearsay and of
hearsay exceptions are post-framing developments.
Thus, the critical question is whether inferences can be
drawn from the original meaning of a constitutional provision
regarding a subject the Framers had no occasion to consider, or
even anticipate. Justice Scalia implicitly asserted a narrow
understanding – the original meaning should be understood to
prohibit only the specific abuses the Framers were familiar
with. Unsurprisingly, that approach to original meaning seems
to appeal to those who generally prefer to read constitutional
“no evidence” as a matter of doctrine, see id. at 235-37, it often arose during criminal
trials, see id. at 234-35. Because judges could not prevent witnesses from referring to
hearsay statements, they could only direct the jury that hearsay was “no evidence” and
thus should not be credited. See id. at 235, 236, 247-51.
303
As is widely understood, the criminal trial before the petit jury has become
a much more complex and rigorous procedure than it was during the late eighteenth
century, and the subsequent increased frequency of counsel in criminal trials almost
certainly is part of the explanation for that increase in complexity. See, e.g., Gallanis,
supra note 179, at 537-38. See also LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 79, at
242-44. Langbein suggests that the hearsay rule itself – that hearsay was “no
evidence” – was “firmly in place” in English practice at the Old Bailey “by the end of
the eighteenth century.” Id. at 242. However, he does not identify exceptions to that
rule other than the dying declaration exception, which he dates as having arisen prior
to the hearsay rule itself. See id. at 249 n.305.
304
Professor Gallanis noted in his study of the emergence of hearsay doctrine
that “hearsay controversies in [reported English] criminal cases were almost
nonexistent before [the 1780s].” Gallanis, supra note 179, at 536. However, he
concluded that the contours of the modern rule against hearsay, and its exceptions,
were evident in cases decided during the 1780s because of a “sharp rise” in litigated
issues regarding hearsay during that period. Id. at 535-36. (Note, however, that
because Gallanis was interested in English developments, he referred only to the dates
when cases were decided, not to the dates when published reports of those cases would
have become available in America.) Gallanis attributed the increase in hearsay
litigation to the increased frequency with which lawyers appeared in routine criminal
trials during that period. Id. at 537-38.
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restrictions on government criminal justice authority narrowly.
However, that approach ignores the basic fact that all texts are
incomplete on their face.
D.

What the Framers Did and Did Not Expect

All texts are incomplete in the sense that they do not
explicitly spell out all of the premises and expectations that
shaped the meaning that the authors intended to convey to
their audience. Widely shared premises are often left unstated,
simply because there does not seem to be a need to state them.
In addition, the meaning that the language of a text carries can
change if the premises under which it is read have changed.
Indeed, the practical import of a text can be inverted if the
premises and context have changed enough. 305 Thus, the
original meaning of a text has always been shaped by the
historical context in which it was written. But what if the
context has changed? Is it really appropriate to limit the
“meaning” of the text to only the “original” specific abuses the
Framers actually had in mind when they wrote it, without
inquiring as to whether or how the underlying premises and
expectations that caused the Framers to focus as they
supposedly did may have changed over time?
Consider the extent to which contemporary criminal
procedure context has diverged from the premises and
expectations that shaped the Framers’ understanding of the
confrontation right. The Framers still had confidence that
oaths provided an assurance of truthfulness; in contrast, we
305
For example, Professor Telford Taylor once argued that the absence of any
explicit warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment’s text indicated that the
Framers were “[not] at all concerned” with warrantless government intrusions.
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH,
SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 39 (1969). In one sense
that was correct; the original Fourth Amendment was focused only on the standards
for a valid warrant. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 724. However, the
reason that the Framers were content to simply control warrants was that they never
anticipated the emergence of the modern police officer, and thus never conceived that
ordinary officers would be accorded much authority unless they were executing
warrants. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment was written, controlling the warrant
sufficed to serve the Framers’ larger purpose of preventing ordinary officers from
exercising discretionary arrest or search authority. Id. at 650. However, if one were to
read the Fourth Amendment today as only addressing standards for valid warrants,
the whole purpose of that Amendment would be defeated because modern police have
acquired warrantless authority that the Framers never imagined they would be
permitted to exercise. Thus, the sound response to Professor Taylor’s position is that
there is reason to think that Framers would have been very concerned about
warrantless intrusions had they been able to anticipate how policing would develop.
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are less sure the oath assures the likelihood of truth-telling –
which is why we now value cross-examination so much. In
addition, although the Framers still expected that criminal
procedure would be accusatory – indeed, they probably thought
that the provisions in the state declarations of rights and the
federal Bill of Rights would preserve accusatory procedure –
accusatory procedure was replaced by modern investigatory
procedure. More specifically, the Framers expected that the
full case against the arrestee would usually be set out at the
time of the arrest that commenced a prosecution; in contrast,
contemporary prosecutors now withhold as much of their case
as possible during preliminary hearings (which had not been
invented in 1789 306) in order to gain advantage in pleabargaining (a process that does not appear in framing-era
sources 307) or to have the advantage of surprise in the event of
trial. 308
Even more importantly, the Framers did not expect that
government officers would search out potential witnesses of
crime; that was the complainant’s burden. 309 In contrast,
modern police officers do search out potential witnesses in the
process of investigating charged crimes and even develop
informant networks for discovering uncharged crimes. In the
course of conducting this modern form of investigation, police
generate and collect rumors and hearsay information to a
degree that was unknown during the framing era.
306
Professor Langbein suggests that Marian procedure may have taken on
features of a preliminary hearing in London in the 1750s. See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY
TRIAL, supra note 79, at 274-77. However, that seems likely to have been an
aberration. Preliminary hearings probably came into widespread use only after
Marian procedure was abandoned during the nineteenth century; Marian examinations
were replaced by the combination of a probable cause hearing for warrantless arrests,
and a subsequent preliminary hearing. This evolution may have been well underway
in Virginia’s use of a “court of examination” even before the framing-era, but that
development seems to have been limited to Virginia. See supra notes 248, 265.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford refers to “ex parte testimony at a
preliminary hearing” as an example of a form of a statement that would clearly be
“testimonial” under any definition of that term. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
52 (2004). The reference is puzzling because, so far as I can determine, preliminary
hearings are not held ex parte. If Scalia meant to refer to a Marian deposition, he
departed from historical usage in referring to such as a “preliminary hearing.”
307
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 278 (1978) (noting that there were few guilty pleas in eighteenthcentury English trials and that judges typically advised defendants against pleading
guilty).
308
See, e.g., NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 141 (2d ed. 2000).
309
See, e.g., LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 79, at 11-12; cf. Davies,
Chavez, supra note 70, at 1028-29.
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Additionally, hearsay information collected by police and
prosecutors is of considerable importance because modern
evidence law authorizes the use of hearsay evidence to a far
greater degree than was the case in 1789. 310 Indeed, it is at
least a plausible hypothesis that courts have liberalized the
exceptions to the supposed ban against hearsay in order to
allow the government to exploit the array of hearsay-like
information now generated by modern police investigation.
It is pointless to ask what the Framers would make of
all these changes – they cannot tell us, and we cannot know.
The more appropriate question is whether there is any method
by which we now can decide how the original understanding of
a provision in a 200-plus-year-old text should apply to a very
different context than that for which it was written.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia purported to translate the
original meaning to the modern context by assessing
“resemblance” to a historical feature. Thus, he asserted that
statements made during police interrogations should be
understood to fall within the scope mandated by “text and
history” because “[p]olice interrogations bear a striking
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in
England.” 311 But do they?
Framing-era depositions were under oath and conducted
by magistrates; in contrast, contemporary police interrogations
are not sworn. Scalia asserted that these differences were
immaterial, but he offered no valid historical evidence for his
suggestion that oaths were not assigned importance in
framing-era law. 312 Instead, he asserted that it “does not
310
In contrast to the historical rule that “hearsay is no evidence,” see supra
note 297 and accompanying text, contemporary evidence law recognizes a variety of
exceptions to the rule against hearsay. For an explication of the variety and scope of
the contemporary exceptions, see, for example, 4-5 JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL, supra note 25, chs.26-38 (discussing hearsay exceptions relating to: prior
inconsistent statements by witnesses; admissions; spontaneous statements (“res
gestae”); state of mind; statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment; special
exceptions for sexual assault or child abuse cases; recorded recollections; business
records; public records; miscellaneous “declarant availability immaterial” exceptions;
market reports and commercial publications; “declarant unavailable” exceptions
(including former testimony, dying declarations, statements against interest, and
statements admitted on account of wrongdoing by a litigant); and “residual”
exceptions).
311
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
312
Id. at 52 (stating that the fact that “statements [to police officers are
unsworn] is not dispositive”). As evidence on this supposedly historical point, Scalia
cited only Jardine’s 1832 account of Raleigh’s trial, see supra note 50, and an 1844
South Carolina opinion. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (citing CRIMINAL TRIALS (1832),
supra note 50, at 430; State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124 (App. L. 1844)). Obviously,
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change the picture” that depositions were conducted by
magistrates rather than peace officers because “[j]ustices of the
peace conducting examinations under the Marian statutes were
not magistrates as we understand that office today, but had an
essentially investigative and prosecutorial function.” 313
However, that assessment is too superficial. Justices of the
peace were understood to be judicial officers in 1789, 314 and it
mattered that justices conducted interrogation of witnesses in
1789 because only sworn statements could constitute valid
evidence. A justice of the peace could administer an oath
precisely because he held a judicial commission – but a
constable could not. 315 In 1789, it was still unthinkable that a
constable would take an examination of a witness.
In addition, Scalia’s claim of a “striking resemblance”
blurs two very different levels of “investigation.”
The
“investigation” conducted by a justice of the peace during the
framing era was limited largely to questioning those who were
already arrested on the basis of an accusation of crime “in fact”
and those who brought the arrestee to him; the justice did not
investigate in the sense that he undertook to discover
uncharged crimes or even sought out potential witnesses when
an accusation had been made. Marshalling witnesses was the
obligation of the private complainant. 316 In contrast, modern

neither of those sources sheds any light on the Framers’ understanding of the
importance of an oath for determining the validity of evidence. In addition Scalia
noted that unsworn confessions were admitted against the person who made them. Id.
However, confessions were understood to be entirely distinct from evidence from
witnesses. See supra note 298. Except for a defendant’s own confession, an oath was a
requisite for valid evidence. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
313
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
314
See, e.g., JACOB’S LAW DICTIONARY (1782), supra note 144 (pages
unnumbered) (stating in a discussion of “Justices of the Peace” that “[t]he power of
justices is ministerial when they are commanded to do any thing by a superior
authority, as by the court of B.R. [i.e., King’s Bench] &c. In all other cases they act as
judges; but they must proceed according to their commission, &c.”). See also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF England 342-43 (1st ed. 1765)
[hereinafter 1 BLACKSTONE] (stating that the commission of a justice of the peace
“empowers any two or more of them to hear and determine all felonies and other
offenses; which is the ground of their jurisdiction at [the court of] sessions.”).
315
See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 623 n.199.
316
See supra text accompanying notes 70-76. See also LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY
TRIAL, supra note 79, at 41 (noting that, although some English justices of the peace
may have sought out additional witnesses, the Marian statutes did not require them to
do so). See also id. at 42-43 (concluding that Marian procedure mainly helped
perpetuate private prosecutions and channeled English pretrial procedure away from
public prosecution); id. at 338 (concluding that the privatization of criminal
investigation was the central failing of English criminal procedure).
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police attempt to “ferret out” uncharged crimes, 317 and they
detain or arrest and question suspects on the basis of minimal
standards of possible crime such as “reasonable suspicion” or
“probable cause.” 318 Hence, there are striking differences
between the two types of “investigation”; justices of the peace
did not “investigate” as intensively or intrusively as modern
police investigate – no government officer investigated in that
sense in 1789. 319
Thus, Justice Scalia’s assertion that contemporary
police interrogation is somehow equivalent to a framing-era
judicial deposition (a claim that also holds significant
implications for the Fifth Amendment right against selfThe asserted
accusation 320) has little basis in history.
“resemblance” ignores at least as many features as it considers,
and falsely implies more continuity in criminal procedure than
has been the case.
My point is not that the Confrontation Clause today
should not extend to a hearsay statement made during police
interrogation. In light of the fact that depositions taken by
justices of the peace are no longer used, the confrontation right
would be virtually meaningless if were understood to prohibit
317

For the origin of this phrase, see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503,

512 (1943).
318

See supra note 69.
Justice Scalia committed a classic prochronism when he wrote that “it is
not surprising that other government officers [that is, justices of the peace during the
framing era] performed the investigative functions now associated primarily with
police.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004). That statement simply
assumes that there has always been government investigation of ordinary crime.
However, that assumption is false. Neither the justice nor his constable had authority
to ferret out crime in the way that modern police officers are expected to. See Davies,
Atwater, supra note 2, at 422-25. Modern policing is a post-framing invention that is a
salient feature of the larger transformation from accusatory to investigatory procedure.
Specifically, modern policing dates from the mid-nineteenth-century substitution of
“probable cause” for the crime-in-fact standard for warrantless arrests. See Davies,
Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 627-40. That relaxation of the arrest standard for
officers vastly expanded the discretionary authority of the police officer. Indeed, it
made the modern police officer possible. It also opened the way for the development of
police investigation and interrogation of suspects. See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70,
at 1030-32. The concept of a peace officer taking a statement to be used as evidence
would not have made any sense to the Framers. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra
note 2, at 749 n.574.
320
It should be noted – as I am confident that Justice Scalia would recognize –
that the claim that modern police interrogation is equivalent to a framing-era
examination by a justice of the peace is also a necessary component of any claim that
police interrogation is consistent with the original understanding of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The examination of an arrestee by a
justice of the peace was the only form of pretrial interrogation authorized by framingera law. See Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1001-06.
319
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only the admission of depositions and affidavits. Rather, it
makes sense to apply the confrontation right at least as far as
statements made during police interrogation if for no other
reason than that police investigation and interrogation
generates much of the potential evidence in contemporary
criminal prosecutions.
The crucial shortcoming of an
originalist approach that would define a protection in the Bill
of Rights according to only the specific abuses that the Framers
actually anticipated is that such an approach underestimates
the tendency for government power to expand in ways that
end-run the Framers’ experience. Hence, reading the Bill of
Rights to prohibit only the exact abuses that the Framers
imagined would tend to drain the Bill of practical meaning.
However, given that it is necessary to construe the
confrontation right to extend beyond the specific abuses known
to the Framers, why stop at statements made during police
interrogation – particularly given that police interrogations are
quite distinct from framing-era justice of the peace depositions?
How does history compel that choice? Indeed, even assuming
that there are valid policy justifications to restrict the
confrontation right to something less than every hearsay
statement identified by modern evidence law, why should the
confrontation right today be defined according to specific
settings or forms in which the hearsay statement was
obtained? Why not extend the right more broadly to any
statement that is the product of police investigation? 321 Or to
any statement that materially goes to the assessment of guilt?
No doubt a variety of policy considerations are pertinent to
assessing these possibilities; my point is simply that none of
these questions are actually answered by original meaning
precisely because they all involve matters that fall outside of
the Framers’ experience and expectations.
For present purposes, the important point is that the
“testimonial/nontestimonial” distinction that is salient in
Crawford was not part of the original meaning, and Justice
Scalia misdescribed history when he suggested that the
original meaning limited the reach of the Confrontation Clause
to “testimonial hearsay.” That was a political judgment posing

321
See, e.g., Berger, supra note 51, at 561 (commenting, with regard to the
confrontation right, that “[h]earsay statements procured by agents of the prosecution
or police should . . . stand on a different footing than hearsay created without
governmental intrusion”).
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as history, not history itself. 322 History can inform us of the
importance the Framers attached to the confrontation right
and to cross-examination, but it cannot tell us what that right
should now mean, in a very different context. The answer to
that question can be addressed only by assessing the
contemporary conditions and consequences of the relationship
between the right of confrontation and hearsay.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE FALSE ALLURE OF ORIGINALISM

I have not engaged in the preceding assessment of the
originalist claims in Crawford in the hopes of prompting a
reconsideration of the outcome of that case. As noted above,
my sense is that Crawford probably is an improvement over
the extreme flexibility of Roberts. Instead, my hope is that
exposing the errors and distortions in Crawford’s claims about
original meaning will encourage the justices and commentators
to forego the pretense of originalism for more candid and
constructive modes of justifying constitutional rulings. 323
322

It should be noted that all of the briefs filed in Crawford seem to have
anticipated or endorsed the restriction of the scope of the Confrontation Clause to only
“testimonial hearsay.” In particular, the professors’ amicus brief endorsed this
limitation in much the same way Justice Scalia did. The brief asserted that “the law
against hearsay has not played a role in this account [of the emergence of the
confrontation right]. Hearsay law, like evidence law more generally, was not well
developed at the time the [Confrontation] Clause was adopted, much less during the
previous centuries.” Professors’ Brief, supra note 28, at 11 (repeating a virtually
identical statement in Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1208 (2002)). However, after stating, in effect, that the
Framers were unfamiliar with modern hearsay doctrine, the Professors’ brief
nevertheless draws a negative conclusion: that “[i]n expressing a fundamental
procedural principle governing how testimony must be given, the [Confrontation]
Clause was not meant to constitutionalize the law of hearsay.” Id. at 11. I think this
conclusion is simply arbitrary. Indeed, this brief was a bit too imprecise in saying that
hearsay law was not well developed when the Confrontation Clause “was adopted”; in
framing-era doctrine, hearsay was “no evidence.”
See supra note 293 and
accompanying text. Hence, I do not see how the Framers were ever given any reason to
consider whether or how confrontation should apply to hearsay “evidence.” It may be
that the combination of a cross-examination rule for “testimonial hearsay” and a free
pass for “nontestimonial hearsay” constitutes a neat compromise for construing the
Confrontation Clause today, but that does not mean that the comprise has any
historical roots or character.
The amicus brief of the United States in Crawford once again restated the
Justice Department’s view that the confrontation right should be restricted to
“testimony or its equivalent.” Compare Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note
28, at 8-10 with White, 502 U.S. at 352-53 (indicating that the United States as amicus
had contended “that the Confrontation Clause generally does not apply to the
introduction of out-of-court statements admitted under an accepted hearsay
exception”). However, although this brief addressed history, it also failed to articulate
any substantial historical basis for the construction it sought.
323
See supra note 43.
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Originalism in criminal procedure suffers two serious
defects. First, the justices too often get the history wrong.
Getting the history right requires considerable immersion in
the historical sources, but the justices do not have the time to
delve into history that deeply. Second, in the event the justices
were to get the history right, they would find that authentic
framing-era doctrine is usually so distant from the modern
context and from modern conceptions that it simply does not
connect up with contemporary issues.
A.

The Recent Emphasis on Originalist Justifications

The appeal of originalism lies in the notion that it
injects a degree of discipline into constitutional law. However,
the recent turn to originalism is largely the product of
constitutional politics. Specifically, the turn to originalism
reflects the search by conservative politicians, judges, and
lawyers for a rhetoric to justify retrenching the expansive
constructions of constitutional rights that had been articulated
in the decisions of the Warren Court and early Burger Court.
During the Nixon period, this response was
characterized as a return to “strict construction.” However,
when applied to the cryptic language of the Bill of Rights, this
textual-sounding approach did not always suggest precisely
what the strict construction should be. Thus, during the
Reagan administration, the response was shifted slightly to
place greater emphasis on the supposedly historical “original
meaning” of the constitutional text. 324
Although much of the impetus for the turn to
originalism probably arose from the Court’s decisions regarding
the right of privacy (abortion) and, perhaps, the religion
clauses (school prayer, vouchers, etc.), originalist claims also
appeared in constitutional criminal procedure opinions.
Conservatives were particularly hostile toward the Warren
Court’s interpretations of the implications of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments for police conduct, and especially the
exclusionary rules that enforced Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protections. They responded by formulating a search-for-truth
agenda for criminal procedure.

324

See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 252-60.
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Contemporary Search-for-Truth Investigatory Procedure

Of course, the notion that criminal procedure should be
only a “search for truth” in criminal trials provides a perfect
slogan for legitimizing unfettered government investigative
power. That agenda treats the jury trial at the end of a
criminal proceeding as the only important safeguard, but
dismisses pretrial standards and protections as unnecessary
obstacles to the search for truth at trial. Thus, although the
search-for-truth agenda accords importance to the trial rights
in the Sixth Amendment – or at least to some aspects of those
rights 325 – it justifies the evisceration of the contents of the
Fourth and Fifth amendments. Moreover, because jury trials
actually occur in only a very small percentage of criminal
prosecutions, this agenda effectively frees police and
prosecutors from constitutional restraints in most criminal
matters.
Unsurprisingly, the theme that criminal procedure
should assure that the criminal trial is an unfettered “search
for truth” has also shaped the originalist claims regarding
constitutional criminal procedure in Rehnquist Court opinions.
The self-described originalist justices have justified the
removal of constitutional restraints on police by asserting that
the Framers intended for the Fourth Amendment to apply only
a flexible “generalized reasonableness” standard for assessing
police detentions, arrests, and searches – an approach that
maximizes the potential for after-the-fact rationalizations of
police intrusions. 326 Likewise, they have also asserted that the
325
The Court has not been particularly insistent on providing effective
assistance of counsel in criminal trials. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, History’s
Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (2004). Of course,
other aspects of contemporary procedure, such as the extremely limited pretrial
discovery permitted defendants, are also difficult to square with search-for-truth
rhetoric. In practice, the search-for-truth model may operate largely as a search for
incriminating evidence.
326
The notion that the Fourth Amendment was intended to create a broad
reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard for assessing the constitutionality of
government intrusions is the product of a series of false historical claims. The idea
that the Fourth Amendment created a reasonableness standard distinct from the
warrant standards it explicitly set out had its start in Justice Bradley’s opinion in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). That opinion is notable for Bradley’s heavy
reliance on a long quotation of a statement Lord Camden made in a 1765 English
general warrant case. Id. at 627-29. However, the quoted language had not appeared
in the report of the case that the Framers likely were familiar with, but had been
added in a report that was not published until the 1780s, after all of the components of
the Fourth Amendment, including the reference to a right against “unreasonable”
searches and seizures, had already appeared in the language of the state declarations
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Framers intended for the right against self-incrimination to
operate only at trial itself, but not to limit pretrial
investigation of crimes – a construction that maximizes the
opportunity for police interrogation. 327
I think the search-for-truth agenda is also evident in
Crawford itself – albeit with a twist. Because the right of
confrontation does relate to the criminal trial, and because
cross-examination is widely regarded as essential to accurate
truth-finding, the search-for-truth model identifies the
Confrontation Clause as a trial right that must be accorded
some importance. I think that explains why the two justices
who seem most committed to originalist justifications, Justices
Scalia and Thomas, joined more moderate members of the
Court in asserting a strong cross-examination rule in
Crawford. Their insistence that the confrontation right take
the form of an enforceable rule was consistent with taking
seriously the search for truth in the jury trial.
Conversely, the fact that the confrontation right can
operate as an exclusionary rule that excludes potentially
incriminating evidence from trial, as was the case in Crawford
itself, undoubtedly explains why the articulation of the crossof rights. Hence, it seems highly unlikely that the Framers would have paid any
attention to the language on which Bradley relied. See supra note 34. However,
although Boyd invented the idea of a free-standing reasonableness standard, the
content that case assigned to Fourth Amendment reasonableness has not exerted a
significant influence on modern Fourth Amendment doctrine.
The more important decision, which also rests on a historical error, is Chief
Justice Taft’s opinion in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In that case,
Taft justified permitting police to make warrantless searches of cars on the ground that
such a search would be “reasonable” if there was probable cause that the car contained
contraband because the First Congress had enacted statutes that permitted
warrantless searches of ships roughly contemporaneously with the framing of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 150-53. However, Taft erred by assuming that the Fourth
Amendment would have applied to ships; the historical evidence indicates that a ship
would have fallen outside of the “houses, papers, and effects” protected by the Fourth
Amendment. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 604-08. Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment had never been mentioned in any of the numerous ship seizure cases
decided by the Court prior to Carroll. Id.; Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 262.
More recently, Justice Scalia endorsed a generalized reasonableness
approach and asserted that it was the “first principle” mandated by the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565, 583 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
Specifically, he asserted that “colonial juries” used only a
“reasonable[ness]” standard to assess the lawfulness of a search. Id. at 581. However,
the only historical source he cited did not mention any “reasonable[ness]” standard; the
only other authority he cited, a commentary by Professor Amar, actually only cited, in
turn, an article by Scalia himself in which Scalia had asserted that search and seizure
law should be based on a reasonableness assessment rather than upon a set of rules.
See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 263 n.64.
327
See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (discussed in Davies, Chavez,
supra note 70, at 990-95).
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examination requirement in Crawford was coupled with the
limitation of the confrontation right to “testimonial”
statements. As a practical matter, that limitation may well
turn out to leave police and prosecutors with considerable room
to obtain and use “nontestimonial” hearsay statements as
evidence for establishing the guilt of criminal defendants.
However, the defect in all of this – at least in terms of
the historical focus of this article – is simply that the larger
search-for-truth ideological agenda does not mesh with the
authentic original understanding of constitutional criminal
procedure.
C.

The Contrast Between the “Search-for-Truth” Agenda
and Historical Accusatory Procedure

As noted above, framing-era criminal procedure – the
procedure that the Framers actually sought to preserve in the
Bill of Rights – was accusatory. 328 Moreover, accusatory
procedure differed in fundamental ways from current
investigatory procedure. Indeed, the search-for-truth model of
investigatory procedure now locates safeguards against abuse
of criminal justice power quite differently than accusatory
procedure did.
The essence of framing-era accusatory procedure was
that government criminal justice power did not arise unless
and until a complainant actually made a strong accusation that
a crime had been committed “in fact.” 329 Government provided
the forum to resolve accusations, provided coercive power to
arrest the accused to assure his appearance in that forum, and
inflicted punishment on the guilty. However, at least in
ordinary crimes, government did not initiate the use of the
criminal power, and did not investigate to discover uncharged
crimes. 330
Of course, the Framers conceived of the jury trial as the
ultimate protection against abuse of criminal justice power,
and there is no doubt that they assigned it great importance.
However, as the Framers were undoubtedly aware, the abuses

328
See supra notes 67-69, 306-10 and accompanying text. See also Davies,
Atwater, supra note 2, at 422-29.
329
See supra note 67. This standard was more rigorous than mere “probable
cause.” See supra note 69.
330
There were exceptions in which government itself was the victim of the
crime, for example, counterfeiting, smuggling, treason.
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that had prompted the reformulation of common-law criminal
procedure during the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries had mostly involved the initiation of criminal
proceedings without a prior accusation of a specific crime. 331
Thus,
accusatory
procedure
located
important
protections at the initiation of a criminal proceeding. It set a
high threshold for initiating a prosecution by requiring a sworn
accusation of a crime in fact – and by making the complainant
at least potentially responsible for having made the accusation.
These aspects were meant to prevent the wrongful initiation of
prosecutions. 332 Indeed, the importance accorded the sworn
accusation probably explains the acceptance of the
admissibility at trial of Marian depositions of witnesses who
had become unavailable after the arrest. Because Marian
procedure recorded the sworn information that constituted the
basis for the accusation, and because the oath was accorded
considerable weight, the judicial record of that information was
too substantial to be cast aside if the witness later became
genuinely unavailable.
Accusatory procedure also imposed a series of postarrest tests of the validity of the accusation prior to the
ultimate trial before the petit jury. The Marian examinations
of the arrestee, the complainant, and the complainant’s
witnesses was the first test of the substantiality of the
accusation. The grand jury then tested the prima facie truth of
the accusation a second time. 333 Only after passing those two
filters was a defendant subjected to trial before the petit jury.
Thus, the final petit jury trial was not understood as a wideranging search for truth; rather, it was one last opportunity for
the defendant to challenge and rebut a strong, already twice-

331
See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 430-31 (discussing the
importance of the 1628 Petition of Right, which was a response to arrests made without
accusation of a specific crime; the 1642 abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, which
was a response to the abuse of interrogation prior to any criminal charge; and the 1769
Habeas Corpus Act, which was a response to evasions of the standards for legally valid
arrest and pretrial imprisonment).
332
Of course, there is no way to know whether the historical accusatory
standards were efficacious in preventing unfounded prosecutions. However, the fact
that English courts relaxed these standards to facilitate the development of modern
policing, see supra note 159, suggests that the accusatory standards did restrict the
initiation of criminal proceedings.
333
During the framing-era, the standard for grand jury indictment was the
apparent truth of the accusation, not the lower probable cause standard used today.
See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 427-28.
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tested accusation of guilt. 334 The underlying idea was that a
defendant should not have to undergo trial at all unless it had
already been concluded that there was a high probability that
he was guilty. That is the accusatory procedure the Framers
thought that they had preserved in the state declarations of
rights and in the federal Bill of Rights. However, it did not
work out that way.
The most salient feature of the post-framing history of
American criminal procedure is the displacement of accusatory
procedure by investigatory procedure.
Contrary to the
Framers’ perception that the legislature posed the greatest
danger to the preservation of accusatory procedure, 335 it was
actually the courts themselves that relaxed arrest and
interrogation standards during the nineteenth century. The
obvious reason they did so was to facilitate the development of
more aggressive forms of crime suppression, especially modern
policing. 336 At roughly the same time, and perhaps partly in
response to that relaxation, but also as a result of increased
appearance by defense counsel, the criminal trial became more
complex, and the law of evidence became more elaborate. 337
By the late nineteenth century, the protections against
abuse that had restricted the initiation of a prosecution had
virtually disappeared; instead, what safeguards there were
became concentrated in the jury trial itself. In a very real
sense, pretrial constitutional criminal procedure was
essentially nonexistent in this period. Thus, the accusatory
procedure that had informed the original understanding of the
criminal procedure protections was displaced and lost more
334

For example, the final trial before the petit jury was sometimes described
as a trial before the “traverse” jury – meaning that it was the opportunity for the
defendant to “traverse” (respond to, rebut) the evidence against him. See Davies,
Atwater, supra note 2, at 428 n.630.
335
See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 407-08 (noting that Madison
initially proposed inserting the criminal procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights into
the limits on the powers of Congress set out in Article I, section 9, of the Constitution).
See also, e.g., Henry, supra note 158, at 447-78 (warning during the Virginia ratifying
convention that without a federal bill of rights, “Congress will loose the restriction of
not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and
unusual punishments [and that] Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law,
in preference to that of the common law [and] may introduce the practice of France,
Spain, and Germany – of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.”); Holmes, supra
note 158, at 111 (warning during the Massachusetts ratifying convention that without
a federal bill of rights “[w]e shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to
institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal of Spain . . . the
Inquisition.”).
336
See, e.g., Davies, Chavez, supra note 70, at 1030-32.
337
See supra note 303.
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than a century ago, and the original meaning of the criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights were lost at the same
time.
Constitutional criminal procedure was revived in the
Supreme Court toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning
of the twentieth centuries, and the justices invented the
modern doctrinal structure at that time. 338 However, the early
twentieth-century justices shaped the new doctrine to facilitate
government investigation of crime, 339 not to return to
accusatory procedure. Of course, the Supreme Court did not
call attention to the fact that it had fundamentally revised the
content of constitutional standards.
Rather, the justices
finessed it.
Unsurprisingly, the justices who reinvented criminal
procedure also invented an official history of criminal
procedure to legitimate their reformulation. “We have always
done it that way” is the most common source of legal
legitimacy, and an originalist pedigree was particularly
necessary in the formalist jurisprudence of the early twentieth
century.
Of course, because investigatory procedure had
338
The reformulation of constitutional criminal procedure appears to have
been prompted by a fundamental change in the understanding of the legal character of
misconduct committed by officials and officers. Strange as it now may sound, during
the framing era, there had been no conception that misconduct by an officer could
constitute government wrong-doing or an unconstitutional government action; rather,
because misconduct by an officer was, by definition, outside of the valid authority of his
office, such misconduct was conceived to be only a form of personal wrongdoing and
trespass. Thus, there was no basis for applying constitutional standards directly to the
officer. For that reason, the Bill of Rights was aimed at limiting the power of Congress
to relax settled conceptions of legal rights by legislation. See Davies, Original Fourth,
supra note 2, at 660-67.
However, the modern notion that misconduct by officers constitutes a form
of government illegality began to emerge around the end of the nineteenth century
when the Supreme Court expanded the concept of “state action” to allow it to employ
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to oversee the regulation of
businesses by state regulators. In particular, the justices made the novel ruling that
even actions by state regulators that violated state law could constitute “state action”
for purposes of applying the Due Process Clause. That new conception that officers
could violate constitutional standards was then transferred to unlawful conduct by law
enforcement officers in the early twentieth century. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra
note 2, at 729-30.
339
There is a twist; the initial rulings in the reconstruction of constitutional
criminal procedure often imposed limitations on law enforcement authority in order to
protect business records. See, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 729 n.516
(noting that the initial application of the Fourth Amendment to a warrantless police
search appears to have been a response to government seizures of business records).
However, the justices reversed direction and undertook to facilitate law enforcement
during Prohibition when the focus of law enforcement was no longer on business
interests. See supra note 326 (discussing the adoption of a generalized reasonableness
approach to police searches in Carroll).
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become firmly established by that time, the justices shaped the
official history to support investigatory procedure. This official
history then took on the aura of stare decisis. Fictional
assertions in one opinion became the starting point for
justifying the next. 340 Historical aspects that fit, or could be
made to fit, or at least seem to fit, were cited as evidence of the
official version of original meaning; those that did not were
either distorted or ignored. Thus, the justices shaped the
supposed original meaning to mesh with and support the
already decided-upon doctrine, not the other way around. 341
Happily, originalist claims were somewhat less evident
in the opinions announced during the mid-twentieth century,
though nothing was done to correct the official history that had
already been created. However, fictional originalist claims
again became salient during the Burger and Rehnquist Court
periods, as the new law-and-order majority set about
dismantling the constructions of the Warren Court.
The recent (re)turn to originalism is distinguishable by
the specificity of the supposedly historical claims that are
made. Perhaps in response to current academic styles, the
originalists on the Court now tend to assert specific historical
precedents for the specific rule that they announce. Ironically,
the specificity of the claims has made it easier to detect just
how fictional official history has become. If one examines the
evidence offered for the specific claims that are made, the
evidence usually collapses. That is what the preceding pages
340
Unfortunately, the legal academy has often given the official history
invented by the justices a free pass. Unlike other disciplines, law is essentially
normative. Hence, there are no objective standards of validity in law. Rather, law
reflects status, and the Supreme Court is at the apex of the legal status structure.
That was especially so earlier in the twentieth century. Thus, early twentieth-century
commentators often parroted what justices wrote about history as though that were the
history. The result was that official history became the accepted wisdom.
Even today, despite the more critical tenor of legal scholarship, the originalist
claims in Supreme Court opinions are likely to get a free pass from many
commentators and most casebook editors. Most legal academics have little background
(or interest) in the relevant history, so they simply treat what the justice wrote as
though it were valid. Others may even sycophantically curry favor by praising the
justices’ historical claims as scholarship. See, e.g., Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at
245-46 n.16 (discussing academic comments that uncritically accepted or even praised
Justice Souter’s purportedly historical but actually inaccurate analysis of framing-era
arrest doctrine in Atwater).
341
Of course, the justices sometimes encountered the complexity of the
authentic history, but they easily evaded that complexity by simplifying the original
meaning to abstractions of “core concerns,” “first principles,” and the like. That
simplification was achieved by editing away the complexity of authentic history.
However, selective original meaning does not constitute original meaning in any
meaningful sense.
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demonstrate about Justice Scalia’s claims in Crawford. That is
what I have previously demonstrated regarding Justice
Souter’s claims about supposedly historical arrest law in
Atwater. 342 Other examples are not hard to find. 343
Thus, Crawford offers a paradigmatic illustration of the
defects of an originalist approach to criminal procedure.
Justice Scalia got the history wrong because he insisted on
treating Marian procedure as though it were merely an
aberration from the contemporary paradigm of the trial as the
search for truth.
But his claims were prochronistically
defective because Marian procedure comprised a significant
aspect of the accusatory structure of framing-era procedure.
D.

Conclusion

Originalism cannot provide valid justifications for
contemporary criminal procedure rulings because the authentic
history involves far more discontinuity than is commonly

342

See generally Davies, Atwater, supra note 2.
Fictional historical claims have taken a variety of forms. In some
instances, justices have correctly stated but then misapplied framing-era doctrine. For
example, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932-34 (1995), Justice Thomas correctly
noted that framing-era law required that an officer knock and announce when
executing a warrant for a house search; however, he ignored the fact that the commonlaw authorities consistently stated a rigid, not flexible, knock and announce
requirement, and instead endorsed a flexible standard as though it were the historical
standard. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 259, 264.
Additionally, justices have sometimes drawn on historical authorities that
simply were not on point. For example, in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-94
(1998), Justice Scalia cited English cases that pertained to hot pursuit as evidence that
an invited guest did not enjoy any protection against a warrantless police intrusion of a
house. However, the situation in Carter did not involve hot pursuit, and framing-era
law did recognize circumstances in which a guest enjoyed the same protections as a
resident of a house. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 264 n.66.
Indeed, justices sometimes even make historical claims without offering
any evidence at all. For example, in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300-02
(1999), Justice Scalia asserted that framing-era search authority would not have
recognized any distinction between authority to make a warrantless search of a parcel
of freight on a ship and of a personal handbag, but offered no historical evidence for
that rather strained claim.
More recently, in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), Justice Thomas opined that the historical evidence is too ambiguous to
provide guidance as to whether the Framers intended for a warrant to be required for a
search of a house, but cited no historical materials at all to justify the claim of
ambiguity. The historical evidence actually quite consistently indicates that the
Framers did value specific warrants as a means of controlling the officer and that,
except in emergencies, an entry of a house was unlawful unless it was made pursuant
to a valid warrant. See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 2, at 642-50; see also supra
note 326.
343
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expected. The real past is foreign. 344 As a result, there is little
likelihood that authentic framing-era law will speak coherently
to the types of issues that arise from contemporary doctrine. It
often is possible to recover the authentic original meaning of a
constitutional provision – provided one looks only to the
historical sources themselves rather than to U.S. Reports – but
what one finds in the historical sources will seldom connect up
with modern doctrine. Far too much has changed. Indeed, so
much has changed that the original meanings would not serve
contemporary society all that well even if they could be
reimplemented. 345
The bottom line is that, at least in criminal procedure,
originalism is not a sound mode of constitutional discourse. If
the claimed original meaning is derived from the official
history and the sources are made to fit, or made to seem to fit –
as they were in Crawford – originalism is merely fiction posing
as history. However, false history is entitled to no more respect
than junk science. 346 Conversely, if the authentic history is
344
Let me mention one other salient, but overlooked, way in which framingera doctrine was drastically different from modern doctrine. At the time of the
framing, “due process of law” still referred quite precisely to the requisite legal
“process” (that is, the documentary authority) for initiating a criminal prosecution:
arrest warrants (including both a written warrant “in deed” and comparable authority
to make warrantless arrests, referred to as a “warrant in law”), indictments, or
informations.
Thus, the common-law standards for warrantless arrests were
constitutionalized in the Fifth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment was addressed
solely to banning unparticularized general warrants. Moreover, “due process of law”
was strictly a standard for initiating criminal or penal proceedings (including
nonmaritime forfeitures); the term was not applied to civil matters.
Subsequently, of course, the Supreme Court appropriated “due process” for
a variety of other purposes during the late nineteenth century. Hence, when the
Supreme Court constructed modern criminal procedure doctrine in the early twentieth
century, it necessarily reassigned warrantless arrests to the Fourth Amendment, and
thus made them subject to the purported “reasonableness” standard of that
Amendment. Thus, modern doctrine has transferred the original content of “due
process of law” – including arrest standards – to the Fourth Amendment and relaxed
the standards that formed the historical content of “due process of law” to a
“reasonableness” standard, while it has also accorded a host of novel meanings to “due
process of law” that have no basis in the framing-era understanding of that term. That
is no small adjustment. See Davies, Atwater, supra note 2, at 391-96.
345
Accusatory procedure may have been adequate for a nation of relatively
small, stable, homogeneous communities; it would be far from ideal in an urbanized
nation where persons often interact as strangers.
346
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court held that a
trial judge should act as a gatekeeper to assure that expert testimony on scientific
matters is permitted only when the proffered expert’s testimony is based on “good
science” and comports with the scientific method. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the Daubert approach to
non-scientific experts). Unfortunately, there is no comparable gatekeeping regarding
the historical claims cited to or made by the Supreme Court.
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recovered, it usually doesn’t mesh with modern doctrine and
doesn’t answer the questions that arise from contemporary
procedure.
One thing that history indisputably teaches us about
constitutional criminal procedure is that the Framers of the
Bill of Rights thought the subject was important. That is why
so many clauses in the Bill of Rights address criminal
procedure. That being so, the justices owe us more than a
fictional justification when criminal procedure is at stake.

